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ABSTRACT 
Most models of recognition memory assume that familiarity results from the matching 
of stimuli to the contents of memory.  This matching process accumulates “evidence” that 
the stimulus was seen before, and when the evidence exceeds a criterion, a feeling of 
familiarity is experienced. Such models do not specify what constitutes “evidence,” and 
therefore offer limited insight into the specific attributes that make stimuli feel familiar.  In two 
experiments, this dissertation examined the type of pictorial attributes that serve as 
“evidence” for familiarity-based picture recognition.  Participants encoded briefly presented, 
masked pictures while event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded.  Of primary 
interest were ERPs for pictures that participants could not identify by name, as previous 
behavioral research suggests that such items are recognized on the basis of familiarity.  
Analysis of these encoding ERPs revealed that the global shape of subsequently recognized 
yet unidentified pictures was fully extracted during the picture’s brief presentation, but that 
their global object shapes were not successfully matched to object representations in 
memory (Exp 1 & 2).  This result indicated that the memory trace for unidentified pictures 
contained limited conceptual information, and perceptual details that were abstract rather 
than detailed/episodic.  ERPs recorded during retrieval revealed that the neural correlate of 
familiarity-based retrieval, the FN400, was present for unidentified pictures (Exp 1 & 2), and 
that the FN400 was more pronounced when participants were oriented toward processing 
perceptual, as opposed to conceptual, attributes of pictures during encoding (Exp 2).  The 
behavioral measure of familiarity was consistent was consistent with this finding, which 
together implied that the largely perceptual representations in the pictorial memory trace 
were sufficient for later recognition of the unidentified picture, and that the pictures were 
more familiar when perceptual processing was greatest at encoding.  The data presented in 
this dissertation indicate that familiarity-based picture recognition can be based on evidence 
that is largely perceptual and abstractly represented.  The results are discussed within the 
context of perirhinal cortex models of familiarity, which suggest that picture familiarity is 
based on conjunctive features represented by the perirhinal cortex within the medial 
temporal lobe. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Humanity has a long-lived fascination with its ability to remember the past.  This 
curiosity about human memory is evident upon considering that it has been a consistent 
topic of intellectual curiosity since the time of Aristotle. At its most basic, memory is the 
influence of prior experience on behavior and/or cognitive processes.  This description is 
overly simplistic, however. Up close, human memory is a vast and flexible construct, 
involving many component processes that interact in complex ways.  While the 
understanding of memory has advanced considerably since the days of Aristotle, even 
contemporary researchers struggle to unravel the layers of memory’s elaborate 
architecture. 
Some of the earliest scientific inquiries into human memory (i.e., Ebbinghaus, 
1885; Nipher, 1876, 1878) focused primarily on identifying the parameters of conscious, 
everyday memory phenomena.  Thus, it is unsurprising that the first published 
experimental study of human memory aimed to explain why, when writing a series of 
digits (e.g., serial number) from memory, the middle digits are more frequently forgotten 
than the digits at either end of the series (Nipher, 1876).   
The curiosities of everyday memory phenomena continue to inspire the science 
of human memory; the feeling of familiarity is one such example.  A feeling of familiarity 
is a vague impression of past experience with an event (or stimulus, e.g. person, place, 
object, tune; see Yonelinas, 2002).  Albeit vague, this impression can still engender 
confidence that the prior event actually took place (e.g., Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  What is 
curious about this phenomenon is that the sense of past experience may not be 
accompanied by the retrieval of any specific information about the prior event (i.e., 
recollection; Yonelinas, 2002). That is, with feelings of familiarity one may only have the 
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impression that “this was seen before,” without any specific mnemonic evidence to 
support that impression.  Consequently, familiarity provides little means of determining 
whether or not the impression of past occurrence was based on an actually experienced 
event.  For this reason, feelings of familiarity can be quite unsettling, especially when a 
decision must be based on a seemingly incomplete memory.   
The feeling of familiarity is a common experience and has been referred to in 
written texts throughout history (e.g., Hume, 1777; Jewsbury, 1828; Lyon, 1996; Russell, 
1921; Tucker, 1805).  It is fairly safe to say that when one utters the phrase, “this feels 
familiar,” it is widely understood what is meant.  Unfortunately, the origins 
(neuropsychological bases) of feelings of familiarity are not so well understood (for 
reviews, see Rugg & Curran, 2007; Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).   
The frequency with which people experience feelings of familiarity, together with 
a limited understanding of its bases, has made the nature of familiarity an active area of 
research amongst cognitive psychologists and cognitive neuropsychologists.  There is 
substantial agreement that the strength of a feeling of familiarity is related to how well a 
given stimulus matches the contents of memory (e.g., Clark & Gronlund, 1996; ; 
Mandler, 2008; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003; Yonelinas, 1994, 2001; 
Wixted, 2007b).  The degree to which the stimulus matches the contents of memory can 
also be conceptualized as the amount of “evidence” there is for the stimulus’ having 
been encountered previously.  When sufficient “evidence” is present, one will accept 
that the stimulus was, in fact, encountered (for a detailed account of what qualifies as 
sufficient, see Bröder & Schültz, 2009). 
There is general agreement that familiarity is cognitively impenetrable and, 
accordingly, the observer remains unaware of the type of “evidence” supporting the 
  3
feeling of familiarity (Lyon, 1996).  The large majority of models of familiarity are silent 
about the precise types of information that constitute (or do not constitute) “evidence.”  
Hence, regardless of whether it is known that familiarity is based on an evaluation of the 
available evidence, so long as the nature of the evidence remains unspecified, it will be 
difficult for researchers to answer the fundamental question of, “what makes something 
seem familiar?” 
Approach 
This dissertation describes the use behavioral and noninvasive neuromonitoring 
measures to investigate the nature of the “evidence” supporting familiarity-based 
memory for pictures.  As explained above, understanding the nature of the “evidence” 
supporting familiarity-based memory is essential for understanding why some previously 
encountered stimuli feel familiar while other previously encountered stimuli do not.  It is 
also important for theory, as identifying the types of evidence that can support familiarity 
may allow for the reconciliation of various classes of recognition memory models.  
Establishing types of evidence could also have more practical implications.  For 
example, familiarity-based recognition tends to be relatively inaccurate (Reder, 
Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000).  Identifying the strongest 
types of evidence may prove useful in developing strategies for reducing the inaccuracy 
of familiarity-based memory, which would be especially relevant for segments of the 
population thought to rely more on familiarity to recognize stimuli in the environment 
(e.g., older adults, amnesics). 
The general approach of the present study is to narrow the range of information 
that can serve as evidence for later familiarity-based judgments.  The logic is that 
restricting the range of potential evidence at encoding will facilitate the identification of 
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the type of evidence critical for successful familiarity-based recognition.  To restrict the 
range of potential evidence, pictures at encoding were presented briefly and masked, 
making identification of the pictures difficult.  During these brief presentations, it is 
assumed that only a subset of information inherent to a given picture will be encoded 
and stored in a memory trace.  Whether or not a picture can be identified by name 
during a given encoding trial will serve as a marker for sufficient restriction.  The range 
of potential evidence will be considered sufficiently restricted if the picture could not be 
identified. 
For such an approach to be informative, picture presentation must be brief 
enough (and masking heavy enough) to prevent identification on approximately half of 
the encoding trials.  Conversely, presentation must not be so brief that it prevents the 
extraction of any information that could aid subsequent memory.  In other words, 
pictures must be presented in a way that many of them are unidentifiable during 
encoding but also recognizable at retrieval.  Previous studies using a procedure such as 
this (Langley & Cleary, 2008; Langley, 2008) have established the appropriate timing to 
achieve balance and this timing has been adopted here (see Chapter 6 for details). 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded both during encoding and 
retrieval.  The ERPs recorded during encoding can provide vital information about the 
degree to which the unidentified pictures undergo specific stages of perceptual and 
conceptual processing.  This information can then be used to make inferences about the 
type of stimulus attributes most likely to be present in the memory trace (i.e., potential 
evidence).  Manipulations of participants’ orientation to perceptual and conceptual 
information during encoding may be able to further specify the stimulus attributes that 
are stored in the memory trace (Stenberg, Johnansson, & Rosén, 2006).  ERPs 
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recorded during retrieval can also provide crucial information about the processing 
involved in matching the test picture to the contents of memory.  By manipulating both 
(a) participants’ orientation toward perceptual or conceptual stimulus attributes during 
retrieval, and (b) the degree of perceptual matching between test picture and what was 
encoded, the nature of the evidence supporting familiarity may be further specified. 
Organization 
 Chapter 2 describes the qualitative experience of familiarity, how various models 
have characterized familiarity, and how familiarity is commonly measured behaviorally. 
Chapter 3 introduces a noninvasive neuromonitoring measure (i.e., ERPs) that has 
proven useful for indexing (in real-time) the neural activity occurring as cognitive 
processes unfold.  The advantages and disadvantages of using ERPs are also 
discussed.  Chapter 4 reviews how the ERP measure has been used to study memory, 
what has been learned, and why its use is desirable for the present study.  Chapter 5 
focuses specifically on what ERPs have revealed about the sequence of neural activities 
associated with the processing of perceptual and conceptual attributes of objects and 
pictures.  Here, it is shown how the literature concerning the neural correlates of object 
identification can speak to the perceptual and conceptual processes that occur during 
the encoding of pictures.  This knowledge is then merged with what is known about the 
perceptual and conceptual processes that occur during memory retrieval of pictures.  
Chapter 6 introduces the motivation behind Experiment 1, its methods, results and 
discussion.  Chapter 7 introduces the motivation behind Experiment 2, its methods, 
results, and discussion.  Chapter 8 is the general discussion, in which the results from 
Experiments 1 and 2 are discussed within the context of perirhinal cortex models of 
familiarity-based recognition.  
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CHAPTER 2.  FAMILIARITY 
Passages from century-old literature show that it has long been understood what 
is meant when someone states that s/he is experiencing a feeling of familiarity (e.g., 
Baldwin, 1893; Calkins, 1901).  In fact, it appears that the feeling of familiarity is largely 
unique and unmistakable.  The following quote describes, almost humorously, the 
experience of familiarity: 
“What again happens when we meet with a person who is strangely 
familiar to us.  The ‘strange’ familiarity consists in the arousal of a number 
of specific representations, many of which are recognized as incongruous 
and are rejected.  Representations rise and revolve round that percept.  
The mind tingles with cognitive anxiety, with mental throes on the eve of 
giving birth to the specific associations, resulting in final recognition.  This 
peculiar condition of subexcstimulusent of representative elements started 
by the perception of an object constitutes the state which is termed the 
sense of familiarity.  Familiarity is vague recognition, recognition not as 
yet made specific” (Sidis & Goodhart, 1904, p. 46). 
 
This description of the experience of familiarity is, more or less, in agreement with my 
own view (albeit not as dramatic as described above).  As the quote suggests, 
experiencing something as familiar can at times seem like a cruel trick of the mind.  A 
tortuously vague sense of recognition—a sensation strong enough to inspire some 
degree of confidence in prior occurrence, yet absent of the smallest recollection on 
which to justify this level of confidence.  Despite the frequent frustration that this feeling 
causes, familiarity can actually be quite useful.  In an extension of the above example, a 
sense of familiarity can inform the decisions one makes after encountering a person that 
one cannot identify or cannot “recollect” meeting.  During such an encounter, as the 
familiar individual initiates a conversation, does one: 
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a) Proceed with a smile, pretend to remember this person, and continue the 
desperate search of your memory?  Or 
b) Wait for the appropriate moment and politely ask, “Umm… Have we met?” or, 
“I’m sorry, but what was your name again?” 
If there is a strong sense of familiarity for this individual, it may pay off to feign 
remembering until something that the familiar person says triggers recollection.  If one 
has in fact met the individual, this tactic (informed by your sense of familiarity) may 
prevent embarrassment and spare the acquaintance from feeling unmemorable.  
Alternatively, if there is no inkling of familiarity for this person whatsoever, you might be 
more prone to accept the embarrassment of having to ask, “Have we met?”  After all, 
maybe this person has mistaken you for someone else and your lack of familiarity 
reflects the fact that the two of you have never met.  In either case, an assessment of 
familiarity (or lack thereof) is useful because it can guide your decisions in situations in 
which no other information is immediately available. 
On the Nature of Familiarity:  Descriptive, Statistical, and Neuroanatomical Models 
What follows is a review of descriptive models of recognition memory.  The 
purpose of this review is to provide perspective on the various ways in which the nature 
of familiarity has been described.  The experiments reported here are primarily 
concerned with recognition that is familiarity-based, and so this review does not 
describe hypotheses related to recollection specifically.  The breadth of this review is 
wide but selective, emphasizing theories proven most influential over the past three 
decades. 
Signal Detection Models.  Discriminating between previously experienced 
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events and novel events involves memory processes and a decision process.  One 
difficulty in modeling memory is determining how to distinguish between the memory 
and the decision processes.  The initial appeal of signal detection models was that they 
accounted for both the decision and the memory processes. 
As applied in memory research, signal detection theory (see Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005; Parks, 1966) assumes a response to most environmental stimuli that 
an observer encounters.  Such stimulus responses are characterized as “signals”.  The 
more experience that is gained with stimulus, the stronger the signal (or response) to it 
will be.  Thus, if an observer were to study a list of stimuli, and were later presented with 
a second series of stimuli (some old, some new), the observer should be able to 
discriminate the old stimuli from the new stimuli on the basis of their “signal strength.”  
For each stimulus, signal strength is compared to a criterion set by the individual.  When 
the signal satisfies the criterion an “old” response may be given, indicating that one 
recognizes the stimulus as studied. Such a signal could be the amount or degree of 
familiarity a participant experiences when presented with a stimulus, for example. Of 
course, some stimuli are inherently more familiar than others (regardless of their study 
status). Therefore, a variable that represents the strength of a specific test-stimulus 
must vary over a range of values. The distributions of the strength variable are separate 
for old stimuli and new stimuli, and the distance between the old and new distributions 
increases as the signal strengths of old stimuli increase.  Thus, the distance between 
the distributions can be used to quantify the degree to which one is discriminating old 
stimuli from new stimuli (also referred to as “memory strength”). 
The Atkinson and Mandler Models.  In Atkinson and colleagues’ (Atkinson & 
Juola, 1974; Atkinson, Hertmann, & Wescourt, 1974) model, familiarity reflects the 
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activation of nodes in a lexical network, with each node in the network representing a 
previously encountered word/object.  When one encounters a word/object, the 
stimulus’s node becomes temporarily more active than the other nodes, with this 
heightened activation decreasing slowly over time.  It is the assessment of the relative 
levels of activation that allows one to discriminate old from new stimuli based on 
familiarity.  Atkinson described the activation of old versus new stimuli as resulting from 
perceptual, as opposed to conceptual, stimulus attributes.  In this model, familiarity 
processes precede recollection, with recollection occurring only when familiarity is 
insufficient recognition to occur. 
Mandler’s (e.g., 1979, 1980) view of familiarity is very similar to that of Atkinson 
and colleagues, in that familiarity increases following exposure to stimuli.  Like in the 
Atkinson model, Mandler also posited that familiarity is faster acting than recollection.  
However, he departed from Atkinson with familiarity being independent of, and operating 
in parallel with, recollection.  Another difference is that the increased ‘activation’ results 
specifically from the successful integration of a stimulus’s perceptual features in 
memory, the products of which can support both explicit and implicit memory 
processes1.   
According to Mandler (1980, p. 255), “…the phenomenal experience of familiarity 
can be best assigned to a process of intrastimulus integration.  Repeated exposure of 
an event focuses organizational processes on the perceptual featural, and intrastructural 
                                            
1 An example of implicit memory can be seen during instances in which past experience improves 
performance on a task, or facilitates a cognitive process, without one being consciously aware that 
the past experience is being influential.  An example of explicit memory can be seen during instances 
in which a past experience improves performance on a task because one consciously and 
deliberately references memory for the experience with the intention of retrieving information relevant 
to the task.  In short, implicit memory operates outside of one’s intention and awareness, while 
explicit memory in most often used intentionally and the end result is always experienced 
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aspects of the event; intrastimulus organization involves sensory and perceptual 
integrations of the elements of the target event.”  In other words, the integration process 
underlying familiarity concerns the relationship between the perceptual components of a 
visual stimulus.  The more exposure one has with a particular stimulus, the more 
established the relationships among components become.  When a stimulus is 
encountered, it is matched against representations in memory.  If the representation of 
the component relations is well established, then there will likely be a greater match with 
the stimulus, which in turn yields strong stimulus familiarity. 
Mandler (1979, 2008) further argued that if such ‘perceptual familiarity’ is 
insufficient to support recognition, then additional retrieval processes are engaged which 
seek, among other things, information pertaining to the target stimulus’s identity.  
Together, familiarity and identification account for the whole of recognition in Mandler’s 
model. With respect to recollection, Mandler described an underlying process of 
experienced-based “elaboration” that works to associate a stimulus’s representation with 
other representations in memory.  This associative elaboration operates within a 
semantic (and presumably episodic) network.  As experience with a stimulus grows, the 
strength and number of semantic associations between its representation and those of 
existing representations will increase (i.e., elaboration).  The network within which these 
processes operate is searchable during retrieval attempts.  Thus, relative to a poorly 
elaborated stimuli, well elaborated stimuli will have more numerous and stronger 
connections within the network, thereby increasing the likelihood that the stimulus will be 
retrieved.  Mandler’s model also predicts that increasing amounts of time spent 
attempting to match perceptual stimulus features to feature patterns in memory leads to 
                                                                                                                                       
consciously.  These terms were first introduced by Graf and Schacter (1985). 
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a higher probability that elaborative retrieval processes will be engaged. 
Fluency.  Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Kelley & Jacoby, 1989) have argued that when recognition is not based on recollection it 
is based on the attribution of “processing fluency” (their take on familiarity).  Fluency 
refers to the ease with which one perceives and processes stimuli.  According to many 
familiarity-as-fluency hypotheses, previously encountered stimuli are more easily/fluently 
processed upon a subsequent encounter, merely due to the fact that they were 
processed before (this is also known as priming).  One might attribute the enhanced, or 
more fluent, processing to prior experience with the stimulus, and thus be more prone to 
experience a sense of familiarity or remembrance.  According to the early Jacoby model, 
such attributions may be based on the fluency elicited by either conceptual or perceptual 
priming (Kelley & Jacoby, 1989).  Like the Mandler model, familiarity/fluency in the 
Jacoby model is independent of and operates in parallel with recollection. 
The idea that attributions of any kind, fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), 
discrepancy (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000, 2001), or otherwise, can serve as the sole 
basis of explicit familiarity is a bitterly contentious idea.  With regard to fluency 
attributions, a number of recent studies have provided convincing evidence that fluency 
does contribute to recognition memory.  However, the degree to which it contributes 
depends on factors such as stimulus format or modality congruency between study and 
test (Miller, Lloyd, & Westerman, 2008; Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003), the 
expectation that test stimuli will be fluently processed (Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 
2002), and the degree to which fluency seems relevant or diagnostic for recognition 
decisions (Lloyd, Westerman, & Miller, 2003; Miller et al., 2008; Westerman et al., 2002, 
2003).  While the ephemeral nature of fluency’s contribution to recognition makes it an 
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unlikely explanation for familiarity-based recognition, the fact that it does contribute in an 
intricate way (Westerman, 2008) should not be ignored. 
Global Matching Models.  The term ‘global matching’ describes a class of 
models whose primary assumption is that recognition is based solely on familiarity 
(Clark & Gronlund, 1996).  The global matching process combines all of the information 
present at the time of the retrieval attempt into a single, conglomerate memory probe 
(CMP).  This CMP accesses a broad swatch of memory, and activates matching 
memory trace information (Clark & Gronlund, 1996).  The degree to which the CMP 
activates stored information is a function of how well the CMP and stored information 
match, or share similar attributes.  There are many global matching models, the majority 
of which are variants of the signal detection model (Clark & Gronlund, 1996).  Some of 
the more influential global matching models include the TODAM model (Murdock, 1982), 
the SAM model (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984), and MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1988).  
These models share the same basic principles, but the specifics of these models vary 
considerably.  For reviews of global matching models, see Humphreys et al. (1989) and 
Clark and Gronlund (1996). 
Moscovitch’s Model.  In Moscovitch’s (1995a, 1995b, 2000) theory of explicit 
memory, he proposes that it begins with the “conscious apprehension of a stimulus 
event” (Moscovitvch, 2000, p. 612) and proceeds to describe his theory at the level of 
the brain.  Assuming successful ‘apprehension’ takes place, Moscovitch argued that 
neurons in the neocortex that support conscious experience become part of the memory 
trace (due to binding mechanisms in the medial temporal lobe).  Thus, the memory trace 
for an event consists of a network of neurons in both the medial temporal structures and 
the neocortex, with medial temporal regions facilitating the search of information stored 
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in the neocortex.  When network reactivation occurs, both the stimulus feature 
representations and the neural elements that gave rise to the original conscious 
experience become active.  This explains why recollecting information is like ‘mental 
time travel,’ because recovering episodic information for a previous event also entails 
recovering the conscious awareness one experienced as the event unfolded.   
It is possible, however, to lose both the information regarding stimulus features 
and the information regarding the conscious experience at various points throughout the 
distributed neural network.  Loss of information can occur either from improper 
consolidation or during retrieval.  Retrieval of a relatively intact memory trace that 
includes contextual and stimulus feature details would likely yield recollection.  However, 
the retrieval of an impoverished memory trace that is lacking in spatio-temporal context 
and stimulus feature details, while still containing information related to the conscious 
experience, would likely yield only familiarity.  If the trace did not retain information 
regarding the conscious experience of the event, only implicit memory would be 
possible.  As such, Moscovitch (1992, 1993, 2000) argued for the idea that familiarity is 
functionally and anatomically distinct from priming (and semantic memory), and is 
instead dependent upon mechanisms that support explicit memory (not further 
specified).  Lastly, it is important to note that Moscovitch’s (e.g., 2000) theory is agnostic 
as to whether recollection and familiarity are fundamentally different neural processes.  
However, his proposal does allow for the subjective experience of both recollection and 
familiarity to emerge from a single memorial process and, therefore, side-steps the 
single-process dual-process debate. 
Behavioral Measures of Familiarity 
Cognitive psychology is rich with methodologies for measuring the various facets 
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of the human mind.  When it comes to recognition memory measures, there are many 
measures and each has its own merits.  Moreover, several of the more prominent 
memory measures have influenced theory over the years.  To provide perspective, 
several of the most prominent measures are described here.  Signal detection analysis 
receives the most thorough treatment because this is the measures has been adopted 
for the experiments of this dissertation.  
Signal Detection Analysis.  In a yes-no (YN) memory task (e.g., Murdock, 
1965), the presentation of a test-stimulus that was actually studied is termed a “signal 
trial,” and participants are to respond “yes” during such trials. The presentation of a test-
stimulus that was not studied is termed a “noise trial,” and participants are to respond 
“no” during these trials. When a participant responds “yes” on a signal trial, it is referred 
to as a hit. The proportion of correctly recognized stimuli is called the hit rate and this 
equals the proportion of the signal distribution that has satisfied the decision criterion set 
by the participant. Similarly, when a participant endorses an unstudied test-stimulus as 
old, it is called a false alarm, and the proportion of false alarms made, the false alarm 
rate, equals the proportion of the noise distribution that has satisfied the participant-set 
decision criterion (Bernbach, 1971). 
The hit and false alarm rates reflect two factors, response bias and the extent to 
which the signal and noise distributions overlap (i.e., sensitivity). The usefulness of 
signal detection theory stems from its ability to separate the two. Sensitivity, or d', is 
derived from the hit and false alarm rates and is a measure of the distance between the 
signal and the noise distributions. A d' value of zero indicates no discrimination between 
old and new test-stimuli, while values reliably greater than zero imply, overall, successful 
discrimination between old and new stimuli (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
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According to equal-variance signal detection, response bias does not affect 
sensitivity if two assumptions are met: (1) The signal distribution and the noise 
distribution are normal, and (2) the signal distribution and the noise distribution have the 
same standard deviation (or have equal variances). If either assumption is violated, 
sensitivity will vary with response bias and the two cannot be separated. As it turns out, 
these assumptions are suspect with respect to performance on yes/no tasks and the 
equal-variance model is not recommended for recognition memory data (Wixted, 
2007a,b).   
The preferred signal detection model is the unequal-variance model (Wixted, 
2007a,b), which allows the distribution of the old stimuli to differ from the distribution of 
the new stimuli.  Preference for the unequal-variance model is justified on the grounds 
of substantial empirical evidence and common sense.  First, meta-analyses (Glanzer et 
al., 1999; Ratcliff et al., 1992) on approximately 30 years of recognition memory receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) data have shown that the variance of the old stimulus 
distribution is significantly greater than 1.0, generally observed to be around 1.25.  This 
long and consistent history implies that the equal-variance model (which assumes an 
old stimulus variance distribution equal to 1.0) is unlikely to be correct.  Second, and as 
Wixted (2007a, p. 154) points out, it is instructive to think of old stimuli as new stimuli 
that have undergone a boost in memory strength as a function of being encoded during 
their presentation in the study-list.  If each stimulus in the study-list received an equal 
boost in memory strength after being encoding, then the variance of the old stimulus 
distribution should remain the same.  In other words, if the variance of the soon-to-be 
old stimulus distribution equaled 1.0 prior to encoding and during encoding each 
stimulus received an equivalent boost in memory strength, then the variance of the 
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distribution should not change and the unequal-variance model would hold.  However, 
such an occurrence is unlikely, to say the least.   
The boost in memory strength that each stimulus receives during encoding will 
vary across stimuli, as each stimulus possesses a somewhat unique “individuality,” 
differing along variables such as salience or ‘fluency.’  Moreover, other factors that are 
potentially unrelated to the stimuli will no doubt differ across the encoding episode—
attention, for example.  Thus, encoded stimuli receive not only a boost in memory 
strength but also a boost in variability, thereby rendering an equal-variance account 
implausible.  In using the unequal-variance model, an appropriate estimate for the 
variance of the old stimulus distribution (σold) can be determined  by calculating the 
slope (s) of the z-ROC and using the following equation: σold = 1/s (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). 
It is important to note that signal detection theory’s description of recognition 
along a single, unidimensional strength axis does not imply that recognition memory 
itself operates by a single process (Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Wixted, 2007b).  On the 
contrary, the memory strength variable can represent the joint contributions of 
recollection and familiarity.  The key assumption here is that recognition memory is most 
often a mixture of the two recognition processes rather than one or the other (Wixted, 
2007b). 
As a measure of old/new discrimination, one weakness of signal detection theory 
is that there is no way to estimate the contributions of recollection and familiarity to 
overall recognition.  Most methods whose measures attempt to calculate estimates of 
the two processes have encountered considerable obstacles (as described below).  A 
second issue, with respect to the unequal-variance model, is that the model has 
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difficulty accounting for data that are indeed characterized by a slope equal to 1 and 
equal distributions.  If merely being encountered in a study-list adds variance to the old 
item distribution, regardless of how poor later memory is, how can it explain statistically 
reliable indices of discrimination that are also characterized by old and new distributions 
of equal variance?  
Remember-Know.  Unlike the signal detection theory analysis, the remember-
know procedure is unambiguous in its assumption that the experience of recognition 
memory involves two processes.  The remember-know procedure was devised by 
Tulving (1985) as a means of differentiating between the subjective experiences of 
recollection and familiarity, and its use within the recognition memory literature has been 
prolific since the publication of seminal works in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (e.g., 
Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  The original 
premise of this procedure was simple:  Merely ask subjects to introspect on their 
subjective memorial experience.  For each test item presented, subjects are asked if 
they recognize a given test item because they “remember” encountering it during the 
encoding phase, or whether they recognize the test item because they simply “know” it 
was presented. Participants in studies using this procedure are cautioned to provide a 
remember response only if they can recollect the test item, and respond know if the item 
only seems familiar (if participants do not recollect the item, they respond “new”).   
As originally proposed, the remember-know procedure assumed that recollection 
and familiarity were dependant processes (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990).  Estimates of 
recollection and familiarity under this assumption are simply the proportion of studied 
items given a remember response, and the proportion of studied items given a know 
response, respectively.  The currently accepted assumption is that recollection and 
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familiarity are independent processes (Yonelinas, 2001; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; but 
see Malmberg, 2002, and Wixted, 2007a,b).  The means of deriving estimates of 
recollection and familiarity under the independence assumption (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995) is to calculate the proportion of remember responses (R) for estimates of 
recollection and to calculate the proportion of know responses divided by the proportion 
of responses that were not “remembered” (F = K/(1 – R)). 
Advantages of this procedure are that estimates of recollection and familiarity are 
easily derived, and that the instructions to participants are simple and intuitive.  
However, an inescapable liability of the procedure is that the measures of recollection 
and familiarity are based on participants’ subjective, qualitative assessments of their 
memories.  Experimental psychology was, in part, adopted by researchers to end the 
practice of collecting non-objective, unverifiable introspection as data on which to make 
inferences about cognition (Overgaard, 2006). 
Another possible liability is that “know” judgments may always, or on some 
occasions, reflect recognition supported by recollection (rather than recognition in the 
absence of recollection).  Supporting this possibility is a study by Wais, Mickes, and 
Wixted (2008) showing above chance source memory (which involves recollection) 
across trials on which participants responded “know.”2  Wais et al. argued that 
remember and know judgments actually reflect varying degrees of recollection.  This 
result is problematic for theories of recognition that assume the contribution of two 
                                            
2 The term source memory refers to memory for the specific contextual details related to the previous 
occurrence of a stimulus or event.  As an example, assume that one is presented with words, some 
spoke in a male voice and others spoken in a female voice.  Three hours later one is given a memory 
test for the spoken words.  On the test, one is asked whether a particular word was heard previously, 
and, if so, what gender the voice was for that specific word.  One’s memory for the gender of the 
voice would is considered source memory.  Evans and Thorn (1966) were some of the first 
researchers to examine memory for source,  but the term “source memory” was not regularly use until 
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independent processes (recollection and familiarity).  As mentioned, much of the 
empirical support for the dual-process view comes from the results of remember-know 
studies.  If Wais et al.’s claims to be believed, it would require a single-process 
interpretation of the remember-know literature, thereby reducing much of the current 
behavior data supporting the dual-process view. 
Process-Dissociation.  Jacoby (1991) devised the process-dissociation 
procedure to obtain quantitative estimates of the recollection-based and familiarity-
based components of explicit recognition.  In the original version of the procedure, 
participants initially viewed a list of words under incidental encoding instructions.  Later, 
participants heard a second list of words under intentional encoding instructions.  
Following the presentation of both lists, participants engaged in a recognition memory 
test consisting of an equal number of words from each list and new words.  In one 
testing condition, participants were to endorse a word as studied, so long as it had 
appeared in one of the two word lists (inclusion condition).  In a second testing 
condition, participants were to endorse a word as studied only if it had appeared in the 
intentionally encoded word list (exclusion condition); words that appeared in the 
incidentally encoded list were to be rejected as unstudied.  Jacoby derived the estimates 
of recollection and familiarity in accordance with the following logic:   
Assuming that recollection and familiarity are independent processes, the 
probability of endorsing an incidentally encoded word as studied under inclusion 
instructions should equal the probability of only recollecting (R) an incidentally encoded 
word plus the probability of the words only being familiar (F), minus the probability that 
the incidentally encoded word is both recollectable and familiar, P(Old) = (R + F) – (RF).  
                                                                                                                                       
approximately two decades later (e.g., Shimamura & Squire, 1987).  
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This essentially amounts to saying that one can recognize an incidentally encoded word 
in the inclusion condition if one recollects it or if one deems the word familiar. 
For incidentally encoded words in the exclusion condition, the probability of 
endorsing a word as old should equal the probability that the word is familiar minus the 
probability that the word is both recollectable and familiar P(Old) = F – RF.  Remember 
that in the exclusion condition, participants are to reject all incidentally encoded words 
as unstudied.  Therefore, participants should only endorse these words as studied if the 
words are sufficiently familiar (as a result of having been presented recently), but not 
recollectable.  Jacoby (1991) subsequently calculated the contribution of recollection to 
memory performance by subtracting exclusion from inclusion, R = ((R+F)-(RF)) – (F-
(RF)).  After solving for R, F can be derived, F = (F-(RF))/(1-R).  
The liability of this procedure is that the equations for estimating familiarity and 
recollection in this procedure are fundamentally flawed because the equation induces 
item selection effects (Russo, Cullis, & Parkin, 1998).  The flaw in the equation is most 
considerable in the estimates of familiarity.  The equations lead to familiarity estimates 
being based on exclusively nonrecollectable items, and the bias that this induces will 
increase under conditions in which items are particularly recollectable.  Levels of 
processing manipulations would achieve significant biasing in the process estimates.  
Indeed, Russo et al. observed this very pattern when introducing a levels of processing 
(size congruency) manipulation.  They also observed that the shallower the encoding 
was at study, the greater the estimates of familiarity became.  Such outcomes violate 
the procedure’s key assumption of the processes being independent. 
On the Role Perceptual vs. Conceptual Processing in Dual-Process Recognition 
Early research on the dual-process approach to recognition memory suggested 
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that conceptually driven processes supported an effortful, elaborative recollection-based 
memory, whereas implicit-like perceptually-based processes supported automatic 
familiarity-based memory (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1979, 1980; Tulving, 
1985; Whittlesea, 1993).  Departure from this view has come about for three reasons:  
First, subsequent studies (e.g., Wagner, Gabrieli, & Verfaellie, 1997) have shown clear 
dissociations between the familiarity associated with explicit recognition and familiarity 
associated with implicit manifestations of memory.  Second, several studies imply a 
substantial role of perceptual and conceptual processing in explicit familiarity-based 
recognition (e.g., Ally & Budson, 2007; Boldini, Algarabel, Ibañez, & Bajo, 2008; Boldini, 
Russo, Punia, & Avons, 2007; Ecker & Zimmer, 2009; Ecker, Zimmer, & Groh-Bordin, 
2007; Groh-Bordin, Zimmer, & Ecker, 2006; Grove & Wilding, in press; Schloerscheidt & 
Rugg, 2004; Stenberg et al., 2006; Wagner & Gabrieli, 1998).  Third, a line of research 
demonstrates quite well that recollection is fairly sensitive to changes in the perceptual 
characteristics of pictorial stimuli between study and test (e.g., Ally & Budson, 2007; 
Gardiner, Gregg, Marshru & Thaman, 2001; Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni & 
Gregg, 2005; Rajaram, 1996; Verfaellie, Cook & Keane, 2003; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995).  More specifically, research demonstrating the role of recollection in picture 
memory has centered on what are known as perceptual matching effects.  A perceptual 
match occurs when a stimulus is in no way altered in terms of its sensory features 
between study and test.  For example, a robust finding in research on recognition 
memory is that when there is not a perceptual match between a stimulus’s study and 
test presentations, recognition memory performance declines.  As a testament to its 
pervasiveness, perceptual matching effects in recognition memory have been shown to 
occur for both verbal stimuli (e.g., Reder, Dinavos, & Erickson, 2002) and pictorial 
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stimuli (e.g., Snodgrass, Hirshman, & Fan, 1996).  However, in some regards the 
research on perceptual matching effects has brought about more questions than it has 
answered. 
This dissertation is concerned with the contributions of perceptual and 
conceptual processing to familiarity-based recognition, and studies of perceptual 
matching effects in recognition have been somewhat informative on this matter.  Of the 
perceptual matching effects that occur within modality (e.g., visual) and within a single 
visual form (e.g. pictures alone as opposed to pictures being changed to words), the 
most widely examined matching effect in recognition memory is probably the size 
congruency effect (which is a benefit to recognition memory when study and test 
pictures are the same size (see Jolicoeur, 1987).  In what follows, I describe some of the 
research on the size congruency effect to illustrate the point that to-date the relative 
contributions of perceptual and conceptual processes to both recollection and familiarity 
are far from well defined. 
Among researchers who have examined pictorial size congruency effects from a 
dual-process perspective, most have searched for differential effects of size congruency 
on remember and know judgments.  In these studies, declines in the accuracy of 
recognition, as seen in remember responses, would imply a sensitivity of recollection to 
perceptual information.  Declines in the accuracy of recognition, as seen in know 
responses, would imply a sensitivity of familiarity to perceptual information.  Many 
studies have shown size congruency effects in remember judgments (Gardiner, Gregg, 
Marshru & Thaman, 2001; Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni & Gregg, 2005; Rajaram, 
1996; Verfaellie, Cook & Keane, 2003; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  If one accepts the 
idea that remember responses primarily reflect the contribution of recollection and know 
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responses primarily reflect the contribution of familiarity (for compelling data against this 
idea, see Wais et al., 2008), it would appear that such studies support the idea that 
recollection is sensitive to perceptual manipulations.  The question that remains is 
whether familiarity is also sensitive to size congruency and perceptual matching effects.   
Indeed, some evidence does suggest that familiarity-based picture recognition 
may also show size congruency effects.  In their Experiment 2, Yonelinas and Jacoby 
(1995) initially found size congruency effects reflected only in remember responses.  
They argued that this observation was an artifact resulting from a theoretical assumption 
of the Remember/Know procedure, namely that the memorial processes underlying 
remember and know responses (recollection and familiarity, respectively) are 
dependent.  However, when the assumption of independence between remember and 
know responses was adopted, wherein the proportion of know responses were divided 
only by the proportion of the responses that are not remember responses, a size 
congruency effect was observed in remember and know responses.  This finding was in 
agreement with the results of Yonelinas and Jacoby’s Experiment 1 (a process-
dissociation experiment) that was also suggestive of a familiarity-based size congruency 
effect.   
For reasons not initially obvious, however, other studies of size congruency (e.g., 
Verfaellie et al., 2003) that have used Yonelinas and Jacoby’s (1995) independence 
Remember/Know procedure have failed to find a size congruency effect for know 
responses (but see p. 110 of Verfaellie et al. for speculation as to why).  Specifically, 
Verfaellie et al. failed to find size congruency effects in amnesic patients.  Many studies 
have shown that certain types of amnesia are characterized by impairments of 
recollection primarily (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 1999).  Thus, if amnesic patients’ explicit 
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recognition operates primarily on familiarity processes, then the fact that the amnesic 
patients failed to show any manifestation of size congruency effects suggests that size 
congruency is in fact a recollection-based effect.  Such inconsistencies in the literature 
cast doubt on the idea that familiarity is capable of supporting size congruency effects 
and matching effects in general.   
Complicating the picture even further is a study by Gardiner et al. (2001) wherein 
size congruency effects were only in remember responses under some conditions and 
in know responses under other conditions.  In the first of two experiments, Gardiner et 
al. had participants study a series of line drawings under divided or full attention 
conditions.  During test, participants made old/new judgments for each test stimulus.  
For those stimuli given old judgments, participants were asked to indicate, subjectively, 
the source of their memory (i.e., recollection or familiarity) using remember or know 
responses, respectively.  Interestingly, Gardiner et al. reported that full attention at 
encoding produced size congruency effects that were reflected in remember responses 
only, a finding that replicates Rajaram (1996).  In contrast, divided attention at encoding 
(or impoverished encoding condition) produced size congruency effects that were 
reflected in only know responses. 
So, like Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995), Gardiner et al. found evidence suggesting 
that familiarity can support size congruency effects.  However, unlike Yonelinas and 
Jacoby, Gardiner et al. did not observe that recollection-based and familiarity-based 
congruency effects occur under the same conditions.  Gardiner et al. had posited that 
impoverished encoding conditions would lead to recognition based largely on familiarity 
and less on recollection.  This idea stemmed from prior work (Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; 
also see Gardiner & Gregg, 1997) suggesting that when rapidly presented stimuli are 
  25
used to create impoverished encoding conditions, subsequent recognition is based 
primarily on stimulus familiarity.  The idea that impoverished study conditions might lead 
to recognition based primarily on familiarity is an idea that, if true, might have significant 
implications for the study of familiarity in the absence of recollection. 
The size congruency studies just described all used the remember-know 
procedure to separate recollection from familiarity, yet there is little agreement among 
their results.  One explanation for this may be that “remember” and “know” judgments do 
not actually reflect recollection and familiarity, but rather varying degrees of recollection.  
If true, the contribution of recollection to “know” judgments could explain why in some 
conditions size congruency effects are observed in both remember and know judgments 
(e.g., Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995) or remember judgments alone (Gardiner et al., 2005) 
in other conditions.   
Nevertheless, it seems clear that perceptual matching manipulations (such size 
congruency) can be used to influence the role of perceptual and conceptual processing 
in recognition memory.  It has also been shown that demands of the memory task may 
influence the degree to which perceptual and conceptual information contributes to 
recognition.  For example, Stenberg et al. (2006) have shown that factors such as 
retrieval instructions can influence the degree to which participants rely on perceptual 
and conceptual information.  With an inclusion/exclusion manipulation, Stenberg et al. 
showed that participants tended to rely more on perceptual information under exclusion 
instructions and more on conceptual information under inclusion instructions.  It seems 
plausible that task demands could also affect the degree to which participants rely on 
perceptual and conceptual information.  Might task demand be partially responsible for 
the discrepancies found between the aforementioned size congruency studies? 
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As mentioned, Gardiner et al. (2001) also reported size congruency effects 
exclusively in know judgments when participants were subjected to divided attention at 
encoding, whereas size congruency effects were found exclusively for remember 
responses under full attention conditions at encoding.  If dividing participants’ attention 
during encoding makes perceptual information less useful, accessible, or reliable during 
familiarity-based retrieval, then participants may rely more on conceptual information, 
leading one to predict greater effects of perceptual mismatching.  This seems plausible 
given the rich conceptual/semantic processing that pictures receive relative to words 
(Paivio & Csapo, 1973).  This idea is also consistent with Mandler’s (1980, 2008) 
description of the integration process that underlies familiarity.  Mandler argued that the 
strength of familiarity increases as a function of the degree of stimulus integration, which 
itself increases with the quality of encoding (e.g., repetition).  If encoding is 
impoverished, then stimulus integration should be fairly weak.  As a consequence, the 
degree of perceptual match between encoding and retrieval stimulus instantiations 
would be poor, which may lead to a reliance on conceptual processing.  Unfortunately, 
Mandler’s model is in fact silent on how conceptually/semantically based familiarity 
might operate. 
Chapter 2 Summary 
 Within the last 35 years of behavioral research, the familiarity process has been 
described as (a) an increase in activation of a preexisting representation (e.g., Atkinson 
& Juola, 1973), (b) an increase in activation of a perceptual representation constructed 
through a process of intraitem integration (e.g., Mandler, 1980), (c) perceptual or (d) 
conceptual fluency (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), (e) an increase in activation of any 
representations across the entire memory network that match the stimulus (e.g., 
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Hintzman, 1988), (f) signal strength (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) or strength of a 
particular memory trace (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001), and (g) the reactivation of neocortical 
neurons representing only the conscious experience of a prior event (e.g., Moscovitch, 
2000).  Researchers generally agreed that familiarity is a fast-acting process, and there 
is more or less agreement that familiarity can be characterized as an increase of 
activation of some type of stored information. Familiarity may also solely support 
recognition (Hintzman, 1988), or it may operate in parallel with and independently of 
recollection (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001).  Familiarity may be an attribution of priming (Kelley 
& Jacoby, 1989), or it may be functionally and anatomically distinguishable from priming 
and semantic memory.  
 Clearly, the characterization of familiarity and the neural network that supports it 
is not yet complete.  Moreover, there is some cause for concern regarding the methods 
of estimating the contributions of recollection and familiarity to overall recognition 
memory performance. Lack of consensus on how to characterize familiarity and 
problematic process estimation procedures make interpreting the behavioral literature 
difficult.  Questions regarding the role of perceptual and conceptual information in 
familiarity also remain to be addressed.  The experiments presented here use an 
alternative procedure for assessing familiarity-based recognition, while also collecting 
physiological data that may aid in corroborating the behavioral results obtained.  
Chapter 3 describes the method and procedure for collecting the ERP data, and also 
describes some considerations in interpreting these data. 
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CHAPTER 3.  ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 
An active topic in human memory research concerns the identification of the 
neural mechanisms that govern many aspects of human behavior.  Many technologies 
now exist for assessing the relationship of a given brain region or neural response with a 
particular memory phenomenon.  Such methods range from those capable of imaging 
areas of the brain that are highly active during memory encoding or retrieval, like 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to those capable of temporarily 
modulating the neuronal activity in specific areas of the cortex, like repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS).  The methodology of the experiments 
described in this dissertation involve ERP, recording the spatial distribution and 
temporal dynamics of participants’ neural activity occurring as memory-related cognitive 
processes unfold.  The following will explain in detail (a) electroencephalography and 
the ERP technique, (b) considerations for interpreting the resultant data, and (c) why the 
technique is desirable for the research undertaken in this dissertation.  
The Electroencephalograph 
An electroencephalograph is an instrument that uses small electrodes, placed on 
the scalp, to record the electrical activity of the brain (i.e., electroencephalogram (EEG) 
see Figure 1).  The neural origin of said activity (that is recordable at the scalp) is the 
sum of postsynaptic potentials from a large population of neurons (thousands to 
millions).  The postsynaptic potentials, themselves, originate from the binding of 
neurotransmitters to receptors on the membrane of postsynaptic neurons (Fabiani, 
Gratton, & Coles, 2000).  Binding causes the neuron’s ion channels to open/close, 
leading to changes in the electric potential on the postsynaptic cell surface (Luck, 2005).  
In turn, postsynaptic potentials generate minute electrical fields that vary in voltage 
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across time. 
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Figure 1. A vintage photograph of an early ERP system. 
 
Because postsynaptic electrical fields are extremely weak by the time they reach 
the scalp (currents weaken as they spread), they must be amplified (x103 - 106) as they 
are recorded (Davidson, Jackson, & Larson, 2000).  Postsynaptic potentials reach the 
scalp because the tissue between the scalp and the given neuronal population (neural 
generator) serves as a volume conductor (Fabiani et al., 2000).  Not all neuronal activity 
reaches the scalp, however. For example, activity produced by a single neuron (or a 
small group of neurons) will not generally reach the scalp.  Rather, the summed activity 
of a large neuronal population is usually sufficient in producing a level of activity 
detectable in the EEG.  Criteria additional to the summation of neural activity are that 
individual neurons of a given population must (a) have synchronous activation and (b) 
be oriented such that their activity summates at the same region of the scalp (Fabiani et 
al., 2000).  Therefore, only brain structures with particular spatial organizations can 
generate activity detectable at the scalp.  But even brain structures with this type of 
organization are not guaranteed to elicit activity that can be detected at the scalp. 
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Figure 2.  Event-Related Potential Technique. 
 
 
The Event-Related Potential (ERP) 
ERP is brain activity that occurs “in preparation for, or in response to, discrete 
events, be they internal or external to the subject” (Fabiani et al., 2000, p. 53).  In other 
words, the ERP is a component of the larger EEG oscillation, but represents only that 
portion of the EEG that is elicited relative to a specified event in time.  A common 
method of extracting ERPs from an EEG is to average sections of the EEG that maintain 
a constant temporal relationship with repeated occurrences of the specified event (see 
Figure 2).  The logic for this method is as follows:  EEG components not time-locked to 
the event of interest vary randomly across samples (assumed), and such random 
potentials will average out over samples leaving behind only the ERPs of each sample 
(Fabiani et al.).  When examining the effects of experimental variables, 30-100 samples 
(trials) are generally recommended when averaging—although this number varies 
across discipline and is highly dependent upon the EEG signal in question, the number 
of other EEG signals present, the signal-to-noise ratio, and the degree to which artifacts 
are present in the data (Luck, 2005). 
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Figure 3. Approximate electrode location and distribution across scalp for the EEGs recorded in the 
experiments reported in this dissertation.  Electrode Cz served as a reference during recoding, and 
electrode Afz served as the ground electrode. 
 
It is tempting to conceptualize an ERP waveform merely as the brain activity 
measured at a particular scalp site (See Figure 3).  The EEG/ERP waveform actually 
reflects the difference between the voltage recorded at a specific electrode and the 
voltage at the reference electrode (the electrode(s) to which all other electrodes are 
compared).  Conceptually, the reference electrode would index an electrically neutral 
location on the scalp.  Unfortunately, no such electrically inactive site exists on the body.  
One method (of many) for circumventing this reference problem is to use a common 
average reference (used in this dissertation).  Using a common average reference 
involves averaging the voltage across all electrodes as a reference to examine the 
activity at a given electrode (Davidson et al., 2000).  The assumption here is that the 
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positive/negative variation in voltage across the head will average to zero (Davidson et 
al., 2000).  This assumption is the most likely to hold when using moderate to high-
density systems (> 32 electrodes) that maintain a reasonably even distribution of 
electrodes over the head (for other referencing methods, see Luck, 2005).  The common 
average reference method is an accepted approach and appropriate under a variety of 
experimental conditions and only when moderate to high-density systems are used 
(Picton et al., 2000). 
It is also tempting to conceptualize ERPs simply by the characteristics of their 
voltage deflections (peaks and troughs).  However, the voltage deflections are most 
typically the expression of many summed latent components.  The latent components 
are difficult to ascertain from a visual inspection of an ERP waveform because smaller 
latent components may have occurred simultaneously, summating at the same region of 
the scalp to contribute to the shape of the ERP.  Thus, one important task involved in 
assessing an ERP waveform is approximating the number of components that may be 
contributing in a significant way to a particular ERP, which itself is a product of many 
averaged samples (Hillyard & Kutas, 1983).   
Quantifying ERPs   
Electrophysiologists have developed statistical techniques over the years that aid 
researchers in identifying latent components in ERP waveforms (Hillyard, 2009).  The 
majority of these techniques are correlation-sensitive, meaning that they identify 
components based on the correlational structure of ERP data.  More specifically, these 
techniques derive ERP components by grouping time points that vary in a correlated 
way (Luck, 2005).   
Researchers can assess and interpret ERP and ERP component differences on 
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several distinct dimensions.  For example, the amplitude of a particular component can 
imply the degree of neural activation and a component’s functional response to a 
particular variable (Friedman & Johnson, 2000).  The latency of a component implies the 
timing of neural activation, while the scalp distribution (or scalp topography) of ERP data 
implies an overall pattern of brain activity (Friedman & Johnson); ERP components are 
typically differentiated by their latency and scalp topography (Curran, Tepe, & Piatt, 
2006).  The specifics of how waveforms are differentiated, how components are 
identified, and how quantitative and qualitative differences are assessed statistically are 
described in Chapter 6.   
When only ERP magnitudes differ between conditions, researchers generally 
consider the differences to be quantitative, and interpret them as reflecting a common 
neural generator at different levels of engagement (Allan, Robb, & Rugg, 2000).  When 
ERPs differ only with respect to scalp distribution (or electrode location), researchers 
generally consider the differences to be qualitative, and interpret them as reflecting 
distinct neural generators, or different levels of engagement of the same generator 
(Allan et al., 2000).  Whereas quantitative differences involve comparing conditions and 
effects at the same electrode(s), qualitative differences involve comparing conditions 
and effects across individual electrodes or groups of electrodes. 
The Advantages/Disadvantages of ERPs 
The practical advantages of ERPs are that the measurement of neural activity is 
a) noninvasive and b) inexpensive relative to other neuroimaging techniques.  The 
principal advantage of ERPs, however, is the capacity to index the neural correlates of 
cognition in “real-time” (Wilding, 2001).  Whereas with hemodynamic methods the 
temporal resolution can range between 3 and 5 seconds (e.g., fMRI) to ~30 and 60 
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sseconds (e.g., PET), with ERP the neural response can be measured on the order of 
milliseconds (Friedman & Johnson, 2000). This makes ERP particularly well suited for 
the study of human memory because most memory processes occur within the first 
second of stimulus processing.  ERPs also provide researchers with a means of 
separating early memory processes with similar time courses, a task that has proven 
difficult for other neuroimaging techniques. 
 There are also advantages of ERP over purely behavior measures.  For 
example, reaction time (RT) and accuracy, which are fundamental measures of 
behavior, are overt responses and may therefore be ambiguous with respect to a 
specific cognitive operation (Luck, 2005).  ERPs, however, are continuous measures of 
neural activity that are time-locked to the stimulus or the response.  It is therefore 
possible to identify the specific stage in processing that a given variable has its effect.  
As a second example, ERP allows for the measurement of neural activity when no 
behavioral response is required (Luck, 2005).  For instance, in memory experiments 
participants often encode to-be-remembered stimuli passively—that is, the only task that 
participants must perform is attending to the stimuli.  In such a behavioral experiment 
there is no data collection during encoding.  In an ERP study, the electrophysiological 
responses for each stimulus are recorded and thereby available for subsequent 
analysis. 
 Lastly, participants’ electrophysiological responses to stimuli can often be 
conditionalized on the basis of stimulus properties (e.g., whether it is a word or a picture, 
or whether it has been seen before within the context of the experiment).  However, they 
can also be conditionalized on the basis of participants’ behavioral responses to the 
stimuli (e.g., whether it was correctly identified, or whether it was correctly recognized as 
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seen before).  Consequentially, the greater the variety of behavioral responses one 
collects from participants, the greater the flexibility one has in analyzing and interpreting 
the electrophysiological data within an information-processing framework (Picton et al., 
2005).  
 The principal disadvantage to ERP is that one cannot unequivocally determine 
the location of the neural generators that yielded the activity recorded on the scalp; thus, 
only limited inferences can be made about the likely brain structures responsible for the 
cognitive processes reflected by ERP.  However, recent efforts in this domain have 
produced source-localization models that seem to generate source-estimates that are 
fairly consistent with estimates from PET and fMRI.  So, although ERP itself will remain 
poor in terms of its spatial resolution, it may be possible in some instances to derive 
reasonably accurate estimates of neural generator source with source-modeling 
programs such as sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002).  
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CHAPTER 4: ERPs IN RECOGNITION MEMORY 
 It is fair to say that the majority of ERP studies of recognition memory assume a 
dual-process framework (e.g., Curran, 2000; Düzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & 
Tulving, 1997; Friedman, 2004; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg et al., 1998; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  Thus, most studies focus on specific ERP 
components associated with either recollection or familiarity to make inferences about 
these cognitive processes.  As will be discussed in the following sections, it appears that 
there are unique ERP signatures for recollection and familiarity during both intentional 
memory encoding and during memory retrieval. 
Encoding 
A large body of evidence provides support for the idea that recollection and 
familiarity arise from dissociable neural substrates (see Aggleton & Brown, 2006; Rugg 
& Curran, 2007).  While the studies supporting this view consist primarily of data 
collected during retrieval, a reasonable question to ask is whether neural mechanisms 
operating during encoding may partially constrain the series of processing stages (and 
processing mechanisms) that operate during retrieval.  If so, the neurological activity 
during encoding may partially determine the phenomenological experience of 
remembering as well as what one remembers.  This possibility raises questions as to 
whether there are dissociable neural substrates active during encoding that are, 
themselves, uniquely determinate of later memory.  Additional questions are what 
initiates activity in one neural substrate over the other and to what degree various 
encoding tasks and encoding strategies influence subsequent memory? 
Differences in subsequent memory (Dm): a neural correlate of memory encoding.  
With increasing frequency, cognitive neuroscientists are addressing questions 
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regarding the neural correlates of encoding with the intent to remember.  Many of the 
researchers employ the ERP methodology for the advantages listed at the onset of this 
chapter and in Chapter 2 (Groh-Bordin, Busch, Herrmann, & Zimmer, 2007; Guo, Zhu, 
Ding, & Fan, 2003, 2004; Schweinberger & Sommer, 1991; Williamon & Egner, 2004).  
More specifically, neuroscientists often address questions regarding the neural 
correlates of encoding by studying “differences in subsequent memory” (Dm; Paller, 
Kutas, Shimamura, & Squire, 1987), otherwise known as “subsequent memory effects”  
(Rugg, 1995).  To study these effects, researchers record EEG while participants 
encode a given number of stimuli.  While not always the case, encoding is typically 
passive, with instructions to the observers being only to remember the stimuli for a later 
memory test. The portion of the EEG corresponding to the duration between stimulus 
onset and offset (called the EEG epoch) is segregated such that there is a time-locked 
epoch (generally not exceeding ~2 seconds) for each encoded stimulus.  These EEG 
samples are then segregated once more on the basis of whether or not the 
corresponding stimuli were remembered during a memory test (as indicated by 
participants’ behavioral responses during test).  This separation of ERP samples 
enables researchers to compare neural activity at encoding that is correlated with 
subsequent memory to neural activity at encoding that is associated with subsequent 
forgetting. 
The general finding is that between 400 -1100 ms post-stimulus, subsequently 
recognized stimuli are associated with more positive-going ERPs during encoding than 
are subsequently unrecognized stimuli (Figure 4), and this differences is observed along 
midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz; see Figure 3).  Although this effect is for the most part 
bilaterally distributed, the magnitude of the Dm effect is greatest over the left 
  38
hemisphere for verbal stimuli and greatest over the right hemisphere for pictorial stimuli 
(Friedman & Sutton, 1987).  
 
 
Figure 4.  Difference in Subsequent Memory Effect (Dm effect). Figure modified from Johnson & 
Friedman (2000). 
 
 
Significance of Dm effects.  Compelling support for the implicit-explicit 
distinction in Dm effects stems from a recent study (Schott, Richardson-Klavehn, 
Heinze, & Düzel, 2002) in which levels of processing were manipulated (deep vs. 
shallow).  Using this levels of processing task at encoding and a joint word-stem 
completion task/yes-no recognition task at test, the researchers were able to clearly 
separate the effects of implicit memory from the effects of explicit remembering.   The 
general procedure was as follows: During encoding, a cue preceded each target word 
and it indicated whether participants were to rate the pleasantness (deep; semantic 
task) or count the syllables (shallow; phonemic task) of the target word.  Experimenters 
explicitly instructed the participants not to memorize the words because it would 
interfere with the rating task.  During the test, participants were to complete word-stems 
with words from the prior list when possible, and with the first word that came to mind 
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otherwise (inclusion instructions).  Participants then gave a yes-no judgment as to 
whether they had completed the stem with a word from the prior list.   
The logic behind this design was as follows: First, prior work (e.g., Craik, 
Moscovitch, & McDowd 1994) has suggested that phonemic and semantic encoding 
yield equivalent priming effects and therefore should not lead to differences in word-
stem completion performance.  The same body of research also showed that explicit 
memory does differ between phonemic and semantic encoding (semantic > phonemic); 
thus, such a manipulation should affect explicit remembering but not priming.  Second, 
the perceptual representation system (PRS) (a) operates during both perceptual and 
lexical levels of processing, and (b) temporally precedes conceptual levels of processing 
(which code to semantic and episodic memory systems); thus, ERP priming effects 
should be observed at an earlier latency than explicit remembering effects.  Also, 
because phonemic and semantic encoding are known to elicit similar levels of 
perceptual and lexical processing, and differ only in the level of conceptual processing 
(Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998), Dm effects for remembering items should be 
based more heavily on activity differences in neural populations associated with 
conceptual processing than should Dm effects for priming.  Thus, the levels of 
processing manipulation should reveal Dm effects that differ both temporally and 
topographically. 
The results of Schott et al.’s (2002) study justified their logic.  Dm effects for 
words subsequently used to complete the stem via priming emerged around 200 ms and 
peaked at ~400 ms at midline and parietal electrodes, and (as predicted) there was no 
effect of the size congruency manipulation on the ERPs for primed words.  There was a 
Dm x size congruency x Electrode interaction for remembered words at parietal 
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electrodes in the 600-800 ms window (Figure 5a).  On the one hand, the Dm effect 
occurred over left posterior sites in the phonemic encoding condition only.  On the other 
hand, the size congruency effect occurred from 600 ms to the end of the epoch and at 
fronto-central site (more positive for deep than shallow).  With regard to contrasts of the  
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Dm effects in implicit (panel B) and explicit (panel A) memory.  Figure taken from Schott et 
al. (2002). 
 
implicit and explicit Dm effects, the Dm effects did in fact differ temporally (onset 
between 200-400 ms vs. at 600 ms, respectively) and topographically (midline to 
parietal vs. left-lateralized posterior, respectively; Figure 5).   
The Dm effect in explicit memory may be related to semantic processing, as the 
effect is often times absent for abstract visual stimuli and inherently meaningless visual 
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symbols, and reduced in amplitude with decreasing levels of associative and elaborative 
processing (Wagner, Koustaal, & Schacter, 1999).  Some also speculate that the Dm 
effect may be predictive of subsequent recollection-based recognition, as the amplitude 
has been observed to decline with decreasing levels of retrieved episodic detail 
(Friedman & Trott, 2000; Mangles et al., 2000-unpublished).  In further support of this 
idea, the Dm effect is sometimes absent for memory with no contextual retrieval (i.e., 
familiarity as indexed by “know” responses in the remember-know paradigm; Friedman 
& Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007). 
Although the centro-parietal Dm effect appears not to emerge for acontextual 
memory, one unpublished report (Mangles et al., 2000) described a second Dm effect 
observed over the inferior left temporal scalp region (electrode T7) that did not decrease 
in amplitude with lesser amounts of retrieved context (recalled = “remembered” = 
“known”).  One interpretation of this observation is that this left temporal Dm effect may 
be predictive of subsequent memory based on familiarity.  Unfortunately, there seems to 
have been no further investigation into this possibility.  Future work in this arena should 
explore this possibility. 
Retrieval 
 As mentioned at the outset of the previous section, most recognition memory 
ERP studies examine retrieval processes and do so by recording EEG when 
participants are attempting to discriminate between studied and unstudied stimuli.  
These studies examine retrieval processes by isolating ERP “old/new effects” (e.g., 
Warren, 1980). Old/new effects are seen as differences across time in ERP waveforms 
elicited by repeated (old) versus novel (new) stimuli, with more positive-going 
waveforms for old than new stimuli being most typical. 
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 The vast majority of studies interpret this retrieval related neural activity within a 
dual-process framework (see Rugg & Curran, 2007).  From this perspective, recognition 
is supported by a recollection, familiarity, or some combination of the two.  While there 
are various takes on the dual-process framework, there is general agreement that single 
stimulus recognition can be supported by familiarity alone (although it does not have to 
be), while associative recognition requires a more detail-rich recollection process.    
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Figure 6. The Mid-Frontal Old/New Effect (FN400).  The solid-line waveform corresponds to new 
items that were correctly rejected, whereas the dashed-line waveform corresponds to old items that 
were correctly recognized (hits). 
 
 
Old/New Effects: A Neural Correlate of Successful Memory Retrieval 
Two of the most widely reported ERP components in the recognition memory 
literature are the FN400 (e.g., Curran, 2000), held as a correlate of familiarity (e.g., 
Curran, 2000, 2004), and the parietal old/new effect (e.g., Curran, 2000; Rugg et al., 
1998), which is thought to be a correlate of recollection (for a review, see Curran, Tepe, 
& Piatt, 2006).  It is important to note some also refer to the FN400 as the mid-frontal 
old/new effect (see Figure 6, Rugg et al., 1998).  The following discussion will outline (a) 
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the characteristics of these ERP components and (b) the degree to which the published 
research supports the claim that the FN400 and the old/new parietal effects reflect the 
neural correlates of familiarity and recollection, respectively. 
The FN400.  The FN400 is characterized by more positive ERPs to old stimuli 
than to new stimuli over anterior, superior regions (old>new), and with reversed polarity 
(new>old) over posterior, inferior regions between 300-500 ms post-stimulus.  This 
modulation generally peaks between 400-450 ms post-stimulus and is greatest in 
magnitude at medial-frontal to fronto-polar sites.  Assuming an averaged-reference 
transformation, this modulation can be verified statistically with a condition (e.g., old, 
new) by region interaction (e.g., anterior, posterior; Curran, 2000, p. 926-927). 
Düzel et al. (1997) and Rugg et al. (1998) were two of the first studies to suggest 
that the FN400 may be a neural correlate of familiarity.  In the Düzel et al. study, they 
reported distinct scalp topographies with unique time courses for recognition judgments 
accompanied by “remember” responses versus “know” responses.  Know responses, 
which studies link to familiarity-based recognition in the behavioral literature, were 
associated with the occurrence of the FN400, whereas remember responses (linked to 
recollection + familiarity) were associated with both the FN400 and the parietal old/new 
effect.  In the Rugg et al. study, the authors observed a mid-frontal old/new effect that 
was not affected by depth of processing at encoding (deep vs. shallow), a finding that is 
consistent with the familiarity hypothesis because familiarity is less sensitive to levels of 
processing manipulations than is recollection.  As in the Düzel et al. study, the mid-
frontal old/new effect observed by Rugg et al. dissociated both temporally and 
topographically from the parietal old/new effect. 
Many subsequent studies have approached the investigation of the FN400 in 
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much the same way as the two aforementioned studies. That is, they sought to 
manipulate variables with well documented behavioral effects on recollection and 
familiarity and then examined whether the putative familiarity correlate was modulated in 
a consistent way. The behavioral literature indicates that familiarity is for the most part 
insensitive to perceptual mismatching (see Yonelinas, 2002), and has therefore been 
described as “amodal.”   
A popular variable to manipulate in ERP studies of the FN400 has been the 
degree to which the stimuli match between their study and test presentations.  Thus, the 
common prediction is that the FN400 should be affected very little, if at all, by changes 
to study-test perceptual mismatching.  In general, this is what has been shown.  For 
example, Curran (2000) found similar effects between matching test words and plurality-
changed words (PAPER vs. PAPERS).  Curran and Cleary (2003) observed similar 
effects between matching and mirror reversed line-drawings.  As Mecklinger (2006) 
pointed out in his review of ERP measures of familiarity, the fact that changes in 
perceptual/surface features (Curran et al.) and modality (Curran & Dien, 2003; Nessler 
et al.) yielded similar ERPs to the ERPs of perceptually-matching stimuli suggests that 
the familiarity does not operate in only the perceptual domain.  Rather, it suggests 
familiarity processes operate amodally and therefore necessarily includes processing in 
the conceptual-semantic domain. 
Although there is to date a strong case for the FN400’s connection to familiarity-
based recognition memory, a small body of research raises valid concerns about the 
validity of such claims.  The strongest of these concerns is voiced by Paller and 
colleagues (e.g., Paller, Voss, and Boehm, 2007; Yovel & Paller, 2004) who argue that 
the majority of FN400 research has not successfully ruled out the possibility that the 
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FN400 is actually a correlate of conceptual priming rather than a correlate of familiarity.  
For example, they note that familiarity and conceptual priming behave similarly to 
manipulations of study-test perceptual mismatching (e.g., Curran, 2000; Curran & 
Cleary, 2003), depth of encoding (Rugg et al., 1998), confidence (Curran, 2004), divided 
attention (Curran, 2004), and aging (Trott, Friedman, Ritter, Fabiani, & Snodgrass, 
1999).   
While the aforementioned variables constitute the majority of those used in 
FN400 research, there are studies to which the conceptual priming argument does not 
apply.  As an example, two separate studies have used stimuli with no inherent meaning 
(geometric shapes, Curran et al., 2002; unfamiliar faces, Johansson et al., 2004) and 
still report an FN400 effect.  Without preexisting and distinct conceptual representations 
for the individual experimental stimuli, it is difficult to see how the pattern of neural 
activity characteristic of the FN400 could be attributed to conceptual processing. 
However, stronger evidence of this familiarity-effect’s distinction from conceptual 
priming would be the demonstration their dissociation, which Groh-Bordin et al. (2005) 
have reported.  In their study, participants performed an implicit memory task (living/non-
living decision) and a separate explicit memory task with figural stimuli.  In the implicit 
task, repetitions of both the identical stimuli and mirror-reversed stimuli showed 
equivalent priming in the form of a broad positive slow wave, maximal over the parieto-
occipital region between the 500-800 ms window; this effect was not present at frontal 
electrodes.  Conversely, the explicit test elicited a FN400 between 250-450 ms for 
identical repetitions only; this effect was not present at parietal electrodes.  Similar 
dissociations have also been shown between familiarity and “semantic familiarity” 
(Nessler, Mecklinger, & Penny, 2005), familiarity and “episodic priming” (Friedman, 
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2004), and familiarity and “perceptual priming” (Nessler et al.; Rugg et al., 1998) for 
verbal and non-verbal stimuli.  It appears, therefore, that while implicit and explicit 
memory processes are indeed separable based on their neural correlates, one should 
ensure that the manipulations used are capable of distinguishing between these 
different forms of memory. 
As stated earlier in this section, familiarity is often described as a process that 
can be amodal (Curran, 2000)—a state in which perceptual information may be fairly 
irrelevant compared to conceptual information.  However, a few recent studies have 
suggested that the FN400 may not actually represent a familiarity process that is entirely 
amodal.  For example, Mecklinger et al. (unpublished) manipulated modality at study 
(spoken words/objects) and tested participants’ recognition with objects.  Their design 
allowed for the contrast of perceptual repetitions (studied objects, object test-cue) with 
conceptual repetitions (studied words, object test-cue) on the FN400.  They observed an 
early effect (350-450 ms) for perceptual but not conceptual repetitions, and a slightly 
delayed FN400 effect (450–550 ms) for perceptual and conceptual repetitions.  The 
former effect was equivalent for perceptual and conceptual repetitions at frontal and 
fronto-polar sites, but it was larger for perceptual repetitions at central sites. 
In a study that is also informative with regard to the relative contributions of 
perceptual and conceptual information to familiarity, Czernochowski, Mecklinger, 
Johansson, and Brinkmann (2005) presented participants with spoken words or 
photographs of real-life objects (in different blocks) and tested their memory with line-
drawings.  Participants were to respond old when the line-drawing denoted a studied 
stimulus of a particular modality (word or picture), and everything else was to be called 
new (exclusion task).  Overall, targets and non-targets showed an equivalent FN400 
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(200-400 ms).  However, when non-target type was assessed separately, only pictorial 
non-targets (test pictures studied as pictures to which participants were to respond 
“new”) elicited an FN400.  This FN400 for pictorial non-targets was identical to the 
FN400 found for word targets (test pictures studied as words to which participants were 
to respond “old”) and for picture targets; no FN400 was found for word non-targets.   
The interesting aspect of this study is that only when the non-targets matched 
both perceptually and conceptually did an FN400 effect emerge, despite instructions to 
respond “new” for these stimuli.  No FN400 was found when non-targets matched only 
on the conceptual level.  This finding, as well as those of Mecklinger et al. (unpublished) 
and Groh-Bordin et al. (2005) demonstrate that both perceptual and conceptual 
processing can drive familiarity based memory judgments.  Moreover, the significance of 
the early onsetting old/new effect (250 ms) has yet to be clarified.  The aforementioned 
ERP studies concerning possible perceptual and conceptual modulations of the FN400 
bear directly on the theoretical motivations behind the experiments of this dissertation.  
As such, they are discussed within this context in later sections (Chapter 6). 
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Figure 7. The Parietal Old/New Effect.  The solid-line waveform corresponds to new items that were 
correctly rejected, whereas the dashed-line waveform corresponds to old items that were correctly 
recognized (hits). 
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The parietal old/new effect.  The parietal old/new effect (Figure 7) represents a 
more positive going waveform for correctly endorsed old stimuli relative to correctly 
rejected new stimuli between 400-800 ms post stimulus (e.g., Donaldson & Rugg, 1998; 
Wilding et al., 1995).  As described by Curran (2000, p. 927), the effect is “…a greater 
voltage difference between posterior, superior and anterior, inferior regions for old 
stimuli than for new stimuli.”  Like the FN400, the effect is also statistically indicated by 
condition X region interactions.  This effect is generally maximal over left temporo-
parietal regions and is usually larger over the left than the right hemisphere, but this is 
not always the case (e.g., in continuous recognition procedures, Van Strien, 
Hagenbeek, Stam, Rombouts, & Barkhof, 2005).  The effect generally onsets around 
420-490 ms, peaks at ~550-600 ms, and offsets around ~790-800 ms. 
The general consensus is that the parietal old/new effect is a likely neural 
correlate of recollection.  The evidence supporting this assertion comes from the many 
studies demonstrating that the parietal old/new effect is modulated by the same 
variables thought to influence behavioral measures of recollection.  For example, the 
effect has been shown to be largest for consciously remembered stimuli and absent for 
misses and false alarms (Smith 1993; Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg; 1995); this is consistent 
with predictions from behavioral research because, in theory, one should not show 
neural correlates of recollection for stimuli that were not explicitly remembered (misses), 
nor for stimuli “recognized” but nevertheless unstudied (false alarms).   
Other examples of consistency between behavioral and ERP measures include 
demonstrations that the old/new effect is sensitive to size congruency manipulations 
(Paller & Kutas, 1992), and larger ERP old/new differences occur when recognition is 
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accompanied by recall (Rugg et al., 1996) or accompanied by retrieval of context or 
some type of source specifying information (e.g., list membership; Trott et al., 1999).  
The parietal old/new effect is also consistently larger for recognition accompanied by the 
phenomenological experience of recollection (“remember” judgments) versus the 
phenomenological experience of familiarity (“know” judgments; Trott et al.).  Moreover, 
Johnson (1995) and others (e.g., Düzel et al., 2001; Smith & Halgren, 1989) have 
shown that the parietal old/new effect is absent in patients with damage to areas of the 
brain hypothesized as critical to recollection (e.g., lesions to medial temporal lobe, 
bilateral hippocampal damage).   
A challenge to the assertion that the parietal old/new effect reflects recollection 
comes from studies contrasting recollection occurring with and without the retrieval of 
the encoding context/source.  The logic in such studies has been as follows:  If the 
parietal old/new effect actually reflects recollection (which is assumed to involve the 
retrieval of encoding context), and if recollection processes are functionally and 
anatomically distinct from acontextual familiarity processes, then recognition memory 
accompanied by context retrieval should show a pattern of neural activity that is 
qualitatively distinct from recognition not accompanied by context retrieval (i.e., 
familiarity).  Contrary to this logic, however, the prevalent finding is that recognition with 
and without context does not produce topographically distinct patterns of neural activity 
at the scalp (e.g., Trott et al., 1999; Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg, 1995; Wilding & Rugg, 
1996).  Rather, equivalent or amplitude-attenuated old/new effects were observed 
between high-contextual and low-contextual recognition.  This finding is fairly consistent, 
and one interpretation is that because the parietal old/new effect cannot dissociate 
contextual and acontextual recognition, it cannot be a neural correlate of recollection 
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and therefore cannot be used as evidence in support of dual-process theory in 
recognition memory (e.g., Wilding et al., 1995, 1996). 
An alternative interpretation is that recollection is a graded phenomenon that is 
sensitive to the amount of contextual information retrieved (Wilding, 2000).  From this 
perspective, if the parietal old/new effect was assumed to reflect a graded recollection 
process, contrasts of scalp distributions at varying degrees of context retrieval would not 
be expected to yield qualitative/topographic differences.  This line of reasoning leads 
some to argue that in order to demonstrate qualitative differences between the neural 
correlates of recollection and familiarity (and find support for dual-process theory), one 
should contrast scalp distributions of the FN400 and the parietal old/new effects (see 
Friedman, 2004).  Although this practice presupposes that the parietal and FN400 
old/new effects are indeed correlates of recollection and familiarity, respectively, the 
ERP literature reviewed in this and the preceding section makes a strong case for this 
presupposition.  Moreover, the evidence from the functional imaging literature is highly 
consistent with the evidence from ERP studies (see Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).  It 
therefore seems likely that the easily dissociable FN400 and parietal old/new effects 
provide a convenient means of further studying dual-process recognition.  This 
dissertation seeks to assess how manipulations of perceptual and conceptual 
processing modulate the FN400 and parietal old/new effects as a method for further 
understanding the nature of recollection- and familiarity-based recognition. 
Priming ERP effects and recognition memory.  Besides the hypothesized 
recollection and familiarity processes involved in recognition, there are other processes 
believed to contribute to recognition that have, themselves, been linked to distinct 
patterns of neural activity.  One such process is implicit in nature and the other process 
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concerns activity that occurs after the retrieval attempt.  As discussed in earlier sections, 
some theories of recognition describe familiarity as relying to various degrees on implicit 
memory or “fluency” (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000, 2001). 
The ERP literature credits Rugg et al. (1998) as the first in demonstrating a clear 
neural correlate of priming that was unequivocally dissociable from the neural correlates 
of recognition memory.  In this study, Rugg and his colleagues examined the dynamics 
of participants’ memory for words under deep and shallow encoding condition.  For 
those words that participants studied under shallow encoding conditions, only ~50% 
were correctly recognized.  The large proportion of unrecognized study-list words 
allowed Rugg to examine whether these unrecognized words still demonstrated an 
“old/new” effect.  Upon inspection, Rugg et al. observed that old, unrecognized words 
elicited waveforms that were reliably greater than new, correctly rejected words across 
the 300-500 ms post-stimulus duration.  This effect was only present at posterior scalp 
regions and showed hemispheric asymmetry such that it was somewhat right-lateralized 
over the parieto-occipital region.  The old/new effect was shown as qualitatively different 
from a second effect found for recognized, shallowly encoded words within the same 
time window (300-500 ms; the FN400).  Qualitative differences imply that the neural 
populations eliciting the activity are at the very lest partially non-overlapping; the 
presumption being that distinct neural populations imply somewhat distinct neural 
processes (although they could both contribute to the same cognitive operation).  
The argument has been made that familiarity is actually based on fluency 
attributions (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001) or some other implicit process (perceptual or 
conceptual), or at the very least that implicit processes play a large role in familiarity.  
Within the ERP literature some have argued that the FN400 itself may actually be a 
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correlate of an implicit process (Voss and colleagues, Paller, Voss, & Boehm, 2007; 
Voss & Paller, 2007, 2008; Voss, Reber, Mesulam, Parrish, & Paller, 2008).  It has 
therefore been of great theoretical interest that Rugg et al. (1998) have shown a 
dissociation between a neural correlate of familiarity and a possible neural correlate of 
implicit memory.  Rugg et al. showed that old/new differences between unrecognized 
words (words for which there was no behaviorally measurable explicit memory) and new 
words produced a distinct scalp topography from that of old/new differences between 
recognized words (words for which there was behaviorally measurable explicit memory) 
and new words.  Moreover, the magnitude of the effects were equivalent, demonstrating 
that the effect between unrecognized words and new words was not merely a neural 
correlate of weak explicit memory.  Rugg et al.’s study is generally viewed as diagnostic 
evidence for the existence of a distinct neural process associated with implicit memory.  
Other studies have demonstrated similar effects which have been consistently observed 
over specific regions of the scalp (right lateralized occipito-temporal, parieto-occipital; 
e.g., Friedman, 2004; Johnson et al., 1998; Paller & Gross, 1998). 
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CHAPTER 5: IDENTIFYING THE CONTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTUAL AND 
CONCEPTUAL PROCESSES TO FAMILIARITY WITH ERP 
Recent ERP studies manipulating perceptual and conceptual processing in 
recognition memory have demonstrated that qualitatively different types of information 
can support both recollection-based and familiarity-based recognition (e.g., Ecker & 
Zimmer, 2009; Ecker, Zimmer, & Groh-Bordin, 2007; Groh-Bordin et al., 2006; Grove & 
Wilding, in press; Schloerscheidt & Rugg, 2004; Srinivas & Verfaellie, 2000).  However, 
much of this work is silent on more specific issues, such as the nature of the perceptual 
and conceptual memory representations involved in recollection and familiarity, and how 
these representations interact with the various attributes of retrieval cues to elicit 
recollection and familiarity. 
In developing an approach for confronting these questions, the considerations 
are as much about how the retrieval cue is processed and in what manner it accesses a 
given memory trace, as they are about how the initial stimulus is processed and which of 
its attributes are stored in the memory trace.  The recognition memory ERP literature 
pertaining to memory retrieval and perceptual and conceptual information processing is 
an asset to understanding what may be stored in the memory trace.  The relatively 
meager recognition memory ERP literature pertaining to both the neural correlates of 
encoding and the influence of perceptual and conceptual processing is somewhat of an 
obstacle.  However, in research one can occasionally gain considerable insight into a 
particular issue by considering work from a related or analogous field.  In what follows, 
Chapter 5 describes ERP research from the field of object identification and how it may 
be able to speak to the issues of central interest to this dissertation. 
 
  54
Linking Object Identification and Object Recognition Memory? 
Perceptual closure is one of the many neural processes by which the brain 
comes to identify images of fragmented or partially occluded objects in the natural world 
(Bartlett, 1916; Snodgrass & Feenan, 1990).  The term “perceptual closure” refers to the 
neural interpolation of missing or obstructed visual information from the visual 
information that is available.  The closure process uses the estimated 
missing/obstructed visual information to complete the object’s visual structure, enabling 
subsequent perceptual and semantic processes to determine object identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electrode P8 
Identified 
Figure 8. The Negativity Associated with Perceptual Closure (NCL).  The solid-line waveform 
corresponds to items that were not identified by name during encoding, whereas the dashed-line 
waveform corresponds to items that were identified by name during encoding. 
 
 Electrophysiological research has identified a component that is closely tied to 
the perceptual closure stage of object identification.  This component is the Ncl , so 
called because it is seen as a more negative-going waveform for objects that have 
achieved perceptual closure relative to those that have not (Figure 8).  The Ncl occurs 
230-400 ms post-stimulus, is maximal around 290-300 ms, and is present over bilateral 
(NCL)
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occipito-temporal scalp regions (e.g., electrodes PO5/PO6; Doniger et al., 2000; 
Sehatpour, Molholm, Javitt, & Foxe, 2006).  The Ncl is not linked to object identification 
itself, but rather to the extraction of object information under circumstances in which the 
object is difficult to identify (e.g., fragmented, masked).  According to Sehatpour et al.’s 
(2006) model, the Ncl reflects effortful processing on a conceptual level and begins only 
after earlier automatic perceptual processes (reflected by the P1 and N1 components) 
fail to identify an object. 
There does, however, appear to be an ERP component closely correlated with 
object identification itself: The N350 (Figure 9).  The N350 component is so named 
because the waveform associated with unidentifiable objects is more negative-going 
than the waveform associated with identifiable objects, maximally between 325-400 ms 
along frontal, midline electrodes (e.g., Fz).  Studies of the N350 demonstrate the earliest 
known separation of waveforms for identifiable and unidentifiable objects, which beings 
around 300ms post-stimulus (e.g., Pietrowsky et al., 1996).  The current view is that the 
onset of the N350 effect marks the upper temporal bounds of correct object 
model/representation selection from long-term memory (Schendan & Kutas, 2002, 
2007a, b).  
According to Schendan and Kutas (2002, 2007b), the N350 corresponds to a 
search of the structural description system (Schacter, 1994) for a perceptually matching 
structural representation of the object being viewed.  The structural description system 
itself abstractly represents the global structure of objects and their component parts, 
such that global object shapes are retained in the absence of more detailed object 
features contained within episodic representations, such as size and spatial location and 
orientation (e.g., Biederman & Cooper, 1991a).  The information stored in the structural 
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description system is, “…a kind of generic memory, that is, explicit memory which is not 
episodic, such as for recognition and recall tasks, but rather for semantic or 
nonsemantic (i.e., perceptual) information or facts, regardless of a temporal event 
context” (Schendan & Kutas, 2003, p. 745).  A successful match between the percept 
and such a representation in the structural description system allows object 
categorization to occur and for subsequent processes that, too, contribute to eventual 
object naming. 
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Figure 9. The N350.  The solid-line waveform corresponds to items that were not identified by name 
during encoding, whereas the dashed-line waveform corresponds to items that were identified by 
name during encoding. 
 
The Schendan and Kutas (2002, 2007a, b) model of object identification predicts 
that the N350 will be large when the recovered object components match many 
structural object descriptions stored in memory (either because the recovered object 
components are few or simply non-diagnostic), resulting in a long, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, search.  Conversely, the N350 will be smaller when a successful 
structural description match is made that leads to identification, or when too little visual 
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information is available for matching at any level to occur.  Repetition (new>repeated), 
perceptual expertise (unusual>canonical views), and object viewpoint (different>same) 
also modulate the N350, and do so in a manner that is consistent with the idea that the 
component indexes an object structure search within a system containing abstract 
perceptual representations (i.e., the structural description system). 
It seems likely that the perceptual information used to conduct an object model 
search is a product of the perceptual closure process (that is, under conditions in which 
the perceptual closure processes is needed in the first place; Schendan & Kutas, 
2007b).  Thus, it would stand to reason that if the perceptual closure processes were 
unsuccessful for a given stimulus, then object model selection would also be 
unsuccessful (or at least difficult) for that stimulus because the search would be based 
on incomplete perceptual information.  As is discussed in Chapter 6, the known 
relationship between perceptual closure (NCL) and object model selection (N350) may 
allow for novel predictions to be made about nature of explicit recognition memory for 
pictures that are difficult to identify. 
Characterizing how and when the brain uses visual information to determine 
object identity is important in its own right.  It is also important because it may inform the 
understanding of the higher-order cognitive operations that act upon (or those that 
depend exclusively upon) the outcome of identification processes, such as object model 
selection.  Indeed, some researchers have examined the neural mechanisms underlying 
object identification and their relationship to higher-order mental processes, such as 
memory.  However, the majority of such studies have only examined the relationship 
between object identification processes and implicit memory (e.g., Schendan & Kutas, 
2002, 2003, 2007a, b).  Of the studies that have examined the neural underpinnings of 
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explicit memory for pictorial and object information, most have done so with respect to 
retrieval processes exclusively (Ecker & Zimmer, 2009; Ally & Budson, 2007; Alley et al., 
2008). 
Behavioral research in this domain has lead to predictions about the relative 
timing of the neural events necessary for object identification and object recognition 
(Subramaniam, Biederman, & Madigan, 2000), although empirical data have not yet 
confirmed these predictions.  Specifically, Subramaniam et al. tested participants’ 
recognition memory for 90 line drawings in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) 
stream.  The participants viewed the individual RSVP pictures at one of five durations 
(72, 126, 196, 462, or 700 ms). Immediately following the RSVP stream, participants 
completed a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test for all RSVP 
drawings.  The picture pairs on each test trial were a target with either (a) an exemplar 
foil (visually similar, but verbally identical), (b) a visually and verbally distinct foil, or (c) a 
visually and verbally distinct foil but with the target itself being mirror-reversed.  Memory 
performance for all test-trial types was at chance for the 72 and 126 ms presentation 
rates.  For the three slower presentation rates, recognition was above chance and 
increased reliably with increasing presentation durations; picture recognition did not 
differ as a function of the similarity of the target or the foil to previously presented 
pictures.   
Although it is somewhat surprising that Subramaniam et al. (2000) did not find 
attenuated recognition memory performance for mirror-reversed-target test-trials, as is 
typically the case (e.g., Biederman & Cooper, 1991, Curran & Cleary, 2003), there is 
precedent for this outcome.  In a similar experiment, Intraub (1980) found no effect of 
mirror-reversed targets on recognition following encoding via RSVP.  Together with 
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other data from their study showing poor identification performance and a lack of picture 
priming (when the prime itself was presented in the RSVP stream) during 72-126 ms 
presentation rates, Subramaniam et al. argued that while 50-100 ms of uninterrupted 
neural activation in inferotemporal (IT) cortex is sufficient for object identification, it is not 
sufficient for subsequent picture priming and recognition memory. 
Single-cell recordings of macaque IT neurons (Tovee & Rolls, 1995) support 
Subramaniam et al.’s (2000) argument by showing that much of the information stored 
in IT cells that respond selectively to objects or object parts is acquired within the first 50 
ms of activation (e.g., Takana, 1996).  Of particular importance to their case is that 
despite requiring a mere 50 ms to derive the information necessary for object 
identification, IT cells continue to fire for an additional 350 ms minimally (e.g., Logothetis 
& Sheinberg, 1996).  Subramaniam et al. argue that the additional neural activity (which 
they term “post-perceptual activity”) is critical for the instantiation of a stable object 
representation.  They explain the lack of perceptual priming and recognition memory for 
short duration RSVP pictures (despite reasonable identification) by positing that the 
rapid onset of the pictures in the RSVP stream directs attention from picture to picture, 
and that this rapid shifting of attention disrupts/suppresses the critical post-perceptual 
activity.  At longer durations (+200 ms), post-perceptual activity can engage long 
enough to develop more lasting object representations before being suppressed by the 
onset of the next RSVP stream picture.  This argument is also consistent with 
Subramaniam et al.’s data in that above chance identification, but not priming or 
recognition memory, is apparent at durations under 200 ms, whereas subsequent visual 
priming and recognition memory are only apparent at durations exceeding 200 ms. 
The relative paucity of research on the relationship between the initial encoding 
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of pictorial/object information, the role of well characterized object identification 
processes, and subsequent explicit memory in part motivates the approach of the 
experiments described in this dissertation.  As an initial attempt to link what is known 
about the ERP correlates of object identification to object recognition memory, the 
present approach is similar to the approaches taken in prior electrophysiological studies 
of object identification that have used fragmented images (e.g., Doniger et at., 2000) 
and object identification and implicit memory (e.g., Schendan & Kutas, 2002).  In the 
present study, however, black and white line drawings were presented briefly and 
forward and backward masked in an attempt to hinder identification.  Pictures that are 
not identified can be analyzed separately from those pictures that are identified.  
Furthermore, the data can be further divided on the basis of whether the pictures in the 
identification task (encoding) are recognized on a subsequent test of memory.   
The rational for the parsing of data on the basis of subsequent memory is that it 
will allow for a direct assessment of the relationship between the identification 
processes during encoding and their potential influences on memory.  Specifically, what 
is known about the aforementioned object identification related ERP components (N350, 
NCL) may be informative with regard to the type of processing that may or may not be 
necessary for successful subsequent memory.  That is, searching for the 
presence/absence of ERP components with known links to specific types of processing 
and neural representations may be informative when contrasting memory for identified 
and unidentified pictures.  Moreover, the presence/absence of these components may 
provide clues to the type of pictorial information stored for pictorial information.  The 
more that is known about the information stored within the memory traces, the more that 
is known about the type of evidence capable of supporting familiarity-based memory. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT 1 
Rational and Justification 
The central question motivating this dissertation is: What type of information can 
serve as “evidence” for familiarity-based memory?  With regard to this question, the 
previous chapters have identified (a) why the question is important, (b) methodologies 
for addressing the question, and (c) the contributions that could come from a study 
examining this question. These points are summarized and then expanded upon here. 
  As described in Chapter 2, this question is theoretically important because 
prominent models of recognition memory assume a familiarity process that is based on 
the strength of available evidence but fail to specify the nature of the evidence (Wixted, 
2007a, b; Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).  The long-term usefulness of a 
memory model depends on its ability to continue to predict memory performance under 
new circumstances and to guide research toward further specifying how the memory 
process operates—this includes providing specificity on the type of information 
supporting the memory process.  It is the latter point that proves difficult for existing 
models. 
 Also described in Chapter 2 is the substantial behavioral data suggesting that 
familiarity can rely on the perceptual and/or the conceptual attributes of stimuli.  
However, from these data it is still unclear why in some instances familiarity appears to 
rely primarily on perceptual evidence and in other instances on conceptual evidence.  
Such ambiguity makes it difficult to address more specific questions concerning the 
specific types of perceptual (or conceptual) information that may support familiarity. 
Chapter 4 describes ERP studies of recognition memory that have been 
especially useful in characterizing familiarity, recollection, and their contribution to 
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recognition memory at the neural level.  Compared to behavioral methods, the ERP 
method has the advantage of providing extraordinary amounts of useful data during 
memory encoding, whereas in behavior methods there is typically little to none. 
Relatively few studies have exploited this advantage, however.  At present, an entirely 
open question is whether manipulations of perceptual and conceptual processing at 
encoding will have selective effects on the neural correlates of recollection and 
familiarity. 
 Chapter 5 describes how the obstacle of a limited literature on the neural 
correlates of memory encoding can be circumvented by turning to the literature on the 
neural correlates of object identification.  The ERP object identification ERP literature 
reports on several electrophysiological markers of visual object processing, which I have 
argued can be used to assess the perceptual/conceptual processing stages that must 
occur for a picture to be recognized on a later memory test.  Ultimately, turning to the 
object identification literature to make predictions should allow for the experiments 
presented in this dissertation to help close the gap in the ERP memory literature by 
producing data directly pertaining to perceptual/conceptual processing during memory 
encoding. 
Experiment 1 was designed to examine the neural correlates of encoding and 
retrieval together.  This approach may be particularly informative because, unlike many 
studies that address issues of encoding and retrieval separately, the two data sets here 
come from the same participants, come from the same experimental procedure, and 
thus have direct bearing on one another.  Relative to studies examining either encoding 
or retrieval in a single study, the present design may allow for stronger and more direct 
inferences to be made between the encoding and retrieval data. 
  63
A unique theoretical element of this study is its approach to examining the neural 
correlates of encoding and subsequent memory.  In particular, the present study seeks 
to utilize what is know about the temporal dynamics of processes involved in object 
identification to guide the examination of processes of object encoding that are critical to 
subsequent object recognition memory.  The relative paucity of research on the 
relationship between the initial encoding of pictorial/object information, the role of well 
characterized object identification processes, and subsequent explicit memory in part 
motivated this line of research. 
As an initial attempt to link what is known about the ERP correlates of object 
identification to object recognition memory, the approach of the present investigation is 
similar to the approaches taken in prior ERP studies of object identification (e.g., 
Doniger et at., 2000) and prior ERP studies of object identification and its relationship to 
implicit memory (e.g., Schendan & Kutas, 2002).  As discussed in Chapter 5, most 
studies examining identified versus unidentified objects have used fragmented images.  
In Experiment 1, however, black and white line drawings were presented briefly and 
forward and backward masked in an attempt to hinder identification.  Those pictures that 
were not identified can be analyzed separately from those pictures that are identified.  
Furthermore, the data were further divided on the basis of whether the pictures in the 
identification task (encoding) were recognized on a subsequent test of memory.  The 
rational for this parsing of data on the basis of subsequent memory was that it allowed 
for a direct assessment of the relationship between the identification processes during 
encoding and their influences on memory.  Specifically, what is known about the 
aforementioned object identification related ERP components (N350, NCL) may be 
informative with regard to the type of processing that may or may not support 
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subsequent memory.  That is, searching for the presence/absence of ERP components 
with known links to specific types of processing and neural representations may be 
informative when contrasting memory for identified and unidentified pictures. 
Experiment 1 was also designed to engage recollection- and familiarity-based 
recognition processes.  Under these conditions, their putative neural correlates can be 
manipulated, recorded, and evaluated.  The attributes of the resulting ERPs may speak 
to the nature of recollection and familiarity as retrieval processes.  In particular, the 
present study was concerned with the effects of encoding, perceptual matching between 
study and test stimuli, and the interaction of these factors with measures of recollection 
and familiarity based memory.  Levels of processing (or depth of encoding) is a well 
studied manipulation in ERP studies of memory (e.g., Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2001; 
Otten & Rugg, 2001; Rugg, Allan, & Birch, 2000; Rugg et al., 1998; Sanquist, 
Rohrbaugh, Syndulko, & Lindsley, 1980), and has been consistently shown to dissociate 
ERP correlates of recollection and familiarity.  Perceptual matching is another well 
studied manipulation (e.g., Curran & Cleary, 2003; Curran & Dien, 2003; Ecker & 
Zimmer, 2009; Ecker, Zimmer, & Groh-Bordin, 2007; Groh-Bordin, Zimmer, & Ecker, 
2006; Grove & Wilding, in press; Schloerscheidt & Rugg, 2004; Srinivas & Verfaellie, 
2000), the use of which, however, has lead to several inconsistencies (particularly with 
respect to its effect on familiarity), and thus warrants further examination. 
Typically, ERP studies examining recollection and familiarity employ the 
remember-know procedure (e.g., Diana, Vilberg, & Reder, 2005; Duarte et al., 2004; 
Düzel et al., 1997; Spencer, Vila Abad, & Donchin, 2000; Trott et al, 1999; Vilberg, 
Moosavi, & Rugg; 2006; Wolk et al., 2006, Wolk et al., 2007).  However, data from the 
remember-know procedure are difficult to interpret in light of recent studies suggesting 
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that “remember” and “know” judgments may actually measure different degrees of 
recollection rather than recollection and familiarity, respectively (e.g., Wais et al., 2008).  
Thus, the present study employed a variant (Langley, 2008; Langley & Cleary, 2008) of 
the recognition without perceptual identification procedure (RWPI; Cleary & Greene, 
2004; Langley et al., 2008), which has proven useful in previous studies for separating 
familiarity-based recognition from recognition based on both recollection and familiarity.  
Because this procedure had yet to be used in an ERP study, the resultant behavioral 
and electrophysiological data were contrasted with a “standard” recognition memory 
procedure run in a within-subjects design.  Doing so allowed for an assessment of the 
generalizability of the data emerging from the recognition without identification 
procedure (RWI; Peynircioglu, 1990; Cleary & Greene, 2000) thus making the data more 
readily interpretable within the context of past research. 
The present procedure was a hybrid of the RWPI procedure (Cleary & Greene, 
2005; Langley, et al. 2008) and the impoverished encoding procedure used by Gregg 
and Gardiner (1994).  In the case of Langley et al., participants studied a series of 
pictures for a subsequent recognition test.  During retrieval, all test pictures were 
forward and backward masked and presented for 60ms.  Participants attempted to 
identify each test picture and then, regardless of their success, rated the likelihood (on a 
scale of 0-10) that the briefly presented pictures were previously encoded during study.  
The authors observed that participants were able to discriminate between studied and 
unstudied pictures that could not be identified by name during retrieval.  Such 
successful RWPI at retrieval replicated one previous study using verbal stimuli (Cleary & 
Greene, 2005), and helped to further extend the original RWI effects found using word 
fragmentation as the means of hindering identification (e.g., Cleary & Greene, 2000; 
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Peynircioglu, 1990).  Data from this procedure converge on the idea that recognition 
memory for stimuli not identified either at encoding or retrieval is largely familiarity-
based. 
In line with the logic of Gardiner and Gregg (p. 475, 1997), it is presumed here 
that by having participants encode stimuli under impoverished conditions that 
researchers are “minimizing the possibility of encoding stimuli in any distinctive way,” 
which, based on the understanding of recollection’s reliance on the retrieval of 
distinctive stimulus features (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Rajaram, 1998) should also 
minimize the possibility of a participant subsequently recollecting the stimulus during 
testing.  A key assumption of the RWPI at encoding procedure, therefore, is that if a 
stimulus cannot be identified during the perceptual identification task at study, it is 
unlikely for it to be fully recalled or recollected at test.  It is important to note, however, 
that there is always the possibility that participants may experience “non-criterial 
recollection” (or “partial recollection”), in which an aspect of the brief pictorial episode is 
retrieved but fails to lead to the complete recollection and retroactive identification of the 
picture.   
Given the criticisms of the remember-know and process-dissociation behavioral 
procedures, and ROC analysis as a method for determining the contribution of 
recollection, there does not appear to be a single reliable means of using behavioral 
data to rule out the potential contribution of recollection to the recognition of pictures 
unidentified at encoding.  Therefore, a question of interest (addressed in Experiment 1) 
was whether the putative neural correlates of both recollection and familiarity are 
present for unidentified pictures.  If recollection does contribute to the recognition of 
unidentified pictures, then an FN400 old/new effect (correlate of familiarity) and a 
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parietal old/new effect (correlate of recollection) should be observed during retrieval.  If 
recognition of unidentified pictures is in fact based largely on familiarity, as would seem 
to be the case, then only an FN400 old/new effect should be observed during retrieval.  
If the former pattern is found, there would be stronger justification for examining the 
RWPI at encoding effect under conditions thought to modulate perceptual and 
conceptual processing (Experiment 2). 
Assuming that only an FN400 old/new effect is found for unidentified pictures at 
retrieval (a result that would imply familiarity), then identifying the encoding processes 
unique to recognized but unidentified pictures may be a first step toward assessing 
potential contributions of underlying perceptual and conceptual processes.  The object 
identification literature has established the time courses during which perceptual and 
conceptual processes operate in functional isolation and in parallel.  Thus, it is largely 
the timing of the neurophysiology identified as unique to recognized but unidentified 
pictures that could expose any specific role of perceptual or conceptual processing.  
Thus, the goals of Experiment 1 were to (a) determine whether an FN400 would be 
present for unidentified pictures in the absence of a parietal old/new effect and (b) 
identify any neural correlates of object identification processes that distinguish 
recognized unidentified pictures from recognized identified pictures and forgotten 
pictures. 
Predictions 
The primary predictions regarding the ERP data are as follows.  During encoding, 
it is predicted that only identified pictures will under go perceptual closure (NCL), and 
thus will also only elicit an N350.  Dm effects are highly inconsistent and may not be 
present under these circumstances.  If a Dm effect is present, it is predicted that it would 
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be present for identified pictures.  With regard to retrieval, it is predicted that identified 
pictures will elicit and FN400 and a parietal old/new effect, whereas unidentified pictures 
will elicit only an FN400. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two Iowa State University undergraduates participated in exchange for 
research participation credit in a lower-level psychology course.  All participants 
provided informed consent, and the study was approved by the Human Participant 
Institutional Review Board of Iowa State University. 
Materials 
Stimuli were 640 line drawings, 320 of which were mirror-reversals of the original 
320.  The original 320 line drawings were obtained from the International Picture 
Naming Project database (Szekely et al., 2004) among other sources.  Stimuli were 
divided into four 80-trial blocks.  For each 80-trial block, there were 40 trials of drawings 
from the original set and 40 from the mirror-reversed set.  Stimuli were counterbalanced 
across block and drawing set type.  During encoding, the stimuli were forward and 
backward masked with a mask used in prior studies (e.g., Langley et al., 2008).  The 
mask consisted of black, curved lines extending in all directions (scribbles) on a white 
background (Figure 10). 
Procedure 
The following describes the procedure of Experiment 1, in which the relative ease 
of encoding was varied between two tasks.  During retrieval, the same manipulation 
occurred across both tasks.  Specifically, the perceptual match (matching pictures vs. 
mirror reversed pictures) of old test pictures was manipulated between study and test. 
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Participants completed four study-test blocks, each consisting of 45 encoding 
trials and 90 test trials.  The study-test blocks differed only in stimulus presentation 
duration during encoding, hereafter referred to as short (33 ms) and long (500 ms) 
encoding conditions.  Participants completed two study-test blocks of each condition.   
Encoding.  As illustrated in Figure 10, encoding trials lasted 2100 ms, beginning 
with a 500 ms fixation ‘+’.  The forward mask (100 ms), pictorial stimulus (33 ms or 500 
ms), and the backward mask (100 ms) were presented in succession with no ISI 
between presentations.  The backward mask was followed by a blank screen (short = 
1367 or long = 900 ms).  Following this 2100 ms encoding trial, a ‘?’ appeared, 
prompting participants to name the drawing aloud.  Participants were encouraged not to 
withhold unconfident responses, but were also cautioned not to guess.  Rather than 
offering a blind guess, participants were instructed to respond with “I don’t know.”  After 
the experimenter recorded naming accuracy, a 1000 ms blank was followed by the 
onset of the next encoding trial.  
Retrieval.  Each retrieval trial lasted 2000 ms, beginning with a 300 ms fixation 
‘+’.  One of three types of stimuli followed the fixation for 1500 ms.  Test stimuli were 
either new (1/2), reversed-old (1/4), or same-old (1/4).  All test stimuli were followed by a 
200 ms blank, which was followed by a ‘?’ that prompted participants to make an 
old/new recognition judgment on an 6-point rating scale (OLD 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 NEW), with 
“1” indicating highest confidence old (“3” lowest) and with “6” indicating highest 
confidence new (“4” lowest).  A 500 ms blank followed the participants’ response, which 
was itself followed by the onset of the next test trial.  Participants were instructed to 
endorse mirror-reversed stimuli as old (inclusion instructions). 
 
  70
 
Figure 10. Encoding Procedure for Experiment 1. 
 
 
To prevent participants from developing encoding strategies based on prior 
knowledge of the two unique encoding conditions, participants were not informed about 
the specifics of a given encoding condition until its onset.  Participants completed two 
blocks of one condition before being introduced to the other.  This blocking regiment 
ensured that participants could not accurately anticipate or prepare for the third or fourth 
block during the previous two.  Moreover, this blocking regiment made it more likely that 
the potential practice effects across blocks one and two would be similar to the potential 
practice effects across blocks three and four.  Counterbalancing dictated the assignment 
of stimuli set (original vs. mirror-reversed) to encoding condition (short vs. long) and 
block (one, two vs. three, four). 
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Electrophysiological recording and preprocessing.  An array of 68 scalp 
electrodes (Fpz, Fz, FCz, CPz, Pz, POz, Oz, Iz, Fp1, Fp2, Af3, Af4, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, 
F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6, FT9, FT10, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, 
C6, T3/T7, T4/T6, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, TP7, TP8, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, 
P7, P8/T8, PO1, PO2, PO3, PO4, PO9, PO10, O1, O2, M1, M2, Lo1, Lo2, Io1, Io2), 
embedded in an Electro-Cap (Electro-Cap International, Eaton, OH) or attached to the 
skin via adhesive patchs recorded the EEG.  The EEG was recorded at 500 Hz (gain 
1000, 16 bit A/D conversion, amplified with a bandpass of .02 – 150Hz).  Four 
electrodes (one below and one near the outer canthus of each eye) recorded vertical 
and horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) activity.  Recordings were referenced to Cz; for 
analysis, recordings were re-referenced to an average reference (Picton et al., 2000).  
The EMSE Software Suite (Source Signaling Imaging, San Diego, CA) was used to 
average ERPs.  An algorithm modeling blink and artifact free EEG topography was used 
to correct blink related artifacts.  Sampling epochs were extracted offline and included 
300 ms of prestimulus baseline activity and 1200 ms of post-stimulus activity for 
encoding trials and 300 ms of prestimulus baseline activity and 1500 ms of post-
stimulus activity for retrieval trials.  The length of the epochs for both encoding and 
retrieval were chosen because the effects of interest occur within the first 1000 ms of 
stimulus processing.  In addition, participants were instructed to withhold their 
responses until prompted, and both epoch latencies ended before this prompt.  Thus, 
the EEG should not reflect significant response-related neural activity.   
When considering the duration of the prestimulus baseline, it is important to 
consider that the stimuli (to which the ERPs were time-locked) in Experiments 1 and 2 
were preceded by a 100 ms mask.  The mask disrupts what would ideally be a relatively 
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calm and flat segment of the EEG.  The integrity of the baseline is important for 
interpreting potential differences between two waveforms at later segments of the 
epoch.  A prestimulus baseline of 300 ms was chosen so that 200 ms of pre-mask 
activity could contribute to the prestimulus baseline of the ERP.  
Experiment 1 Results 
Behavioral Results 
Participants’ ability to identify the line drawings during the perceptual 
identification task (at encoding) was quantified as the mean proportion identified.  
Participants’ ability to discriminate between old and new pictures was quantified as the 
unequal-variance signal detection model discrimination index da.  Conditional mean da 
values are shown in Figure 11. 
Picture identification at encoding.  As expected, participants identified nearly 
all pictures (M = 0.96, SD = 0.04) in the long encoding condition and nearly half of the all 
pictures (M = 0.44, SD = 0.15) in the short encoding condition; the picture identification 
rate differed reliably between the long and short encoding condition (t(31) = 21.22, SE = 
.02, p < .001). 
Recognition memory.  An Encoding Condition (3: long identified, short 
identified, short unidentified) by Cue Type (2: matching, mirror reversed) ANOVA 
performed on mean da values yielded a main effect of encoding (F(2, 62) = 361.08, MSE 
= .45, p < .001, ηp2 = .92), which was not accompanied by a main effect of cue type (F(1, 
31) = 2.68, p = .11) or an encoding condition by cue type interaction (F(2, 62) = 1.18, p 
= .31).  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the main effect of encoding condition 
reflected the fact that recognition memory in the long identified condition was superior to 
that of the short identified (Mdiff = 1.38, SE = .13, p < .001) and unidentified encoding 
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conditions (Mdiff = 3.16, SE = .12, p < .001), and recognition memory in the short 
identified condition was superior to recognition memory in the short unidentified 
condition (Mdiff = 1.78, SE = .10, p < .001).   
Follow-up tests revealed that recognition memory differed between matching and 
mirror reversed pictures for short identified pictures (F(1, 31) = 7.90, p < .01, ηp2 = .20); 
no reliable differences between matching and mirror reversed pictures were present in 
the other conditions (Fs < 1.0).  This pattern was substantiated by an encoding by cue 
type interaction when short identified pictures were separately contrasted with short 
unidentified pictures (F(1, 31) = 4.26, MSE = .09, p < .05, ηp2 = .12); no such interaction 
was present however when short identified pictures were contrasted with long identified 
pictures (F < 1.0). 
Experiment 1: Picture Recognition Memory
Condition
Long Identified Short Identified Short Unidentified
O
ld
/N
ew
 D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n 
(d
a)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Match 
Reversed 
*
 
Figure 11. Error bars represent standard error. * denotes a statistically reliable difference in mean recognition  
memory between matching and mirror reversed pictures. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 11, recognition memory for unidentified matching (M = 
0.46 SD = 0.52) and mirror reversed (M = 0.45 SD = 0.45) pictures was very low relative 
to identified pictures.  However, these da values were numerically similar to previously 
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reported da values for unidentified pictures (M = 0.43; Langley & Cleary, 2008), and 
were reliably above zero (chance memory performance), t(31)’s > 5.0, ps < .001. 
These results are consistent with a number of behavioral studies showing effects 
of perceptual mismatching on pictures likely recognized on the basis of recollection and 
familiarity together (e.g., Gardiner et al., 2001, 2005), but not on pictures likely 
recognized on the basis of familiarity alone (e.g., Verfaellie et al., 2003).  Further 
consideration of these data and there implications are withheld until the Discussion and 
the General Discussion. 
Electrophysiological Results: Waveform Analysis 
Differences in subsequent memory.  The following data were subjected to a 
Condition (3: Identified Hit, Unidentified Hit, Unidentified Miss) by Region (4: Anterior 
Frontal, Frontal, Central, Parietal), by Time (6) by Electrode ANOVA.  Smaller, more 
focused follow-up ANOVAs and paired contrasts were conducted when appropriate. 
Based on the results of previous research (e.g., Doniger et al., 2000; Schendan & 
Maher, 2009), specific lateral electrode pairs during specific 100 ms intervals were 
assessed: (1) 200-300, 300-400, and 400-500 ms for the anterior frontal P250, N350, 
and N450 at Fp1/Fp2 and AF3/AF4, and N250 and P350 at P7/P8 and PO9/PO10; (2) 
300-400, 400-500, and 500-600 for the mid-frontal N350, N390 at F1/F2 and FC1/FC2, 
and P450 at P7/P8 and PO09/PO10; (3) 500-600, 600-700, and 700-800 for the LPC 
(late positive complex) at C1/C2 and CP1/CP2.   
Table 1 provides the F-ratios and ηp2-values for the simple effects of condition 
over each of the four scalp regions and across each of the six time intervals.  In Figure 
12 ERPs are shown for subsequently recognized identified and unidentified pictures 
(hits).  Only unidentified unrecognized pictures (misses) are shown because accuracy 
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on the memory test was so high for identified pictures that there were too few identified 
miss trials. 
Over the anterior frontal region of the scalp, identified hits consistently differed 
from misses for each 100 ms interval between 200-600 ms, and again between 700-800 
ms at the Fp1/Fp2 electrode pair, whereas unidentified hits consistently differed from 
misses between 200-600 ms, and again between 700-800 ms for the at the AF3/AF4 
electrode pair; identified hits also differed from misses between 300-400 ms and 400-
500 ms at this electrode pair (Figure 12).  Identified and unidentified hits did not differ 
from each other at any time over the anterior frontal scalp. 
Table 1. 
Simple Effects of Condition (Identified Hits x Unidentified Hits x Misses) by Region and Time  
 Identification Effects on Subsequent Memory (2, 27) 
Region 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700 700-800 
Ant. Frontal       
   Fp1/Fp2 ┴ 3.26x, .19 ┴ 6.73**, .33 ┴ 6.16**, .31 ┴ 3.35x, .20 - ┴† 5.60**, .29 
   AF3/AF4 † 4.14*, .23 ┴† 7.63**, .36 ┴† 10.20**, .43 † 5.32*, .28  - † 3.28x, .20 
Frontal       
   F1/F2 - ┴† 11.70***, .46 ┴† 13.25***, .50 - - - 
   FC1/FC2 - ┴ 14.52***, .52 ┴‡ 13.98***, .50 ┴ 4.52*, .25 - - 
Central       
   C1/C2 - ┴ 10.43***, .44 ┴‡ 17.83***, .57 ┴‡ 11.46***, .46 ┴ 3.75*, .22 - 
   CP1/CP2 - - ┴‡ 6.22**, .32 ┴‡ 12.71***, .49 ┴‡ 4.08*, .23 - 
Parietal       
   P7/P8 ┴† 31.86***, .70 ≡ 46.05***, .77 ≡ 38.21***, .74 ┴† 33.71***, .71  ┴† 8.42**, .38 ┴† 9.27**, .41 
   PO9/PO10 ┴† 33.17***, .71 ≡ 61.66***, .82 ≡ 45.33***, .77 ┴† 22.47***, .63 ┴† 10.86***, .45 ┴† 12.36***, .48 
        
Table 1. Simple effects of condition (identified hits, unidentified hits, and unidentified misses) by region and time 
interval.  Each cell shows the F-ratios and ηp2.  The symbols following the f-values indicate statistical significance 
of the f-test: - (p > .07), x (.07≤ p ≥ .05), * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** (p < .001).  The symbols preceding the F-
values specify the reliable differences between conditions, as determined by planned pairwise comparisons: ┴ 
(identified hits vs. misses), ‡ (identified hits vs. unidentified this), † (unidentified hits vs. misses), ≡ (identified hits 
vs. unidentified hits, vs. misses). 
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The N250/Ncl or P250 (200-300 ms).  Between 200-300 ms at occpitoparietal 
(PO09/PO10) electrodes, the mean voltage for misses was less negative than the mean 
voltage for either identified or unidentified hits, Mdiff = 2.45, SE = .30, p < .001, Mdiff = 
1.53, SE = .41, p < .01, respectively.  Furthermore, identified and unidentified hits did 
not differ from each other, Mdiff = -0.93, SE = .43, p = .12.  This trend was the same for 
parietotemporal electrodes (P7/P8).  The negative deflection of the ERPs between 200-
300 for identified and unidentified hits is the NCL, which has been shown to coincide with 
the closure of an object’s structure, allowing for later processes to determine object 
identity.  The fact that the NCL did not differ for identified and unidentified hits suggests 
that perceptual closure occurred to a similar extent for both hit types (see Figure 12). 
The P350 or N350 (300-500).  Over the frontal region of the scalp (F1/F2), the 
ERPs to unidentified misses were more negative going than the ERPs for both identified 
and unidentified hits between 300-500 ms, and over the fronto-central scalp region 
(FC1/FC2) the ERPs to unidentified hits were more negative going than ERPs to 
identified hits between 400-500 ms (Figure 12), suggesting a graded pattern across trial 
type.  This graded pattern was more apparent over the occpitoparietal region of the 
scalp between 300-500 ms (see Figure 12, electrodes PO9/PO10), where the effect 
reversed polarity.  Here, the mean voltage for subsequent misses was more positive 
than the mean voltages for subsequently identified hits and subsequently unidentified 
hits, Mdiff = 3.79, SE = .34, p < .001, Mdiff = 2.00, SE = .41, p < .001, respectively.  
Additionally, unidentified hits were more positive than identified hits, Mdiff = 1.79, SE = 
.45, p < .001.  As can be seen in Figure 12, this graded pattern was also present 
between 400-500 ms: misses > unidentified > identified (Table 1); misses vs. 
unidentified, Mdiff = 2.30, SE = .36, p < .001; misses vs. identified, Mdiff = 4.25, SE = .47, 
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p < .001; unidentified vs. identified, Mdiff = 1.95, SE = .45, p < .001.  This graded pattern 
suggests that object model selection, as indexed by the N350, occurred to different 
degrees across condition.  Successful object model selection occurred for identified hits, 
less successful selection occurred for unidentified hits, and object model selection likely 
failed for unidentified misses. 
 
Figure 12. Experiment 1: Differences in Subsequent Memory 
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Figure 12. Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs recorded during encoding at fronto-central 
(FC1/FC2) and parieto-occipital electrodes (PO9/PO10) in Experiment 1.  Time scaling ranges from   
-300 to 800 ms.  The latency of the NCL is shaded in dark-gray and the latency of the N350 is shaded 
in light-gray.  Positive deflections are plotted upward.  See Appendix A for full electrode figure. 
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The P350 or N350 (300-500).  Over the frontal region of the scalp (F1/F2), the 
ERPs to unidentified misses were more negative going than the ERPs for both identified 
and unidentified hits between 300-500 ms, and over the fronto-central scalp region 
(FC1/FC2) the ERPs to unidentified hits were more negative going than ERPs to 
identified hits between 400-500 ms (Figure 12), suggesting a graded pattern across trial 
type.  This graded pattern was more apparent over the occpitoparietal region of the 
scalp between 300-500 ms (see Figure 12, electrodes PO9/PO10), where the effect 
reversed polarity.  Here, the mean voltage for subsequent misses was more positive 
than the mean voltages for subsequently identified hits and subsequently unidentified 
hits, Mdiff = 3.79, SE = .34, p < .001, Mdiff = 2.00, SE = .41, p < .001, respectively.  
Additionally, unidentified hits were more positive than identified hits, Mdiff = 1.79, 
SE = .45, p < .001.  As can be seen in Figure 12, this graded pattern was also present 
between 400-500 ms: misses > unidentified > identified (Table 1); misses vs. 
unidentified, Mdiff = 2.30, SE = .36, p < .001; misses vs. identified, Mdiff = 4.25, SE = .47, 
p < .001; unidentified vs. identified, Mdiff = 1.95, SE = .45, p < .001.  This graded pattern 
suggests that object model selection, as indexed by the N350, occurred to different 
degrees across condition.  Successful object model selection occurred for identified hits, 
less successful selection occurred for unidentified hits, and object model selection likely 
failed for unidentified misses. 
Electrophysiological Results: Topographic Dissimilarity Analysis 
The waveform analyses above imply quantitative differences between conditions, 
which speak to the relative engagement of a particular population of neurons.  However, 
it is also useful to conduct topographic analyses, which can reveal qualitative 
differences between conditions.  In the absence of quantitative differences, qualitative 
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differences (differences in the distribution of the electric field at the scalp) imply that 
distinct brain networks are active for each condition.  To examine topographic 
differences between conditions, the configurational differences between the electric 
fields for two conditions of interest (conditions are compared in pairs) were assessed by 
calculating their global dissimilarity (DISS; Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980).  DISS is 
calculated by first normalizing the potentials by dividing each electrode by the 
instantaneous global field power (GFP)3.  DISS is then equal to the square root of the 
mean squared differences of the GFP-normalized potentials (Murray, Brunet, & Michael, 
2008).  To determine when the DISS values indicated statistical differences between 
topographies, an empirical distribution of possible DISS values was generated from 
individual participant data, which were then compared to the group-averaged DISS 
values for each time point across the recording epoch.  Millisecond-by-millisecond, 
Figure 13 shows the probability of the empirical distribution having a greater DISS value 
than that of the group-averaged data, indicating when differences between topographies 
exist.   
The topographic dissimilarity analyses show that between identified hits and 
misses (Figure 13a), reliable topographic differences began at ~184 ms and lasted until 
the end of the recording epoch (1200 ms).  In comparing unidentified hits and misses 
(Figure 13b), differences were initially present for 90 ms from 84-174 ms.  Topographic 
differences were also present between 242-318 ms and 332-922 ms.   Between 
identified hits and unidentified hits (Figure 13c), short-lived topographic differences were 
present early, between 68-84 ms.  Differences also emerged later, between 358-520 
ms, and again between 1044-1142 ms.   
                                            
3 GFP is the standard deviation across the entire electrode montage at a given moment in time.  GFP is used as a reference-
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Between 242-318 ms both types of hits differed topographically from misses with 
no evidence of topographic differences between the two hit types.  This is consistent 
with the known latency of the N250/Ncl (200-300 ms) and corresponds with the pattern 
of differences found in the waveform analysis.  Between 358-520 ms the three 
conditions exhibited unique topographic patterns.  This corresponds temporally to the 
graded pattern seen across ERPs at parietal electrode sites, and with the latency of the 
N350.  Given that each topographic difference corresponds to a differences in mean 
voltage, it is possible that the topographic differences reflect different levels of 
engagement of the same neural generators as opposed to the activation of distinct 
neural generators.
                                                                                                                                       
independent indicator of a potential’s strength, on average, across all electrodes (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980). 
  
Figure 13. Topographic Differences between Subsequent Memory Conditions 
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Figure 13. Topographic dissimilarity analysis of ERPs recorded during the encoding phase of Experiment 1.  On the y-axis, 1 minus p-
values greater than 0.95 indicate statistically reliable differences between the ERP scalp topographies of the conditions being compared.  
Panel A compares identified hits vs. misses, Panel B compares unidentified hits vs. misses, and Panel C compares hit types.
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Retrieval: Old/New Effects  
In testing for the presence of old/new effects, the mean voltage of the ERPs 
elicited by hits were compared to the mean voltage of ERPs elicited by correct rejections 
from the long encoding condition, resulting in three condition-based contrasts: Identified 
hits in the long encoding condition vs. correct rejections (long identified condition), 
identified hits in the short encoding condition vs. correct rejections (short identified 
condition), and unidentified hits in the short encoding condition vs. correct rejections 
(unidentified condition). Because the means of the three hit conditions were all 
compared to the same correct rejection mean, it was not possible to perform a single 
ANOVAs to compare old/new differences amongst each other.  Therefore, separate 
Time (6) by Condition (2: hit, correct rejection) by Electrode (4) ANOVAs were 
conducted for each hit type and scalp region.  To compare the magnitude of the old/new 
effects reported below, hits were subjected to a series Region (3) by Condition (2) by 
Electrode (4) ANOVAs performed separately for each of the six 100 ms intervals. The 
results of these ANOVAs are provided in Table 2. 
Anterior frontal region.  Old/new differences over the anterior frontal scalp were 
detected only for long and short identified picture trials (Table 2).  For long identified 
picture trials, an old/new difference was present between 500-600 ms, although the 
ERP for old pictures was more negative-going than the ERP waveform for new pictures 
(the opposite of the pattern typically characterizing explicit recognition memory, see 
Figure 15, electrodes Fp1/Fp2).  It is likely that this old/new difference is a polarity 
inverted parietal old/new effect that, as will be described below, was present for long 
identified trails during this time interval.  Nevertheless, the mean amplitudes of each of 
the three hit types did not differ reliably between 500-600 ms (right panel, Figure 14).  
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Thus, although a reliable reversed-polarity old/new effect was observed for identified 
long trials, the effect itself was not robust enough to differ from the statistically unreliable 
differences observed for the other two conditions. 
In the short identified condition, an old/new effect was present between 400-500 
ms (middle column, Table 2), and was characterized by the typical pattern of a more 
negative going waveform for new pictures relative to old pictures.  As shown in the left 
panel of Figure 14, mean voltage of differed among hit types between 400-500 ms (right 
most column, Table 2), with follow-up contrasts confirming that the mean voltage for 
short identified hits was greater that mean voltage for long identified hits (F(1, 31) = 
12.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .29).  Neither of the two identified hit types differed from 
unidentified hits. 
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Figure 14. Mean voltage for each hit type across region of the scalp between 400-500 ms (left panel) 
and between 500-600 ms (right panel).  Error bars represent standard error.  * indicates a statistically 
reliable difference between adjacent bars (p < .05).  An “*” above a horizontal line indicates that the 
corresponding mean is reliably greater than means corresponding to an “*” below a horizontal line. 
 
Frontal region. Over the frontal scalp, FN400s were present between 300-600 
ms.  Reliable FN400s were present between 300-500 ms for the long identified 
condition, between 300-600 ms for the short identified condition, and between 400-600 
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ms for the unidentified condition; all FN400s were characterized as more negative-going 
waveforms for new pictures than for old pictures.    
Table 2.   
F-table for the Simple Effects of Condition across Time and Region 
        Hits vs. Correct Rejections   Hits  
Region Long Identified (LI) Short Identified (SI) Unidentified (U)      LI x SI x U (2, 30)
200-300 ms     
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) - - - - 
300-400 ms      
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) †12.36**, .29 †27.16***, .47 - 5.13*, .26 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) †5.59*, .15 - - - 
400-500 ms      
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) - †6.09*, .16 - 6.16**, .29 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) †12.89**, .29 †58.68***, .65 †5.95*, .16 12.03***, .45 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) †9.73**, .24 - - 8.91**, .37 
500-600 ms      
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) 5.16*, .14 - - - 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) - †23.50***, .43 †4.72*, .13 6.91**, .32 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) †21.93***, .41 †8.52**, .22 - 5.06*, .25 
600-700 ms      
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) - - - - 
700-800 ms      
   Ant. Frontal (AF)  (1, 31) - - - - 
   Frontal (F)  (1, 31) - †4.80*, .13 - - 
   Parietal (P)  (1, 31) - - - - 
     
 
Table 2. The three middle columns report the F-ratios and ηp2 (partial-eta squared) for the simple effects of 
condition.  The simple effects were the product of a series of Time (6) x Condition (2: hit vs. correct rejection)  x 
Electrode (4) ANOVAs that contrasted mean voltage for hits versus correct rejections separately for each of the 
three scalp regions (anterior [ant.] frontal, frontal, parietal).  The symbol preceding the F-ratios indicates old>new 
(†).  The right-most column reports the F-ratios and ηp2 for the simple effects of condition resulting from a series 
of Condition (3: long identified hits, short identified hits, short unidentified hits) x Region (3) x Electrode (4) 
ANOVAs that contrasted mean voltage for the three hit types separately for each of the six 100 ms intervals.  For 
all four columns, the symbols following the F-ratios indicate statistical significance of the F-test: -  (p > .07), x 
(.07≤ p ≥ .05), * (p < .05) , ** (p < .01), *** ((p < .001). 
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Mean amplitude for hits varied across condition for each 100 ms interval between 
300-600 ms (right-most column of Table 2).  Between 300-400 ms, the mean voltage of 
short identified hits was more positive than that of long identified hits (F(1, 31) = 8.22, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .21) and unidentified hits (F(1, 31) = 7.48, p < .01, ηp2 = .19). Shown in 
Figure 14, the mean voltage of short identified hits was also more positive than the 
mean voltage for both long identified (F(1, 31) = 22.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .42) and for 
unidentified hits (F(1, 31) = 13.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .31) between 400-500 ms, possibly 
suggesting a stronger familiarity signal for short identified hits.  Again, long identified hits 
and unidentified hits did not differ.  Lastly, between 500-600 ms, short identified hits 
were more positive than and long identified hits (F(1, 31) = 13.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .30).  
No other differences were detected.  
Parietal region.  As was the case for the FN400, parietal old/new effects were 
present between 300-600 ms (Table 2).  Statistically reliable parietal effects were 
present for each 100 ms interval between 300-600 ms for the long identified condition, 
and exclusively between 500-600 ms for the short identified condition; no reliable 
parietal old/new effects were detected in the unidentified condition.  Although the long 
identified condition was the only condition to produce a reliable old/new effect between 
300-400 ms, a one-way ANOVA failed to detect differences in amplitude between long 
identified hits and hits from the other two conditions, reducing the interpretability of this 
early difference.  The presence of a parietal old/new effect for both types of identified 
hits, but not unidentified hits, is consistent with the predictions outlined earlier in this 
chapter that identified pictures would be recognized on the basis of both recollection and 
familiarity, whereas unidentified pictures would be recognized on the basis of familiarity 
alone.  
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 Amplitude differences between hit types emerged between 400-500 ms and 
were reliable until ~600 ms (see right-most column of Table 2).  Follow-up contrasts 
showed that mean amplitude for ERPs to long identified hits was greater than the ERP 
amplitudes for both short identified hits (F(1, 31) = 9.34, p < .01, ηp2 = .23) and 
unidentified hits (F(1, 31) = 7.52, p < .01, ηp2 = .20); amplitude did not differ between 
short identified and unidentified hits between 400-500 ms.   
 
Figure 15. Retrieval Old/New Effects 
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Figure 15. Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs recorded during retrieval at frontal (F1/F2) and 
parietal electrodes (P1/P2) in Experiment 1.  Time scaling ranges from -300 to 1000 ms.  The latency 
of the FN400 is shaded in dark-gray and the latency of the parietal old/new effect is shaded in light-
gray.  Positive deflections are plotted upward.  See Appendix A for full electrode figure. 
 
Between 500-600 ms, however, the amplitudes of ERPs to short and long 
identified hits were statistically equivalent, suggesting equivalent degrees of recollection. 
While the amplitude of the ERP to long identified hits was greater than that of 
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unidentified hits (F(1, 31) = 9.90, p < .01, ηp2 = .24), ERP amplitudes for identified short 
hits and unidentified hits did not differ. 
Topographic Analysis of Retrieval ERPs 
Topographic Dissimilarity Analysis.  Results of the topographic dissimilarity 
analyses (Figure 16) illustrates that distinct scalp topographies existed between each of 
the three hit types and correct rejections (henceforth referred to as topographic old/new 
effects).  Topographic old/new effects were present from 290–690 ms and 746–1000 ms 
for short identified pictures (Figure 16a), from 332-542 ms and 762-1000 ms for long 
identified pictures (Figure 16c), and from 400–1000 ms for unidentified pictures (Figure 
16e).  For each of the three conditions, the topographic old/new effects roughly 
correspond to the ERP old/new differences that were identified in the waveform analysis 
(primarily between 400-500 ms).  This suggests that both quantitative and qualitative 
differences in neural activity for recognized and unrecognized novel pictures existed 
during latencies known to correspond to successful retrieval of episodic memory. 
 To determine how the topographic old/new effects, themselves, differed between 
conditions, three dissimilarity analyses were conducted on old-new differences waves 
(hits – correct rejections): long identified vs. short identified (Figure 16b), short identified 
vs. unidentified (Figure 16d), and long identified vs. unidentified (Figure 16f).  As can be 
seen in the right column of Figure 16, between 200-800 ms, topographic old/new effects 
between short identified and long identified pictures differed during two distinct intervals: 
458-538, 664-740 ms (Figure 16b).  Topographic old/new effects also differed between 
two distinct intervals for long identified and unidentified pictures between 278-420 ms 
and 478-584 ms (Figure 16d), and for topographic old new differences between short 
identified and unidentified pictures differed between 300-330 ms and 534-642 ms 
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(Figure 16f).   
These patterns are largely consistent with what one would expect on the basis of 
the waveform analysis.  For example, an FN400 was present for both short identified 
hits and short unidentified hits between 400-500 ms, and no difference between the 
topographic old/new effects were present during this interval for short identified and 
unidentified pictures (Figure 16f).  This suggests that no qualitative differences existed 
between the old/new effects for short identified and unidentified pictures.  Likewise, a 
parietal old/new effect was present for short identified pictures but not unidentified 
pictures between 500-600 ms.  Consistent with this pattern, differences were present for 
the topographic old/new effect contrast of short identified and unidentified pictures 
(Figure 16f).  This pattern was expected given that old/new differences were present for 
short identified pictures over the parietal region of the scalp, were not present over the 
parietal scalp for unidentified pictures.  In general, this pattern is consistent with the 
notion that a distinct recollection process was engaged for identified hits that was not 
also engaged for unidentified hits. 
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Figure 16. Global Topographic Dissimilarity between Hits and Correct Rejections 
Hits vs. Correct Rejections Hits 
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Figure 16.  Topographic dissimilarity analysis of ERPs recorded during the retrieval phase of 
Experiment 1.  On the y-axis, 1 minus p-values greater than 0.95 indicate statistically reliable 
differences between the ERP scalp topographies of the conditions being compared.  Panels A, C, and 
E compare hits with correct rejections, whereas Panels B, D, and F compare hit types. 
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Discussion of Experiment 1 Results 
The goals of Experiment 1 were two-fold.  The first goal was to determine 
whether the putative neural correlate of familiarity (FN400) would be present for 
recognized pictures that were not identified by name during encoding (RWPI effect), and 
if so, whether the FN400 would be present in the absence of the putative neural 
correlate of recollection (parietal old/new effect) for these trials.  It was predicted that 
recognition memory for identified pictures in both encoding conditions would be based 
on both recollection and familiarity, and would therefore elicit an FN400 and a parietal 
old/new effect.  The behavioral data replicated previous studies by demonstrating a 
RWPI effect for briefly presented, masked pictures, so, as implied above, it also was 
predicted that recognition memory for unidentified pictures would be familiarity-based, 
and consequently would elicit only an FN400. 
The retrieval data showed that between 400-500 ms, an FN400 was present for 
recognized pictures not identified during encoding.  Moreover, no parietal old/new effect 
was observed at any point during the retrieval epoch for unidentified pictures.  The data 
for unidentified pictures that were later recognized stand in contrast to the data for 
recognized pictures that were identified either during the long or short encoding tasks.  
For such pictures, both an FN400 and a parietal old/new effect were observed.  The 
FN400 was present between 300-500 ms for identified pictures in the long encoding 
condition, and between 400-600 ms for pictures in the short encoding condition.  When 
the FN400 was present for identified pictures in the long encoding condition and 
unidentified pictures, their effects were consistently of lesser amplitudes than the effect 
for identified pictures in the short encoding condition, with the exception of the 500-600 
ms interval where identified and unidentified pictures in the short encoding condition did 
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not appear to differ.  The FN400 was present in all three conditions only during the 400-
500 ms interval. 
Clear parietal effects were found in the long identified condition between 400-600 
ms, whereas for the short identified condition the parietal effect was present only 
between 500-600 ms.  No parietal effect was present for unidentified pictures.  Thus, the 
main finding within the retrieval data was that an FN400, in the absence of a parietal 
old/new effect, was present only for recognized pictures that were not identified at 
encoding.  These data suggest that when impoverished encoding conditions prevent a 
picture from being identified by name, subsequent recognition of the picture is likely 
based on familiarity. 
The second goal of Experiment 1 was to examine the sequence of neural activity 
that unfolded during the perceptual identification task (encoding task).  The purpose was 
to identify the earliest separation between ERPs for subsequently recognized identified 
and unidentified pictures.  The running assumption was that the timing of this separation 
would point to the last stage of unimpeded object processing undergone by the 
unidentified pictures, and that this would provide insight into the type of features that 
might have been stored in the pictorial memory trace.  It was predicted that 
subsequently recognized unidentified pictures would undergo perceptual closure (NCL), 
but not object model selection/object categorization (N350).  This prediction was based 
on the results of previous research (Bacon-Mace, Mace, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorp, 2005) 
that has suggested that the backward masking during encoding disrupts categorization 
of a picture, and that such disruption would be seen as a modulation of the N350 
(Shendan & Kutas, 2007). 
 A difference was observed during the 200-300 ms interval between subsequent 
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misses and both subsequent hit types, suggests that subsequently missed pictures did 
not achieve the same degree of closure (if at all) as identified and unidentified pictures 
that were subsequently recognized.  In addition, ERPs to unidentified hits did not differ 
from ERPs to identified hits between 200-300 ms over the parietal region of the scalp, 
suggesting that perceptual closure was achieved to a similar extent for both types of 
subsequently recognized pictures. 
Assuming that the N350/P350 indexes a search of the perceptual 
representations system, the graded pattern seen over the parietal region of the scalp 
between 300-500 ms suggests that participants recovered non-diagnostic information 
during the encoding of unidentified pictures that were subsequently forgotten, resulting 
in a large N350.  The N350 for unidentified subsequent hits was smaller in amplitude 
than it was for unidentified misses, suggesting that participants recovered more object 
information on unidentified hit trials.  The N350 for identified hits was the smallest in 
amplitude, which is consistent with predictions from the literature.  That is, the 
attenuation of the N350 for identified hits implies that both complete object component 
recovery and model selection occurred and, therefore, a less extensive search of the 
structural description system was undertaken on these trials.  The fact that the N350 
was larger for unidentified hits than for identified hits implies that a more extensive 
search of the structural description system occurred for unidentified hit trials, possibly 
because the object components that were recovered yielded matches to many structural 
object descriptions (Schendan & Kutas, 2007).  The ERP data do not definitively 
indicate whether or not the search of the structural description system was successful 
for unidentified hit trials.  However, successful matching of a perceptually closed object 
representation to a structural description allows for object categorization to occur, which 
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presumably would have been followed by conscious object naming.  Obviously, the 
status of these trials as “unidentified” indicates that object naming did not occur.  Based 
on the present data, therefore it seems most plausible to infer that object model 
selection did not occur. 
 After accepting the inferences that subsequently recognized unidentified pictures 
were perceptually closed, and that structural description representations were activated 
for these pictures in the absence of successful object model selection, the implications 
for the potential contents of the pictorial memory trace are more straightforward.  Given 
that the structural description system representations houses representations that are 
visually abstract (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1994; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 
2001; Schendan & Kutas, 2007), attributes such as picture identity episodic context, 
local features, and other perceptual specifics housed in the episodic representation 
system (e.g., orientation, size) are unlikely candidates for components of the pictorial 
memory trace for picture not identified at encoding.  Thus, with regard to perceptual 
information, it would seem that abstract visual information in the form of global object 
structure or the general configuration of an object’s component parts (possibly geons, 
Biederman, 1987) are the most plausible candidates.  With regard to other forms of 
information, it is very possible that conceptual/semantic information is also stored with 
the pictorial memory trace for unidentified masked pictures.  As pointed out by 
Schendan and Kutas (2007), the N350 reflects a neural system that supports perceptual 
and conceptual implicit memory, “generic memory” (Hintzman, 1978), in addition to 
object model selection.  The data from the present experiment, however, cannot speak 
to this issue as conceptual processing was not directly manipulated. 
 Considering the data from retrieval within the context of the data from encoding, 
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the suggestion is that the successful familiarity-based recognition of pictures that were 
not identified at encoding in Experiment 1 may have been based on non-episodic, 
abstract perceptual information, and potentially some as-of-yet unspecified 
conceptual/semantic information.  Both possibilities are explored in Experiment 2. 
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CHAPTER 7: EXPERIMENT 2 
A primary goal of Experiment 2 was to expand upon the capacity of the design 
used in Experiment 1 to shed light on the type information capable of supporting 
familiarity-based recognition.  This goal was approached in the following ways:  First, 
previous research has demonstrated the potential of inclusion/exclusion retrieval 
instructions to alter the relevancy of a stimulus’ perceptual versus conceptual attributes 
during a recognition memory test (e.g., ; Stenberg et al., 2006).  With regard to 
familiarity specifically, Ecker and Zimmer (2009) found that the FN400 was sensitive to 
study-test congruency, but that it depended on the retrieval instructions. 
In Ecker and Zimmer’s (2009) study, they presented participants with pictures 
during encoding, and with either new pictures, old pictures, or exemplar old pictures 
(same object, different instance; see Figure 17) during test trials.  In one condition 
participants were instructed during the memory test to endorse both identical studied 
pictures and different exemplars of studied pictures as old (inclusion instructions).  In the 
second condition, participants were instructed during the memory test to only endorse 
identical studied pictures as old (exclusion instructions).   Ecker and Zimmer argued that 
reducing the relevance of the stimuli’s perceptual attributes during a memory test by 
introducing inclusion instructions should bias participants toward evaluating test pictures 
on a more conceptual level (Ecker & Zimmer, 2009; Stenberg et al., 2006).  The logic 
was that the matching of perceptual features between encoding and retrieval would not 
be relevant to whether participants endorse the test pictures as old or new, as exemplar 
pictures would not match perceptually but were still to be endorsed as old.  Consistent 
with this idea, Ecker and Zimmer found an FN400 for both types of test pictures in the 
inclusion condition, with the effect being larger for identical pictures than for exemplar 
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pictures. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Example of exemplar stimuli (same/different). 
 
Under exclusion retrieval instruction conditions, the stimuli’s perceptual attributes 
would be particularly relevant (Stenberg et al., 2006), as only test pictures that were 
perceptually identical to those shown at encoding were to be endorsed as old.  In fact, 
relying on conceptual matches between encoding and retrieval would lead to the 
incorrect endorsement of exemplars under exclusion instructions, as decisions based on 
conceptual information alone would not be able to distinguish between identical and 
exemplar pictures (conceptually identical).  For the inclusion condition, Ecker and 
Zimmer observed an FN400 only for identical pictures, a finding that was consistent with 
the logic of using the exclusion instructions.  They interpreted the whole of their findings 
as evidence that familiarity is not just data-driven, but also influenced by top-down 
processes (retrieval orientation).   
The authors rightly point out that familiarity is quite often described as an 
“undifferentiated feeling of prior occurrence” (see Rugg & Curran, 2007), but argue that 
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this does not preclude the influence of an objects conceptual and perceptual features in 
the production of the “undifferentiated” memory signal.  Ecker and Zimmer further argue 
that the role of such perceptual and conceptual information plays in familiarity-based 
memory likely depends on task demands (or task-dependent strategies)—a idea that 
challenges the widely held view that familiarity is a highly automatic, and by extension 
an inflexible, process (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002).  If true, the manipulation of participants’ 
retrieval orientation could provide a means of further specifying the type of information 
that supported the recognition of unidentified pictures in Experiment 1.   
 Manipulating retrieval orientation within the context of the RWPI procedure 
should bias participants’ processing of the test stimuli toward perceptual or conceptual 
attributes, depending on the retrieval instructions.  If the memory trace for unidentified 
pictures contain primarily abstract perceptual representations, as could possibly be 
inferred from the results of Experiment 1, one might expect exclusion instructions to 
improve memory performance because participants would be biased toward processing 
the type of stimulus attributes (perceptual) that are dominate in the picture’s memory 
trace, thereby making more salient the match between what is being perceived and 
what is stored in memory.  Conversely, if an substantial degree of conceptual 
information was part of the memory trace for unidentified pictures (which cannot be ruled 
out on the basis of the results of Experiment 1), one might expect equivalent memory 
between retrieval instruction conditions, or possibly superior memory following inclusion 
instructions.  In either case, the outcome would be informative about the nature of what 
is stored in the memory trace for unidentified pictures, and the types of information that 
are capable of serving as evidence for familiarity judgments. 
There is reason to suspect that manipulations at encoding may also be 
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informative about the type of information contained within the pictorial memory trace for 
pictures unidentified during encoding.  Recall that the ERP encoding data from 
Experiment 1 suggest convincingly that the critical difference between unidentified 
pictures that were subsequently remembered and unidentified pictures that were 
subsequently forgotten was the success of the perceptual closure process.  Moreover, a 
difference was also apparent between these trials for the N350, which, as already 
described, is a component thought to reflect a search of perceptual representations. 
Thus, it stands to reason that additional resources devoted to perceptual processing at 
encoding may further facilitate the formation of memory traces for unidentified pictures 
that are accessed during retrieval.  Likewise, it is plausible that increased attention to 
conceptual components of the stimuli could bolster the memory trace by increasing the 
proportion of conceptual pictorial information. 
 With regard to the effects of encoding task on the neural correlates of retrieval, 
anticipating the outcome is more difficult.  One reason for this is because ERP studies 
that have intentionally manipulated encoding task have not done so in a way that orients 
participants towards attending to either perceptual attributes of to-be-remembered 
stimuli or conceptual/semantic attributes to-be-remembered stimuli.  Rather, the 
dichotomy is typically in terms of “shallow” and “deep” processing (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972).  The majority of “deep” encoding instructions do involve participants processing 
the stimuli on a meaningful level (e.g., is the object depicted living or non-living, Duarte 
et al., 2004; Otten & Rugg, 2001).  However, the majority of “shallow” processing 
instructions do not specifically orient participants towards stimuli’s perceptual attributes.  
Rather, such instructions orient participants towards processing the stimuli in ways that 
generally that avoid meaningful processing.  Examples of such superficial processing 
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instructions include instructing participants to determine (a) whether the first and last 
letter of a name/word are in alphabetical order (Otten & Rugg, 2001; Rugg et al.., 2000) 
or whether the word’s vowels are in alphabetic order (Allan et al., 2002) or the number 
of syllables in the word (Fay, Isingrini, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2005), (b) whether the object is 
manipulable (Duarte et al. 2004; Otten & Rugg, 2001), and (c) whether the object is left 
or right of a fixation point (Iidaka, Matsumoto, Nogawa, Yamamoto, & Sadato, 2006).  
Thus, there is little past research on which to base predictions about perceptual and 
conceptual encoding manipulations in ERP research. 
 A second reason that the results of a perceptual/conceptual encoding task 
manipulation are difficult to anticipate is because the results of ERP studies that have 
examined more general encoding task manipulations on retrieval have produced 
conflicting results.  That is, some studies report little to no modulation of familiarity 
related old/new effects (e.g., Rugg et al., 1998) while others report considerable 
modulation of familiarity old/new effects (e.g., Rugg et al., 2000).  Moreover, some 
studies imply that stimulus class (Allan et al., 2000) or intent to remember (van Hooff, 
2005) have more pronounced effects on ERPs at retrieval.  In these latter cases, the 
general finding is only that waveforms will be more positive for the condition that should 
produce better memory (e.g., more memorable stimulus classes, like pictures relative to 
words, and intentional versus incidental encoding instructions, respectively).  
In Experiment 2 an inclusion/exclusion manipulation was added to the retrieval 
phase of the current design in order to asses the claims of Ecker and Zimmer (2009).  In 
addition, an encoding instruction manipulation was added to the encoding phase of 
Experiment 2, despite the ambiguity that exists regarding its effectiveness.  The 
encoding manipulation required that participants attend to the conceptual attributes of 
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the pictures (a living/non-living judgment) or the visual/physical attributes of the stimulus 
(a judgment regarding the lines contained within the picture).  To the degree that this 
manipulation may direct processing to different attributes of the of the study-list stimuli, it 
creates the appropriate experimental conditions for the emergence of dissociations 
between conceptual and perceptual processes at encoding and retrieval. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty Iowa State University undergraduates (mean age: 20.2 years, range: 18-
28, 7 females) participated in exchange for research participation credit in a lower-level 
psychology course.  All participants provided informed consent, and the study was 
approved by the Human Participant Institutional Review Board of Iowa State University.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two retrieval instruction conditions, the 
inclusion condition (n = 15) or the exclusion condition (n = 15).  
Materials and Design 
Two sets of 512 line drawings were used in the present experiment.  For clarity, I 
refer to the two picture sets as Picture Set A and Picture Set B.  Set A is composed of 
images that are exemplars of the images in Set B.  That is, for every object or animal 
(e.g., pencil, gorilla) depicted by an image in Set A, a different instance (i.e., exemplar) 
of the same object or animal is depicted in Set B.  Images corresponding in this way 
between the two sets share the same name and categorical identity, but the visual 
characteristics of the two images are distinct (see Figure 17). 
 Each picture set was divided in half, resulting if four sets of 256 pictures.  One of 
these halves (256 pictures) from Sets A and B were assigned to serve as “old” stimuli 
and the remaining pictures served as “new” stimuli.  Across four study-test blocks, a 
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given participant would study a total of 256 pictures from either Set A or Set B.  During 
memory testing, half of all “old” pictures (128 pictures) were from Set A and half were 
from Set B.  In other words, half of the old test pictures were exact perceptual matches 
to pictures presented during encoding and the other half were exemplar pictures.  
Likewise, half of all new stimuli presented at test were from Set A and the other half 
were from Set B.  Assignment of Old/New status to pictures from Sets A and B was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the inclusion condition or the 
exclusion condition.  Before the onset of the experiment, participants were run through a 
short practice session that familiarized them with the encoding and retrieval sequences.  
The initial instructions in the practice session explained to participants that the 
experiment would involve the brief presentation of masked picture, and that they would 
be asked to judge whether the pictures was of a living or non-living object (animacy 
encoding), or whether the picture was composed of more horizontal lines or more 
vertical lines (line encoding).  To respond to question about the picture, participants 
pressed the “v” key (living, or horizontal) or the “”b” key (non-living, vertical).  After 
making either the animacy or the line decision, participants were to name the picture 
aloud.  During the practice session, participants perceptually identified four pictures in 
the line encoding task, and four pictures in the animacy encoding task (in separate 
blocks). 
In the next phase of the practice session, the instructions indicated that 
participants would receive a memory test for the pictures they had just seen.  
Participants were presented with one of two instructional displays (Appendix B), which 
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explained that some of the pictures on the test would be identical to those shown in the 
encoding phase, while others would be a different instance (exemplar) of a seen picture.  
Participants in the inclusion condition were instructed to endorse a picture as old, even if 
the picture had changed in its visual form (top panel of Appendix B); participants in the 
exclusion instruction condition were instructed to endorse pictures as old only if they 
were identical to what was seen previously (bottom panel of Appendix B).  Participants 
were then shown an instructional display that described how their memory response 
should be made.  The display (Appendix C) instructed participants that in making their 
old/new discriminations, they should indicate yes (the picture was studied) or no (the 
picture is new) on a 6-point scale (Yes:1 2 3 | 4 5 6 :No).  Reponses of “1” indicated a 
high certainty in their yes response, and “6” a high certainty in their no response (see 
Appendix C).  Numbers toward the middle of the scale (e.g., 3, 4) indicated the lowest 
certainty in their responses.  Responses 1-6 on the rating scale corresponded to keys X-
M on the bottom row of the keyboard (see Appendix C).  Participants then engaged in 
four test trials on which they practiced making their memory response. 
In both conditions, participants completed two study-test blocks.  Within each 
block, participants attempted to perceptual identify 128 masked pictures (the timing for 
the fixation, mask, and stimulus presentation sequence was identical to that used in the 
short encoding condition of Experiment 1; see Figure 10).  However, prior to each 
fixation, participants were presented with one of two cues (“living/non-living,” or 
“horizontal/vertical”; assignment of encoding task to block was counterbalanced across 
participant).  The cues appeared for 1000 ms, and were followed by a blank screen for 
1000 ms before the onset of the fixation cross (1000 ms).  The forward and backward 
masked picture was presented immediately after the fixation cross offset (see Figure 
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10). 
Following the picture’s presentation, participants were asked to provide their 
living/non-living horizontal/vertical judgment (like during the practice trails).  After making 
their response, participants were prompted to identify the picture aloud.  Half of all 
encoding trials were accompanied by the living/non-living (animacy) task and the other 
half were accompanied by the horizontal/vertical (line) task. 
At test, participants discriminated between 64 perceptually matching studied 
pictures, 64 conceptually matching exemplar pictures, and 128 pictures that were both 
perceptually and conceptually novel.  Following their yes-no rating, participants were 
asked to provide a source memory judgment about the test picture.  When asked “What 
decision did you make for this picture?”, participants chose form the following options: 2 
= “Horizontal/Vertical Lines,” 3 =  “Living/Non-Living,” 3 =  “I don’t know,” and 4 =  “It was 
new.”   
Electrophysiological recording and analysis.  The electrophysiological 
recording and statistical analysis in the present experiment were identical to that of 
Experiment 1 unless stated otherwise.   That is, the same array of 68 scalp electrodes, 
recording parameters (e.g., digitized at 500 Hz, etc.), and analysis software and artifact 
correction algorithms were used in Experiment 2 that were used in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 Results 
Behavioral Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, participants’ ability to identify line drawings during the 
perceptual identification task (at encoding) was quantified as the mean proportion 
identified.  Participants’ ability to discriminate between old and new pictures was 
quantified as the UVSD model discrimination index da.  Conditional mean da values are 
  104
shown in Figure 18. 
Picture identification at encoding.  Participants’ identification rates were 
approximately 30% in both the inclusion condition (M = 30.55, SD = 0.15) and the 
exclusion condition (M = 30.01, SD = 0.14), with no reliable differences detected 
between groups (t < 1.0).   
Recognition memory.  Although participants’ old/new discrimination was 
relatively low for unidentified pictures (d′s < 0.7) relative to identified pictures (d′s ≥  0.7), 
discrimination was significantly above chance (d′ = 0) for all unidentified picture 
conditions (ps < .05; see Figure 18).  Thus, the behavioral results of Experiment 
replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 and of previous studies by showing 
that RWPI occurs when (a) participants are asked to make judgments about the stimuli 
in addition to the task of identifying the stimulus by name, and (b) when exclusion 
instructions are given to participants during retrieval. 
To examine the effects of the encoding and retrieval manipulations on picture 
recognition, a retrieval instruction (2: inclusion vs. exclusion) by encoding task (2: 
animacy vs. lines) by test cue type (2: matching picture vs. exemplar picture) by 
identification status (2: identified vs. unidentified) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  The 
ANOVA revealed an encoding by match by identification status interaction, F(1, 28) = 
5.83, MSE = .10, p < .05, ηp2 = .17, along with main effects of encoding, F(1, 28) = 10.11, 
MSE = .28, p < .01, ηp2 = .27, identification status,F(1, 28) = 142.05, MSE = .36, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .80, and retrieval instruction, F(1, 28) = 4.25, MSE = .88, p < .05, ηp2 = .13.  
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Figure 18. Experiment 2: Picture Recognition Memory 
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Figure 18. Error bars represent standard error. * denotes a statistically reliable difference in mean recognition  
memory between pictures encoded in the animacy and line tasks. 
 
In follow-up analyses on the three-way interaction, paired comparisons for 
identified pictures revealed that differences between encoding tasks were present for 
matching test-pictures that were recognized under inclusion instructions, and exemplar 
test-pictures recognized under both inclusion and exclusion instructions.  In all cases, 
these differences showed greater memory following animacy encoding than following 
line encoding (ps < .05).  For unidentified pictures, differences between encoding tasks 
were observed for exemplar test-pictures under both inclusion and exclusion instructions 
(ps < .05), and for matching test-pictures under inclusion instructions (p = .05).  After 
collapsing across variables of retrieval instruction and test cue type, this trend was 
substantiated by an encoding by identification status cross-over interaction (F(1, 28) = 
20.77, MSE = .82, p < .001, ηp2 = .43), with paired contrasts showing that picture 
recognition was better in the animacy task than in the line task for identified pictures 
(F(1, 28) = 17.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), while picture recognition was better in the line 
task than in the animacy task for unidentified pictures (F(1, 28) = 15.95, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.36).  
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Follow-up analyses exploring the main effects showed that the main effect of 
encoding was reliable for both identified pictures (F(1, 28) = 17.90, MSE = 1.00, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .39) and unidentified pictures (F(1, 28) = 15.95, MSE = .16, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.36) separately.  The main effect of retrieval instruction was reliable for identified 
pictures (F(1, 28) = 5.86, MSE = .85, p < .05, ηp2 = .17), but not unidentified pictures (F < 
1.0).  This dissociation was substantiated by an identification status by retrieval 
instruction interaction (F(1, 28) = 4.00, MSE = .36, p = .05, ηp2 = .13).   Furthermore, 
paired comparisons indicated that picture memory differed as a function of retrieval 
instructions (inclusion > exclusion) only for identified matching pictures that were initially 
encoded in the animacy task (p < .05).  No direct differences between matching and 
exemplar pictures were observed in any condition. 
 
Figure 19. Experiment 2: Picture Source Memory 
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Figure 19. Error bars represent standard error.  The dashed line indicates chance performance level. 
 
Source memory.  To further characterize recognition memory during retrieval, 
the accuracy of participants’ source memory judgments were examined to assess the 
degree to which the recall of episodic details may have contributed to picture 
recognition.  As shown in Figure 19, participants accuracy in recalling the context (i.e., 
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the encoding task) in which an old test item was studied was at or below chance (0.50) 
across all conditions.  This suggests that the retrieval of certain contextual details 
present during a given stimulus’s encoding did not contribute in a measurable way to 
picture recognition during retrieval. 
Discussion of Behavioral Results 
The behavioral recognition memory results of Experiment 2 yielded four main 
results.  First, the data revealed opposite effects of encoding task on recognition 
memory for identified and unidentified pictures, showing that orienting participants’ 
processing toward perceptual or conceptual processing has different effects on how well 
identified and unidentified pictures are later recognized.  Second, effects of retrieval 
instruction were limited to recognition of identified pictures following the animacy 
encoding task.  Third, no effects of perceptual mismatching were found for either 
identified or unidentified pictures.  Fourth source memory was at or below chance for 
both identified and unidentified pictures in all conditions.   
The effect of encoding task is of most interest because it demonstrates a 
dissociation between recognition for identified and unidentified pictures.  Many 
behavioral studies have shown that deeper, semantic levels of processing benefit both 
recollection and familiarity, with recollection generally benefiting more than familiarity 
(e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; Khoe et al., 2000; Rajaram, 1993; Toth, 
1996; Wagner et al., 1997; Yonelinas, 2001).  While some studies have shown size 
congruency effects only on recollection (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 
1999; Java, Gregg, & Gardiner, 1997), few studies have shown benefits of shallow (or 
perceptual) encoding on familiarity over deep (or conceptual) processing (Rajaram, 
1993). 
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Nevertheless, the greater RWPI effect for the line encoding condition over the 
animacy encoding condition is consistent with a prediction described at the outset of this 
chapter.  Specifically, it was suggested that if unidentified pictures at encoding led to 
memory traces consisting of primarily of perceptual information, and if this perceptual 
information played a key role in the unidentified picture’s later recognition, then orienting 
participants towards perceptual information during encoding could have improved 
encoding of this critical perceptual material and led to better recognition during retrieval. 
Given the potentially large role of perceptual processing in the RWPI effect 
observed here (such that it was larger following perceptual encoding relative to 
conceptual encoding), it may be tempting to attribute the results to perceptual priming. 
However, it would be difficult to explain the RWPI effects observed in Experiment 2 
through a perceptual priming account given the lack of perceptual mismatching effects 
observed between matching and exemplar pictures.  Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the consistent and reliable decrease of perceptual priming following 
substantial changes to the perceptual characteristics of a picture or object, such as 
when exemplars are shown at test (e.g., Bar & Biederman, 2001; Biederman & Cooper, 
1991a, 1991b), while familiarity-based recognition has been shown in some cases to be 
unaffected even when the format of the stimuli has changed (picture vs. word; Langley, 
2008; Lebreton, Desgranges, Landaeu, Eustache, & Baron, 2001) or when modality has 
changed (auditory vs. visual; Rajaram, 1993).  Given that there was no decline in 
recognition memory for exemplar pictures, perceptual priming seems an unlikely 
explanation.  Conceptual priming also seems an unlikely explanation, given that the 
more conceptually oriented encoding task led to worse recognition memory than did the 
more perceptually oriented encoding task.  Thus, the RWPI effects observed here were 
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likely explicit in nature. 
If the RWPI effects reported here are explicit, largely perceptual in nature, and 
not affected by changes in visual form (exemplars), a logical assumption is that the 
perceptual information driving the effect is abstract.  The stimuli used for this experiment 
were not selected in such a way that all exemplars were different in their structural 
description relative to their counterparts.  In fact, many of the pictures in the stimulus set 
appear to share a similar global shape with their exemplar counterparts.  Therefore, it is 
possible for abstract perceptual representations that are specific only with respect to 
global structure to support memory for both identical picture repetitions and exemplar 
pictures.  As was the case in Experiment 1, it is not possible to rule out the contribution 
of conceptual information.  However, the fact that a conceptual processing orientation 
during encoding lead to worse memory than did a perceptual orientation suggests, at 
the very least, that the contribution of conceptual processing does not dominate over the 
contribution of perceptual processing. 
Electrophysiological Results: Waveform Analysis 
Animacy encoding task. The ERP data from encoding were subjected to a 
Condition (3: Identified Hit, Unidentified Hit, Unidentified Miss) x Region (4: Anterior 
Frontal, Frontal, Central, Parietal) x Time (6: 200-300, 300-400, 400-500, 500-600, 600-
700, 700-800) x Electrode (4) omnibus ANOVA with smaller, more focused, follow-up 
ANOVAs and pairwise comparisons when appropriate. Table 3 provides F-values and 
ηp2-values of the simple effects of condition over each of the four scalp regions and 
across each of the six time intervals.  Figure 20 shows ERPs for subsequently 
recognized identified and unidentified pictures (hits) and subsequently forgotten 
unidentified pictures (misses) for the animacy encoding condition. 
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The N250/Ncl or P250 (200-300 ms).  Between 200-300 ms, effects of condition 
were present over the parietooccipital scalp region (see Table 3, second column from 
left; also see Figure 20).  Pairwise comparisons confirmed that mean voltage for both 
identified and unidentified hits were more negative than for misses during the latency of 
the N250 (Mdiff = 1.69, SE = .63, p < .05, Mdiff = 1.06, SE = .38, p < .05, respectively); 
mean voltage for identified and unidentified hits did not differ (Mdiff = -0.63, SE = .45, p = 
.52), suggesting no quantitative differences in the N250 between the two hit types. 
The P350 or N350 (300-500).  Between 400-500 ms, effects of condition were 
observed over the frontal scalp region (see Table 3 and Figure 20), with pairwise 
comparisons showing that the mean voltage for identified hits was less negative than 
the mean voltages for both unidentified hits and misses (Mdiff = 1.78, SE = .53, p < .01, 
Mdiff = 2.24, SE = .73, p < .05, respectively).  Mean voltage for unidentified hits and 
misses did not differ (Mdiff = 0.45, SE = .53, p = .90), suggesting that the N350 was 
present for both unidentified hits and misses to a similar degree. 
 
Table 3.     ANIMACY CONDITION: Simple Effects of Condition (Identified Hits x Unidentified Hits x Misses) by Region 
and Time 
 Identification Effects on Subsequent Memory (2, 22) 
Region 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700 700-800 
Anterior Frontal - - - - - - 
Frontal - - ┴‡5.93*, .35 - - - 
Central - - ‡3.12X, .22 ‡3.40X, .24 - - 
Parietal ┴†4.11*, .27 ┴†6.00**, .35 ┴‡7.65*, .41 ┴4.86*, .31 - - 
 
Table 3. Simple effects of condition (identified hits, unidentified hits, and unidentified misses) by region and time 
interval.  Each cell shows the f-value and partial-eta squared.  The symbols following the f-values indicate 
statistical significance of the f-test: - (p > .07), x (.07≤ p ≥ .05), * (p < .05) , ** (p < .01), *** ((p < .001).  The 
symbols preceding the f-values specify the reliable differences between conditions, as determined by planned 
pairwise comparisons: ┴ (identified hits vs. misses), ‡ (identified hits vs. unidentified this), † (unidentified hits vs. 
misses), ≡ (identified hits vs. unidentified hits, vs. misses). 
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Line encoding task.  Figure 20 shows ERPs for subsequently recognized 
identified and unidentified pictures (hits) and subsequently forgotten unidentified 
pictures (misses) for the line encoding condition.  As can be seen in both Figure 20 and 
Table 4, no statistically reliable effects of condition were observed between 200-800 ms 
over any of the four scalp regions.  One marginally reliable effect of condition was 
observed over the parietal scalp between 400-500 ms (see Table 4).  This marginal 
effect of condition was driven by a marginally less positive mean voltage for unidentified 
hits than misses (Mdiff = 0.98, SE = .41, p = .07).  Identified hits did not differ from 
unidentified hits or misses (p’s > .45).  It is seems unlikely that this marginal difference 
reflects an old/new difference that is predictive of subsequent memory, especially given 
that the difference was not observed between identified hits and misses.  Likewise, the 
difference does not appear to correspond to any of the known object identification 
ERPs. 
 
 
 
Table 4.     LINES CONDITION:  
Simple Effects of Condition (Identified Hits x Unidentified Hits x Misses) by Region and Time 
 Identification Effects on Subsequent Memory (2, 22) 
Region 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700 700-800 
Frontal Anterior - - - - - - 
Frontal - - - - - - 
Central - - - - - - 
Parietal - - † 2.97X, .21 - - - 
 
Table 4. Simple effects of condition (identified hits, unidentified hits, and unidentified misses) by region and time 
interval.  Each cell shows the f-value and partial-eta squared.  The symbols following the f-values indicate 
statistical significance of the f-test: - (p > .07), x (.07≤ p ≥ .05), * (p < .05) , ** (p < .01), *** ((p < .001).  The 
symbols preceding the f-values specify the reliable differences between conditions, as determined by planned 
pairwise comparisons: ┴ (identified hits vs. misses), ‡ (identified hits vs. unidentified this), † (unidentified hits vs. 
misses), ≡ (identified hits vs. unidentified hits, vs. misses). 
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Figure 20. Subsequent Memory ERPs for Animacy and Line Encoding Tasks 
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Figure 20. Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs recorded during encoding at fronto-central 
(FC1/FC2) and parieto-occipital electrodes (PO9/PO10) in Experiment 2.  The upper four plots show 
ERPs from the animacy encoding task, and the lower four plots show ERPs from the line encoding 
task.  Time scaling ranges from   -300 to 1200 ms.  The latency of the NCL is shaded in dark-gray and 
the latency of the N350 is shaded in light-gray.  Positive deflections are plotted upward.  See 
Appendix A for full electrode figure. 
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Effects of Encoding Task on Encoding ERPs 
To examine the effects of the encoding tasks themselves on ERPs recorded 
during encoding, an initial Task (2) by Condition (3) by Time (6) x Electrode (4) ANOVA 
was performed for each of the four regions in order to identify the scalp regions over 
which condition effects were present.  Task by condition interactions were observed for 
the frontal (F(2, 46) = 3.44, p < .05, ηp2 = .13) and parietal (F(2, 46) = 6.50, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.22) regions.  Neither a main effect of task or condition were present for the frontal 
region, but both were present for the parietal region (F(1, 23) = 4.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .17, 
F(2, 46) = 5.16, p < .01, ηp2 = .18, respectively).   
Given that the reliable task by condition interactions described above were 
present only over the frontal and parietal regions, more focused ANOVAs were limited to 
these regions.  These ANOVAs were further restricted to comparisons of two conditions, 
subsequent hit vs. subsequent miss, so that possible differences between remembered 
and forgotten pictures could be examined.  The ANOVAs revealed the presence of Task 
(2) by Condition (2: identified hits vs. unidentified misses) interactions for both the frontal 
region (F(1, 23) = 4.09 p = .05, ηp2 = .15) and the parietal region (F(1, 23) = 7.75, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .25).  No main effects of task were present for either region and there was no 
main effect of condition for the frontal region (F’s < 1.0).  There was a reliable main 
effect of condition for the parietal region (F(1, 23) = 6.97, p < .05, ηp2 = .23), however.  
No 2 x 2 interactions were present when the ANOVAs were performed using 
unidentified hits in the place of identified hits. 
Follow-up Task (2) by Condition (2) by Electrode (4) ANOVAs were conducted 
separately for each time period for the frontal and parietal regions to better define the 
task by condition interactions.  Task by condition interactions were observed over the 
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frontal scalp between 400-500 ms (F(1, 23) = 4.71 p < .05, ηp2 = .17) and 700-800 ms 
(F(1, 23) = 6.12 p < .05, ηp2 = .21), with a marginally reliable main effect of condition 
(F(1, 23) = 4.12 p = .05, ηp2 = .15) during the 400-500 ms interval.  Over the parietal 
scalp, interactions were present during all six time intervals (all F’s > 5.4, p’s < .05, ηp2‘s 
> .20), with main effects of condition present for each 100 ms time interval between 300-
600 ms (F’s > 7.45, ps ≤ .01, ηp2s > .25).  Post-hoc contrasts confirmed that the task by 
condition interactions between 200-700 ms over the parietal scalp and between 400-500 
ms over the frontal scalp were the result of condition differences only within the animacy 
task (all F’s > 4.20, p’s ≤ .05, ηp2‘s > .16) and that only misses varied between tasks 
(misses were more negative over the frontal region of the scalp and more positive over 
the parietal scalp in the animacy task; all F’s > 4.30, p’s < .05, ηp2‘s > .16).  This means 
that the encoding task manipulation selectively affected ERPs to subsequently missed 
pictures.  The differences observed for subsequently missed pictures between tasks 
likely explains why no reliable effects were observed for ERPs in the line encoding task.  
Further consideration to this is given in the Discussion. 
Electrophysiological Results: Topographic Dissimilarity Analysis. 
Consistent with the results of the waveform analysis, the topographic dissimilarity 
analysis found topographic differences between hits and misses only in the animacy 
condition (see Figure 21).  Specifically, identified animacy hits differed topographically 
from unidentified animacy misses between 342-382 ms and 420-478 ms (Figure 21a).  
Unidentified animacy hits also differed from unidentified animacy misses between 236-
298 ms, 316-328 ms, and again between 452-460 ms (Figure 21c).  The topographic 
difference between 236-298 ms likely corresponds to the NCL, and coincides with ERP 
differences observed for the NCL during this interval. 
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Topographic differences between identified hits and unidentified hits were present 
between 248-280 ms, and again between 346-548 ms (Figure 21e).  The latter 
difference is consistent with the ERP differences observed between subsequent hit 
types for the animacy encoding condition between 400-600 ms.  Although the former 
topographic difference did not correspond to any difference observed in the ERP 
analysis, it did correspond to latency of the NCL.  In general, the topographic analyses do 
not strongly indicate that unique neural generators were active between conditions.  
Rather, the topographic results support the findings from the waveform analysis in that 
specific object related processes were engaged to different degrees in different 
conditions.  This point is elaborated on in the Discussion. 
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Figure 21.  Topographic Dissimilarity for Subsequent Memory 
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Figure 21.  Topographic dissimilarity analysis of ERPs recorded during the encoding phase of 
Experiment 2.  On the y-axis, 1 minus p-values greater than 0.95 indicate statistically reliable 
differences between the ERP scalp topographies of the conditions being compared.  Panels A, C, and 
E compare animacy task conditions, and Panels B, D, and F compare line task conditions.  Note that 
the empty plots in Panels A, C, and E indicate that there were no topographic differences. 
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Retrieval: Old/New Differences 
As in Experiment 1, separate Time (6) by Condition (2: hit, correct rejection) by 
Electrode (4) ANOVAs were conducted for each hit type and scalp region.  To compare 
the magnitude of the old/new effects reported below, hits were subjected to a series 
Region (3) by Condition (2) by Electrode (4) ANOVA performed separately for each of 
the six 100 ms intervals. 
Inclusion Instructions.  No differences between ERPs for correct rejections and 
recognized pictures (hits) encoded in the animacy task and retrieved under inclusion 
instructions were detected (Figure 22).  However, for recognized pictures encoded in the 
line task (Figure 22) and retrieved under inclusion instructions, reliable differences 
between ERPs for unidentified matching hits and correct rejections were present over 
the anterior frontal scalp region between 300-500 ms (F(1, 10) = 6.50, p < .05, ηp2 = .39) 
and over the frontal scalp region between 200-400 ms (F(1, 10) = 9.32, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.48).  In both cases, the mean voltage for matching hits was more negative than for 
correct rejections.  Parietal differences were not observed for matching or exemplar 
pictures.  In summary, no differences of interest were found during a test of memory for 
picture encoded during the animacy task and retrieved under inclusion conditions.  
When pictures encoded in the line task were retrieved under inclusion conditions, a 
reversed polarity FN400 was present. 
Exclusion Instructions.  Under exclusion instructions, ERPs for pictures 
encoded in the animacy task showed old/new differences over the frontal scalp region 
for matching pictures (F(1, 10) = 6.31, p < .05, ηp2 = .39) and exemplar pictures (F(1, 10) 
= 6.31, p < .05, ηp2 = .39) between 300-400 ms (see upper panels of Figure 23).  In both 
cases, the differences reflected more negative mean voltage for hits.  
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Figure 22. Old/New Recognition ERPs – Inclusion Instructions 
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Figure 22. Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs recorded under inclusion retrieval instructions at 
frontal (F1/F2) and parietal electrodes (P1/P2) in Experiment 2.  The upper four plots show ERPs for 
pictures encoded during the animacy task, and the lower four plots show ERPs for pictures encoded 
during the line task.  Time scaling ranges from -300 to 1000 ms.  The latency of the FN400 is shaded 
in dark-gray and the latency of the parietal old/new effect is shaded in light-gray.  Positive deflections 
are plotted upward.  See Appendix A for full electrode figure. 
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Figure 23. Old/New Recognition ERPs – Exclusion Instructions 
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Figure 23. Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs recorded under exclusion retrieval instructions at 
frontal (F1/F2) and parietal electrodes (P1/P2) in Experiment 2.  The upper four plots show ERPs for 
pictures encoded during the animacy task, and the lower four plots show ERPs for pictures encoded 
during the line task.  Time scaling ranges from -300 to 1000 ms.  The latency of the FN400 is shaded 
in dark-gray and the latency of the parietal old/new effect is shaded in light-gray.  Positive deflections 
are plotted upward.  See Appendix A for full electrode figure. 
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ERPs for pictures encoded in the line task showed old/new differences over the 
frontal scalp between 400-500 ms (F(1, 10) = 8.79, p < .05, ηp2 = .47) and 600-800 ms 
(F(1, 10) = 7.90, p < .05, ηp2 = .44) for matching pictures, and between 500-800 ms (F(1, 
10) = 8.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .45) for exemplar pictures (lower panels of Figure 23).  In all 
cases, hits were more positive than correct rejections, and therefore constituted an 
FN400.  The mean amplitude of the ERPs for matching and exemplar hits did not differ 
between 400-800 ms (Fs < 1.0), suggesting that the FN400 (between 400-500 ms) was 
equivalent for both types of test cues. 
Effects of Encoding Task and Retrieval Instruction on Old/New Differences 
In the previous set of analyses, old/new differences were observed under each of 
the two types of retrieval instructions and following each of the two encoding tasks.   
Specifically, old/new differences that were observed under inclusion retrieval instruction 
conditions were detected only for pictures encoded during the line task, whereas 
old/new differences that were observed under exclusion retrieval instructions were 
detected for pictures encoded in either the line or the animacy task.  The old/new effects 
were observed over the anterior frontal and frontal regions of the scalp, occurring 
between 200-800 ms.  With the old/new effects isolated, the following analyses sought 
to examine how the old/new effects differed as a function of the encoding and retrieval 
condition manipulations employed in Experiment 2.  In doing so, a series of Encoding 
Task (2: Animacy vs. Lines) by Condition (2: Hit vs. Correct Rejection) by Retrieval 
Instruction (2: Inclusion vs. Exclusion) by Electrode (4) ANOVAs were preformed 
separately on ERPs recorded over the anterior frontal and frontal scalp regions during 
each of the six 100 ms intervals. 
Anterior frontal scalp.  When including matching pictures as the hit type, the 2 x 
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2 x 2 x 4 ANOVAs revealed only a main effect of retrieval task over the anterior frontal 
scalp region between 300-400 ms (F(1, 20) = 6.45, MSE = 136.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .24).  
Pairwise comparisons showed that the main effect was the result of hits for pictures 
encoded during the line task being more positive under exclusion instructions than 
under inclusion conditions (F(1, 20) = 9.10, MSE = 8.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .31) and correct 
rejections following animacy encoding being more positive under exclusion instructions 
that under inclusion instructions (F(1, 20) = 8.73, MSE = 8.15, p < .05, ηp2 = .30).  No 
main effects or interactions were observed for exemplar pictures. 
Frontal scalp.  When including matching pictures as the hit type, the 2 x 2 x 2 x 
4 ANOVAs revealed encoding task by condition by retrieval instruction interactions over 
the frontal region of the scalp between 300-400 ms (see Figure 24; F(1, 20) = 5.66, MSE 
= 7.93, p < .05, ηp2 = .22), 400-500 ms (see Figure 25; F(1, 20) = 10.85, MSE = 8.96 p < 
.01, ηp2 = .35) and 700-800 ms (F(1, 20) = 7.01, MSE = 10.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .26).  For 
unidentified exemplar hits, a three-way interaction was only observed over the frontal 
region of the scalp between 400-500 ms (see Figure 25; F(1, 20) = 4.75, MSE = 7.34, p 
< .05, ηp2 = .19).  No main effects or lower-order interactions were present.   
For matching pictures, main effects of retrieval instruction accompanied the 
interactions present during the 300-400 ms and 400-500 ms intervals (Fs > 5.0, ps < 
.05), and a main effect of condition accompanied the interaction present during the 300-
400 ms interval (F(1, 20) = 5.70, MSE = 8.01 p < .05, ηp2 = .22).  For both the 300-400 
ms and 400-500 ms intervals, the main effects of retrieval instruction more negative-
going ERPs following inclusion instructions than following exclusion instructions (Figures 
25 and 26, respectively).  For the 300-400 ms interval, the main effect of condition 
reflected more negative-going ERPs for matching hits than correct rejections (Figure 
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24). 
Follow-up contrasts confirmed that, between 400-500 ms, old/new effects for the 
line encoding task were present only under exclusion instructions (F(1, 20) = 11.47, MSE 
= 9.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .36; Figure 25).  Conversely, between 300-400 ms, a marginally 
reliable condition by retrieval instruction interaction suggested that old/new effects 
following the line encoding task were present only under inclusion instructions (F(1, 20) 
= 3.87, MSE = 11.75, p = .06, ηp2 = .16; Figure 24).  A post-hoc test directly comparing 
these two old/new effects (i.e., as difference scores [old – new]) yielded a mean 
difference of 3.94 µV, reflecting the opposing directions of the old/new differences in 
question (as seen by comparing the 3rd and 4th bars in the left panel of Figure 24 with the 
5th and 6th bars in the right panel of Figure 25). This mean difference was statistically 
reliable (t(20) = 4.13, SE =.95, p < .001), suggesting that the ERP old/new effects 
following line encoding differed as a function of retrieval instructions.  The same series 
of contrasts performed for old/new differences following animacy encoding yielded no 
reliable interactions (Fs < 2.0).  Lastly, the three-way interaction present between 700-
800 ms was not accompanied by any main effects or reliable lower-order interactions. 
Effects of Study-Test Matching 
To assess the affect of study-test matching on ERPs for recognized pictures, a 
series of Encoding Task (2: Animacy vs. Lines) by Retrieval Cue Type (2: Match vs. 
Exemplar) by Retrieval Instruction (2: Inclusion vs. Exclusion) by Electrode (4) ANOVAs 
were preformed separately for the anterior frontal, frontal, and parietal scalp regions 
during each of the six 100 ms intervals.  No reliable effects of matching were found at 
any time interval over any scalp region. 
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Figure 24.  Mean Voltage (µV) over the Frontal Scalp between  
300-400 ms for Match Hits and Correct Rejections 
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Figure 24. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. *p < .05, +p ≤ .07. 
 
Figure 25.  Mean Voltage (µV) over the Frontal Scalp between  
400-500 ms for Match Hits and Correct Rejections 
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Figure 25. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. *p < .05, +p ≤ .07. 
 
Effects of Encoding and Retrieval Orientations on Hits and Correct Rejections 
 Hits. A Time Interval (6) by Encoding Task (2: Animacy vs. Lines) by Hit Type (2: 
Match vs. Exemplar) by Retrieval Instruction (2: Inclusion vs. Exclusion) by Electrode (4) 
ANOVA was performed.  Encoding task by retrieval instruction (F(1, 20) = 4.71, MSE = 
977.44, p < .05, ηp2 = .19) and encoding task by time interval (F(1, 20) = 4.39, MSE = 
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7.73, p < .01, ηp2 = .18) interactions were present and were accompanied by a retrieval 
instruction main effect (F(1, 20) = 5.53, MSE = 577.20, p < .05, ηp2 = .22).  The encoding 
task by retrieval instruction interaction reflected the fact that, for recognized pictures 
encoded during the line task, the mean voltage between 200-800 ms was more positive 
for hits achieved under exclusion instructions than under inclusion instructions (F(1, 20) 
= 10.58, MSE = 5.63, p < .01, ηp2 = .35).  The mean voltage between 200-800 ms for 
recognized pictures encoded during the animacy task did not differ as a function of 
retrieval condition (F < 2.0).  The effect of retrieval condition observed for pictures 
encoded in the line task suggests the possibility that pictures encoded under a 
perceptual orientation are recognized differently when retrieval orientation is also 
perceptual versus when retrieval orientation is conceptual.  The null effect of retrieval 
orientation for pictures encoded in the animacy task could be taken to suggest that 
conceptual encoding orientations lead to recognition that is agnostic with regard to 
retrieval orientation. 
 Correct rejections.  A Time Interval (6) by Encoding Task (2: Animacy vs. Lines) 
Retrieval Instruction (2: Inclusion vs. Exclusion) by Electrode (4) ANOVA revealed no 
main effects or interactions.  One simple effect of retrieval instruction was observed for 
pictures encoded in the animacy task, such that correct rejections in the inclusion 
condition were more negative going than correct rejections in the exclusion condition 
(F(1, 20) = 4.56, p < .05, ηp2 = .19). 
Topographic Dissimilarity Analyses.  The results of the topographic 
dissimilarity analyses are shown in Figure 26.  Between 200-800 ms, the topographies 
for animacy matching hits and correct rejections differed during four distinct intervals 
under inclusion instructions, 318-352 ms, 380-458 ms, 540-644 ms, and 668-800 ms 
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(Figure 26a, dark shading), and during two distinct intervals under exclusion 
instructions, 312-390 ms and 620-642 ms (Figure 26a, light shading).  The topographies 
for animacy exemplar hits and correct rejections differed during six distinct intervals 
under inclusion instructions, 200-240 ms, 288-330 ms, 482-500 ms, 620-656 ms, and 
782-800 ms (Figure 26b, dark shading), and during one interval under exclusion 
instructions, 598-622 ms (Figure 26b, light shading). 
 The topographies for line matching hits and correct rejections differed during four 
distinct intervals under inclusion instructions, 222-256 ms, 318-376 ms, 636-676 ms, 
and 784-800 ms (Figure 31c, dark shading), and during four intervals under exclusion 
instructions, 200-230 ms, 412-432 ms, 638-744 ms, and 778-800 ms (Figure 26c, light 
shading).  The topographies for line exemplar hits and correct rejections differed during 
four distinct intervals under inclusion instructions, 226-266 ms, 300-384 ms, 428-442 
ms, 470-482 ms (Figure 26d, dark shading), and during three intervals under exclusion 
instructions, 504-678 ms, 696-750 ms, and 764-796 ms (Figure 26d, light shading). 
The topographic dissimilarity analyses show that the old/new ERP differences 
observed between 300-400 ms over the parietal scalp were accompanied by 
topographic differences between hits and correct rejections for the matching and 
exemplar animacy pictures under exclusion instructions, and for old/new differences 
between 400-500 over the frontal scalp for both matching and exemplar animacy 
pictures under inclusion instructions and for matching line pictures under exclusion 
instructions.  In addition, topographic differences were also accompanied old/new ERP 
differences observed between 600-700 ms over the frontal scalp for matching and 
exemplar animacy pictures under exclusion instructions, and matching line pictures 
under inclusion instructions. 
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Figure 26. Topographic Dissimilarity Analyses for Retrieval ERPs 
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Figure 26.  Topographic dissimilarity analysis of ERPs recorded during the retrieval phase of 
Experiment 2.  On the y-axis, 1 minus p-values greater than 0.95 indicate statistically reliable 
differences between the ERP scalp topographies of the conditions being compared.  Panels A and B 
show topographic dissimilarity profiles for pictures encoded in the animacy task, and Panels C and D 
show topographic dissimilarity profiles for pictures encoded in the line task.  The color scheme for the 
shaded profiles is as follows: Light blue = exclusion/matching (A and C), dark blue = 
inclusion/matching (A and C), light green = exclusion/exemplar (B and D), dark green = 
inclusion/exemplar (B and D). 
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Discussion of Experiment 2 
To summarize the results of the electrophysiological data recorded during 
encoding, the differences between ERPs were primarily between identified hits and 
unidentified misses, although differences were present between unidentified hits and 
misses, and between hit types.  Moreover, the ERP differences were present only for 
the animacy encoding condition.  It is unlikely that the differences between hits and 
misses over the frontal scalp were predictive of later recognition (i.e., Dm effects).  This 
is in part because subsequent recognition effects typically emerge over the mid-frontal 
to mid-central scalp around 400 ms (e.g., Duarte et al., 2004; Otten & Rugg, 2001) with 
hits being more positive than misses.  The differences between hits and misses 
observed here occurred between 200-600 ms over both mid-frontal and bilateral-parietal 
scalp, with hits being more positive than misses over the frontal and central scalp, and 
with misses being more positive than hits over the parietal scalp.  It is more likely that 
the differences observed here reflect the NCL (200-300 ms) and the N350 (400-500), 
which reflect processes related to closure and identification (respectively) and are not 
predictive of subsequent recognition memory.  The NCL was present to the same degree 
for both identified and unidentified hits in the animacy condition, whereas the N350 was 
present to the same degree for both unidentified hits and misses.  Topographic 
differences were also observed between both identified and unidentified hits compared 
to misses during the latency of the NCL.  Likewise, topographic differences were also 
present between both unidentified his and misses compared to identified hits during the 
latency of the N350.  The topographic differences suggest qualitative, in addition to 
quantitative, differences in the neural activity for these components and their respective 
conditions. 
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For the animacy encoding condition, these results suggest that both identified 
and unidentified pictures that were subsequently recognized on the memory test 
achieved perceptual closure, and did so to the same degree, replicating the results of 
Experiment 1.  Also consistent with the results of Experiment 1, subsequently 
recognized unidentified pictures (hits) and subsequently forgotten pictures (misses) 
underwent a more extensive search of the structural description system (object model 
selection stage) compared to subsequently recognized identified pictures, as indexed by 
the N350.   
However, unlike in Experiment 1, the search of the structural description system 
appeared equally extensive for unidentified hits and misses.  It is possible that 
instructing participants to determine whether a briefly presented, masked picture depicts 
a living or a non-living object changes how they encode the image, possibly reducing 
the amount of perceptual detail that is extracted relative to when participants are merely 
asked to name the picture.  As a result, object model selection may be more difficult for 
unidentified pictures.  This would presumably lead to a less diagnostic information being 
stored in the memory trace, should lead to worse memory on a subsequent test.   
Indeed, a comparison of the behavioral indices of recognition memory between 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 bears out this prediction. The variables of retrieval 
instruction and test cue (matching, exemplar) in the animacy encoding condition of 
Experiment 2 and the variable of test cue (match, mirror reversed) in Experiment 1, 
mean old/new discrimination scores (M = 0.28, SD = 0.26, and M = 0.46, SD = 0.40, 
respectfully) were subjected to an independent-samples t-test.  The results showed that 
recognition memory was worse when participants assessed the animacy status of 
pictures in addition to attempting to identify them during encoding compared to when 
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they only attempted to identify the pictures (t(58) = 2.04, SE = .09, p < .05).  Incidentally, 
when recognition memory from Experiment 1 was compared to recognition memory 
following line encoding in Experiment 2 (M = 0.56, SD = 0.46), no reliable difference was 
observed (t(58) = 1.03, ns).  Thus, in considering the ERP encoding data and the 
behavioral retrieval data together, the suggestion is that animacy encoding in 
Experiment 2 resulted in less successful processing of unidentified pictures, such that 
despite subsequently recognized unidentified pictures undergoing perceptual closure, 
object model selection was less successful, which lead to poorer behavioral indices of 
recognition memory. 
The relationship between the ERP encoding data and the behavioral data 
corresponding to the unidentified pictures in line encoding task is less straightforward.  
Again, no reliable differences in the ERPs at encoding were observed, and yet the 
behavioral index of recognition memory exceeded that of recognition memory in the 
animacy condition of Experiment 2 as well as that of Experiment 1. As described 
previously, ERPs to subsequent misses were generally reduced in amplitude during the 
intervals corresponding to the object identification components of interest (NCL: 200-300 
ms, N350: 300-500 ms), while the ERPs to subsequent hits did not differ during the key 
intervals relative to the ERPs during the animacy task.  This effect of encoding task on 
misses exclusively could very well have obscured any effects of interest that were 
present.  For example, based on the results of Experiment 1 and the those found for the 
animacy task in the present experiment, the expected out come between 200-300 ms 
over the parietal scalp region would have been equivalent mean voltages for ERPs to 
identified and unidentified subsequent hits, and less negative ERPs to subsequent 
misses (i.e., an equivalent NCL for identified and unidentified subsequent hits).  Indeed, 
  130
subsequent hits did not differ from each other between 200-300 ms, consistent with the 
results of Experiment 1 and the animacy condition of the present experiment.  However, 
because subsequent misses also did not differ from the two hit types, it is not possible to 
statistically verify the presence of the NCL.  A similar issue exists with confirming the 
N350, as confirmation involves statistical differences between subsequent hits and 
unidentified subsequent misses. 
Subsequent memory have been shown to modulated encoding task (Otten & 
Rugg, 2001), and so the pattern of results reported here is not entirely unprecedented.  
However, in the case of Otten and Rugg (2001), both subsequent hits and subsequent 
misses differed between encoding tasks, with ERPs generally being more positive 
following animacy encoding relative to alphabetic encoding, primarily over the frontal 
region of the scalp.  The present data is partially consistent with their results in that task 
differences were characterized by more positive-going ERPs over the frontal region of 
the scalp for animacy encoding.  However, the difference between tasks was restricted 
to subsequent misses in the present study.  There is no immediately obvious 
explanation for this finding.  One possibility is that the line encoding task resulted in 
participants processing subsequently missed pictures differently than was the case in 
the animacy task.  Perhaps as a result of participants orientation towards the perceptual 
aspects of the pictures, subsequently missed pictures were processed more similarly to 
subsequently recognized pictures than was the case in the animacy encoding condition, 
and therefore no ERP differences were present during encoding.  If this were the case, 
then the improved memory following line encoding, as seen in the behavioral measure 
of memory, could have resulting from processing differences that were not observable 
with ERP, or were too small to detect. 
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 Turning to the ERPs recording during retrieval, the main results were as follows.  
First, an FN400 (new more negative than old) was present over the frontal region of the 
scalp for matching pictures encoded in the line task and retrieved under exclusion 
instructions (perceptual/perceptual).  Reversed old/new effects (old more negative than 
new) were present over the frontal region of the scalp during the latency of the FN400 
(300-500 ms) for pictures encoded in the line and retrieved under inclusion conditions 
(perceptual/conceptual) and pictures encoded in the animacy task and retrieved under 
exclusion conditions (conceptual/perceptual).  No reliable old/new effects were observed 
for pictures encoded in the animacy task and retrieved under inclusion instructions 
(conceptual/conceptual).  An ANOVA contrasting the three statistically reliable old/new 
effects as differences scores (old – new) was significant (F(2, 9) = 5.91, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.56).  Follow-up tests showed that while the two reversed old/new effects were 
statistically equivalent in magnitude (F(1, 10) = 1.60, ns), both the reversed old/new 
effect observed between 300-400 ms for unidentified pictures encoded in the animacy 
task and retrieved under exclusion instructions (F(1, 10) = 12.59, p < .01, ηp2 = .56) and 
the reversed old/new effect for unidentified pictures encoded in the line task and 
retrieved under inclusion instructions (F(1, 10) = 11.20, p < .01, ηp2 = .53) differed from 
the FN400 observed between 400-500 ms for unidentified pictures encoded in the line 
task and retrieved under exclusion instructions. 
 Separate analyses of hits and correct rejections between 200-800 ms revealed 
that hits following the line task were more negative-going under inclusion instructions 
than under exclusion instructions, whereas hits following animacy encoding did not differ 
as a function of retrieval task.  Conversely, correct rejections remained relatively 
consistent as a function of encoding and retrieval task, with the exception that correct 
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rejections in the animacy task were more negative under inclusion instructions than 
under exclusion instructions.   
With respect to the animacy task, the greater negativity for correct rejections 
under inclusion instructions explains why (reversed) old/new effects were not observed 
for these trials and were for correct rejection trials under exclusion conditions.  Note that 
hits following animacy encoding were not found to differ as a function of retrieval 
instructions, suggesting that the neural response to recognized pictures were similar 
across retrieval instructions.  The fact that the neural response to non-studied pictures 
differed suggests that the lack absence of old/new effects for animacy inclusion trials 
does reflect a difference in memory processes, per se, but reflects instead a difference 
in how novel stimuli are processed as a result of the retrieval instructions. 
Although correct rejections following line encoding did not differ as a function of 
retrieval instruction, hits did.  This pattern, which is in some sense the opposite of what 
was seen following animacy encoding, may help to explain why an FN400  was present 
for pictures encoded in the line task and retrieved under exclusion instructions, and why 
reversed old/new effects were present under inclusion instructions.  The fact the 
difference resided with hits and not correct rejections following line encoding suggests 
that the underlying processing difference is in fact memorial.  That is, the way 
recognized pictures were processed following line encoding differed as a function of 
retrieval instruction, whereas novel pictures did not.  Given that the difference is 
memorial, it is important to consider the ERP data from encoding (whereas it would not 
be important to do so if the differences were between correct rejections because correct 
rejections were not previously encoded).  However, as described above, the 
interpretation of the ERPs from the line encoding condition are less than straightforward 
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given the fact that no differences were observed between conditions.  Given these 
difficulties, further discussion of the ERP retrieval data is withheld until the General 
Discussion (which provides a broader context within which to interpret the data).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  134
CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary 
 Using behavioral and electrophysiological measures, the research presented in 
this dissertation examined the contribution of perceptual and conceptual processes to 
familiarity-based recognition memory for pictures.  The primary goal was to further clarify 
type of pictorial representations that support familiarity-based picture recognition.  To 
examine familiarity-based picture recognition, pictures were masked and presented 
briefly to participants.  On the basis of prior research (Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; Langley 
& Cleary, 2008), it was assumed that impoverished encoding would minimize the 
amount of recollection that would contribute to picture memory, and that pictures that 
could not be identified by name would be subsequently recognized on the basis of 
familiarity (Langley & Cleary, 2008).  
To assess the type of pictorial representations likely to result from the 
impoverished encoding of pictures, ERPs were recorded as participants attempted to 
identify the briefly presented masked pictures.  The ERPs were then examined for the 
components that prior studies have linked to specific stages of object identification (i.e., 
the NCL and N350).  The results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed an NCL for 
subsequently recognized unidentified pictures that was equivalent in magnitude to that 
of subsequently recognized identified pictures.  In addition, ERPs during the latency of 
the N350 differed between subsequently recognized identified and unidentified pictures.  
These results indicated that unidentified, masked pictures likely underwent successful 
“perceptual closure” (Bartlett, 1916) and a more effortful (and probably unsuccessful) 
object model selection  process, resulting in the creation of a pictorial representation 
composed (at the very least) of a coherent global object structure that lacked the 
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sufficient perceptual detail necessary for it to be fully matched to stored object 
representations and consciously identified by name.   
It is possible that the memory trace for the unidentified pictures contained coarse 
semantic information as well.  If such semantic information were to reside in the pictorial 
memory trace, it would have likely been integrated during the object model selection 
process, as candidate object models and their corresponding conceptual attributes were 
activated and matched to the visual information extracted during the picture’s 
presentation (Davies et al., 2004). 
Familiarity-based recognition memory was assessed on the basis of a behavioral 
index of recognition of the unidentified pictures (da), and on the basis of the putative 
neural correlate of familiarity, the FN400, for recognized unidentified pictures.  The 
behavioral and the electrophysiological indices of familiarity both implied greater 
familiarity-based recognition under conditions with the strongest orienting toward 
perceptual processing, suggesting a dominate role of perceptual information as 
evidence for familiarity-based memory judgments.  However, above chance recognition 
was observed behaviorally under conditions that oriented participants toward conceptual 
processing at both encoding and retrieval (Experiment 2).  In addition, (reversed) 
old/new effects were also observed under the conditions with the strongest orienting 
toward conceptual processing.  These effects suggest that the familiarity-based RWPI 
observed in Experiments 1 and 2 did not rely solely on concrete perceptual 
representations that required an exact perceptual match between encoding and retrieval 
presentations.  Rather, the data suggest that both perceptual and conceptual processing 
of pictures can support familiarity-based picture recognition.  What is more, the data also 
suggest that the memory traces generated during encoding for the unidentified pictures 
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contain perceptual representations that are somewhat abstract in nature and are 
accompanied by limited conceptual knowledge that falls below the threshold necessary 
for conscious naming of the picture. 
The Object Recognition and Visual Recognition 
Memory Interface: An Emerging Field 
 Over the past 20 years, researchers in the cognitive sciences have lain witness 
to the gradual convergence of two literatures material to this dissertation: the object 
identification literature and the recognition memory literature.  The syncretization of 
these disciplines has emerged in the midst of a larger trend concerning the synthesis of 
the vision and memory literatures, which until the 1990s remained considerably 
disparate (see Buckley & Gaffan, 2006).  Presently, there is considerable interest 
among cognitive scientists in understanding how visual knowledge is represented, and 
how such representations contribute to long-term memory.  This fact was acknowledged 
during the 50th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society in November of 2009, where 
the first symposium on the topic was held (entitled, Visual Knowledge: Emergence of a 
New Discipline that Synthesizes Vision and Memory Theory).  
 Much of the research devoted to clarifying the relationship between visual 
perception processes and memory processes has focused on identifying shared brain 
structures.  For example, lesion studies in animals conducted during the late 1970’s and 
1980’s revealed a role of the hippocampus (e.g., Mishkin, 1978; Murray & Mishkin, 
1984) and parahippocampal region (e.g., Murray & Mishkin, 1986; Zola-Morgan, Squire, 
Amaral, & Suzuki, 1989) in visual recognition memory for objects.  Later research 
conducted during the 1990’s and 2000’s implicated these structures in object 
identification and visual perception (Buckley & Gaffan, 1997, 1998; Buckley et al., 2001; 
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Bussey et al., 2001, 2002, 2006; Devlin & Price, 2007; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Suzuki, 
Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1993; Tyler et al., 2004).  Relative to its role in 
recognition memory, the role of the hippocampus in visual perception is currently 
unclear (Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010).  However, there are many empirical reports 
that provide evidence for the idea that the neuroanatomical apex of visual and 
recognition memory processes is the perirhinal cortex and surrounding cortical areas 
(e.g., entorhinal cortex; Buckley & Gaffan, 2006; Cohen, Poldrack, & Echenbaum, 1997; 
Tyler et al., 2004).  Indeed, numerous studies have linked the origins familiarity-based 
visual recognition to the perirhinal cortex (Bussey & Winters, 2005; Murray & Bussey, 
1999), and the extant perirhinal cortex models provide a rich context within which to 
consider the data reported in this dissertation.  In what follows, I discuss models of the 
perirhinal cortex and the type of representations that this structure houses.  The role the 
perirhinal cortex plays in object encoding and retrieval is discussed, and the data from 
Experiments 1 and 2 are considered within this context.  
The Perirhinal Cortex 
 Before describing the type of representations housed in the perirhinal cortex, it is 
important to first consider the type of information that the perirhinal cortex receives, and 
where this information is received from.  I first consider the role of the perirhinal cortex in 
visual cognition, and then its known role in mnemonic processes. 
 Inputs and representations.  In primates, the perirhinal cortex is physically 
located within the inferior medial temporal lobe, adjacent to the hippocampus, and 
parahippocampal and entorhinal cortices.  The perirhinal cortex is also located at the tail 
end of the visual ventral stream construct (Desimone and Ungerleider, 1989), which is 
comprised of brain regions that are critical for processing various aspects of object 
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identity.  Structures within the ventral stream, including the perirhinal cortex, are though 
to house visual object features in a storage network dubbed the “perceptual 
representation system” (PRS; Tulving and Schacter, 1990).  The PRS is known to 
contribute to perceptual learning and various memory functions (Cooper, Schacter, 
Ballesteros, & Moore, 1994).    
 As reviewed by Brown and Eldridge (2007), the perirhinal cortex receives a large 
proportion of its visual input from the von Bonin and Bailey (1947) ventral temporal 
areas TE (also see Saleem & Takana, 1996) and TEO, which together comprise the 
inferior temporal (IT) cortex.  Areas TE and TEO receive input primarily from the visual 
cortex, thereby making their contributions to the perirhinal cortex almost exclusively 
visual. 
 It is well established that both TEO and TE represents object features that are 
important to object identification (such as shape, color, and texture; see Tanaka, 2004), 
while only coarsely coding for features less important to object identification, such as an 
object’s exact position (Lueschow et al., 1994; Gross & Mishkin, 1977), size (Lueschow 
et al.; Sary & Vogels, 1993), and luminance.  In other words, these areas (particularly 
area TE) do not code for object attributes that are view-specific or immaterial to object 
identity (Tanaka, 2004), and therefore may only provide view-independent visual object 
information to the perirhinal cortex. 
 Area TE has also been characterized as representing the history and meaning of 
complex object features in a behavioral context (Ungerleider & Pasternak, 2004), a 
characterization supported by the observation that a greater proportion of TE neurons 
respond to familiar objects than to unfamiliar objects (Kobatake, Wang, & Takana, 
1998).  Thus, TE provides the perirhinal cortex not only with information regarding the 
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view-invariant visual properties of objects, but also with some information relevant to an 
object’s prior occurrence (or its novelty).   
 Many models of ventral visual pathway structures posit that it represents visual 
information in a hierarchical fashion (Ungerleider & Pasternak, 2004), with the most 
primitive object features represented in caudal regions of the ventral pathway (closest to 
V1) and with the most complex features and feature configurations represented in 
rostral regions of the ventral pathway (closest to the perirhinal cortex); areas TE and 
TEO are on the more complex end of the hierarchy.  Thus, a prominently held view of 
the perirhinal cortex is that it represents information about how features within an 
individual object relate to each other, as opposed to representations of individual 
features or representations of entire objects.  Much of the data supporting this view has 
come from Bussey and colleagues (Bussey et al., 2001, 2002, 2006; Bussey & Saksida, 
2002, 2005, 2007), who have shown that lesions to the perirhinal cortices of rats and 
macaques result in a number of impairments in recognizing and discriminating between 
objects, including the retention of learned visual discriminations, learning the 
configuration of individual novel objects, and the ability to learn new visual 
discriminations between objects. 
The perirhinal cortex additionally receives input of other modalities, including 
auditory (superior temporal gyrus) and somatosensory (insular cortex), which suggests 
that perirhinal representations may be polymodal as opposed to entirely visual. Other 
prominent polymodal input contributors include association areas, such as the 
parahippocampal and entorhinal cortices, the prefrontal and cingulated cortices, and the 
superior temporal sulcus (Brown & Eldridge, 2007).  The fact that the perirhinal cortex 
has connections to these brain regions further suggest that its representations not 
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entirely visual.  Thus, it would appear that the role of the perirhinal cortex in visual object 
identification (visual processing more generally) is to integrate object features from 
various sensory domains into polymodal conjunctions. 
 As mentioned, the perirhinal cortex is just one of many structures comprising the 
MTL.  Traditionally, the MTL was viewed as a brain module largely tasked with 
controlling declarative memory processes (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991).  Thus, given 
the perirhinal cortex’s location within the MTL, it has long been implicated in memory 
processes (e.g., Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Brown & Xiang, 1998; Zola-Morgan, Squire, 
and Amaral, 1989).  Direct evidence for role of the perirhinal cortex in long-term explicit 
memory has been reported many times over (e.g., Montaldi et al., 2006).  The most 
compelling of these reports are those that show strong linear relationships between 
perceived familiarity strength and perirhinal cortex activity, with no concurrent correlation 
between perceived familiarity strength and hippocampal activity (e.g., Montaldi et al., 
2006).  While the role of the hippocampus in explicit memory is indisputable, recent 
research converges on the notion that the hippocampus may be more directly involved 
relational/associative memory (or recollection; e.g., Davachi & Wagner, 2002) or in 
binding item and context information (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; 
Eichenbaum, 2007).  According to such theories (e.g., Diana et al.), encoding context 
and spatial information is stored by the parahippocamus and item information is stored 
by the perirhinal cortex.  It bares emphasis that the perirhinal cortex has reciprocal 
connects with the parahippocampus, but has no direct or reciprocal connections to the 
hippocampus proper.  However, it likely receives indirect hippocampal input through 
both the entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices, which both maintain reciprocal 
connections with the hippocampus (Brown & Eldridge, 2007).  It follows that the 
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perirhinal cortex may therefore receive input indirectly regarding object attributes 
represented by adjacent structures, such as spatial features and encoding context 
(Graham et al., 2010).  Thus, it would seem improbable for the perirhinal cortex to solely 
represent feature conjunctions. 
 Perirhinal contributions to familiarity.  As just described, the perirhinal cortex 
sits at the interface of two systems, one visual (the ventral visual stream; Desimone and 
Ungerleider, 1989) and one mnemonic (MTL memory system; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 
1991).  Thus, the assumption that the perirhinal cortex is critical to visual memory is 
appealing on both a logical and an intuitive basis.  This assumption is supported by 
many of aforementioned studies that show the direct contribution of the perirhinal cortex 
to perception and memory processes.  Moreover, the assumption that the perirhinal 
cortex plays a major role in visual memory has served as a foundation for many models 
of perirhinal cortex functioning, most of which generally agree on the nature of the 
representations that it stores (i.e., complex feature conjunction;).  The questions most 
relevant to this dissertation concerns how these models explain object encoding and 
retrieval processes within the perirhinal cortex and the extent to which these 
explanations can account for the data from Experiments 1 and 2.  In what follows, I 
describe a recent model of familiarity processes in the perirhinal cortex proposed by 
Volodya et al. (2008).  The discussion then returns to the data from Experiments 1 and 
2, which are considered with perirhinal cortex model so as to provide a richer context in 
which to interpret the data. 
 A central premise of Volodya et al.’s (2008) model is that familiarity is a first step 
toward retrieving context-dependent memory.  Using the terminology introduced by 
Mandler (1980; see Chapter 2), Volodya et al. equate item recognition with familiarity-
  142
based memory and identification with context-dependent memory.  This articulation of 
the processes that contribute to recognition memory (familiarity and recollection, 
respectively) is well suited on conceptual grounds for interpreting the data reported in 
this dissertation.  That is, in using Mandler’s terminology, familiarity-based memory is by 
definition ‘recognition’ without ‘identification’.  Given that the type of memory of interest 
is that of recognized pictures that were not identified (assumed to be familiarity-based), 
the mapping between the model and the data is straight forward. 
Volodya et al.’s (2008) account of familiarity processes in the perirhinal cortex 
begins by emphasizing that the phenomenological experience of familiarity implies only 
that one can distinguish between novel and previously encountered stimuli.  That is, 
feelings of familiarity do not include reference to context, nor does it specify the type of 
information (i.e., evidence) on which the feeling of familiarity is based.  According to 
Volodya et al.’s model, this undifferentiated familiarity in the perirhinal cortex is initially 
signaled as a decrease in response to previously encountered visual stimuli, whereas 
novel stimuli elicit an increase in neural activity.  Volodya et al. suggest that the neural 
responses in the perirhinal cortex to familiar and novel stimuli are mediated in a top-
down manner by particular regions of the prefrontal cortex (i.e., anterior cingulated, 
orbitofrontal cortex, and ventromedial cortex).  Support for this notion has come from 
past research that has demonstrated marked impairments to recognition memory when 
the perirhinal cortex is disconnected from the prefrontal cortex through lesion (Parker & 
Gaffan, 1998), and studies showing an increase in activity to familiar, as opposed to 
novel stimuli in the prefrontal cortex (see Xiang & Brown, 2004).  As such, it is the 
activity in the prefrontal cortex that produces the observable familiarity signal in the 
Volodya et al. model, not the perirhinal cortex.   
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Xiang and Brown (2004) have suggested that the functional significance of the 
prefrontal activity is one of a retrieval mechanism that conveys information about familiar 
stimuli.  Volodya et al.’s model is consistent with this interpretation, but they argue for a 
more specific role of the prefrontal cortex.  Namely, they argue that the prefrontal activity 
reflects “readout” (recovery and interpretation of perirhinal cortex representations), 
which is based on a global-matching-like process (Clark and Grounlund, 1996; see 
Chapter 2) that non-selectively samples the entire excitatory network.  In other words, 
the increase in prefrontal activity is thought to reflect the “match” between what is seen 
and the representations stored in memory.  Volodya et al. argue further that the 
matching process accumulates evidence about the significance of a particular stimulus, 
which in turn, through feedback to the perirhinal cortex, facilitates the potentiation of 
those synapses that are selective for the stimulus in question.  Given sufficient 
potentiation of a group of neurons that together represent an object, the strengthened 
synapses will come to constitute a recallable memory. 
 To review, many studies suggest that the perirhinal cortex contributes to both the 
encoding/identification of objects (Bartko et al., 2007; Buckley & Gaffan, 2006; Bussey & 
Winters, 2005; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Meunier, Bachevalier, Mishkin, & Murray, 1993; 
Murray et al., 2007; Preston et al., 2010; Staresina & Davachi, 2008; Winters et al., 
2008) and the retrieval of object representations from long-term memory (Barense, 
Gaffan, & Graham, 2007; Bussey & Saksida, 2002, 2005, 2007; Bogacz, Brown, & 
Giraud-Carrier, 2001; Cohen, Poldrack, & Eichenbaum, 1997; Cohen et al., 1999; 
Davies et al., 2004; Graham et al., 2010; Meunier, Bachevalier, Mishkin, & Murray, 
1993; Rolls et al., 2005; Ryan et al., 2000; Volodya et al., 2008; Xiang & Brown, 2004).  
Of particular relevance to this dissertation are the several studies that have explicitly 
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shown that activity in the perirhinal cortex during encoding is predictive of subsequent 
familiarity-based recognition (as opposed to recollection-based recognition), and in most 
cases its contribution has been observed with no accompanying contribution from the 
hippocampus (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Dougal, Phelps, & Davachi, 2007; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Preston et al., 2010). In light of the aforementioned 
research, it seems clear that what is known about the representations of stored in the 
perirhinal cortex should greatly inform the question central to this dissertation: What 
types of information can serve as evidence for familiarity-based recognition? 
Can Perirhinal Functioning Explain the Data? 
 The extant literature on the subject is fairly consistent in its suggestion that the 
perirhinal cortex represents the conjunctions of object features (Barense et al., 2007; 
Bussey & Saksida, 2002, 2005, 2007; Bussey et al., 2006; Cowell et al., 2006; Danckert, 
Gati, Menon, & Köhler, 2007), and in all likelihood it also less prominently represents 
some non-visual information (Brown & Eldridge, 2007; Davies et al., 2004; Lee, Levi, 
Davies, Hodges, & Graham, 2007).  Given what is known about the perirhinal cortex’s 
role in both encoding and retrieval related aspects of familiarity, a number of predictions 
can be made about how familiarity-based object memory should behave in response to 
manipulations of the perceptual processing of pictures and objects, assuming familiarity 
were to rely largely on this medial temporal structure.  Moreover, should the data from 
Experiments 1 and 2 align with some of these predictions, it could provide additional 
(albeit indirect) evidence concerning the type of evidence supporting recognition of 
unidentified pictures. 
The behavioral data.  To my knowledge, there are some predictions of the 
perirhinal cortex model (generally speaking) that are implied by the existing literature, 
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but that have yet to be formally tested.  For example, Tyler et al. (2004) showed that the 
level of activation within the perirhinal cortex varied with the degree of detail that 
participants had to extract from an object during encoding.  In an fMRI study, Tyler et al. 
had participants perceptually identify pictures of objects and animals either on a “domain 
level” (living or manmade) or on a “basic level” (name the picture, e.g., horse or phone).  
The fairly simple prediction was the perirhinal cortex activation would be greatest when 
participants performed “basic level” identification, because it required participants to 
make a finer-grained differentiation between objects (e.g., pen vs. pencil), as opposed to 
the less precise decision inherent to a “domain level” identification (e.g., bottle vs. 
puppy).  As predicted, the results showed greater perirhinal activation during the “basic 
level” identification.  This suggests that task demands at study can modulate the 
contribution of the perirhinal cortex to picture encoding, such that more complex 
analyses (or more perceptually demanding tasks) lead to greater perirhinal activity.  This 
finding is consistent with some models of the perirhinal cortex, which assume that the 
perirhinal cortex is most likely to be engaged when a task is difficult, or when the 
features of the stimulus generate uncertainty (or ambiguity) with respect to the decision 
that must be made (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002, 2005, 2007; Bussey et al., 2006; 
Cowell et al., 2006). 
 Although Tyler at al. (2004) did not report recognition memory accuracy for the 
identified pictures, perirhinal cortex models would predict greater memory for pictures 
identified at the “basic level” (due to the greater role of the perirhinal cortex), assuming 
that picture recognition memory were to be familiarity-based. 
 An alternative explanation for the hypothetical outcome of Tyler et al.’s study 
could be that memory performance should be better merely because making a “basic 
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level” identification (determining the name of an object) requires more complete 
processing of the stimulus, or requires more attentional resources than would a “domain 
level” identification.  In other words, the stimulus would be processed on a “deeper” level 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  
The data from Experiment 2 can distinguish between these two accounts—a 
perirhinal cortex explanation versus a size congruency explanation.   Recall that 
participants in Experiment 2 encoded pictures under two conditions: The animacy task 
(living or non-living) and the line task (are there more horizontal or vertical lines?).  For 
unidentified pictures, which were recognized on the basis of familiarity, perirhinal cortex 
models would predict better recognition of the pictures encoding during the line task.  
This is the case because the line task required participants to scrutinize each picture to 
determine whether it contained more horizontal lines or more vertical lines (not the case 
for the animacy task).  Therefore, the task is more perceptually demanding and requires 
a more considered decision.  Note that more traditional accounts of recognition memory, 
for instance, the size congruency framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), would predict the 
opposite pattern.  That is, judging the animacy of an image would be considered a  
“deeper” (more semantic or conceptual) mode of processing as compared to judging the 
surficial features or structural properties  of the picture (line task).  As was reported in 
Figure 18, the data of Experiment 2 support the prediction of the perirhinal cortex 
model—recognition of unidentified pictures was superior for pictures encoded in the line 
task compared to pictures encoded in the animacy task. 
 The opposite pattern was true for identified pictures (Figure 18).  That is, 
recognition memory was superior for identified pictures encoded during the animacy 
task, and worse for identified pictures encoded during the line task.  It is assumed that 
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picture identified by name during encoding have a high potential for being recognized on 
the basis of both recollection and familiarity.  While not critical for familiarity, the 
hippocampus, the fornix, and other neighboring structures are important for the 
encoding and recollection of experimental stimuli, as these structures are implicated in 
binding episodic details to the pictorial memory trace (e.g., spatial and temporal context, 
stimulus identity; Graham et al., 2010). If true, the role of the perirhinal cortex would be 
diminished according to Voloyda et al.’s (2008) model because familiarity-based 
memory is only an initial step towards “identification” (i.e., recollection).  When 
identification is achieved, context-dependent memory dominates, which does not rely on 
the perirhinal cortex or its conjunctive feature and its representations. 
 The behavioral data from Experiment 1 are also consistent with predictions of the 
perirhinal cortex in this regard.  Specifically, the nature of the representations stored by 
the perirhinal cortex dictate that certain object features could be changed between study 
and test presentations without resulting in impairments to object recognition memory.  
As described earlier in this discussion, such properties include left-right orientation, size, 
luminance, and other features that are not critical to object identification.  In contrast, 
recognition memory that relies on episodic representations would likely be impaired by 
such changes, as the episodic representation system codes for highly specific visual 
details (e.g., orientation, size, spatial position).  Recall that in Experiment 1 there was no 
difference in memory for mirror reversed pictures that were unidentified at encoding 
(Figure 11).  In contrast, memory for identified pictures was reliable poorer for mirror 
reversed pictures compared to matching identified pictures. 
 While far from definitive, the behavioral indices of recognition memory for 
unidentified pictures do agree with the predictions that could be made on the basis of 
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perirhinal cortex models of familiarity.  Moreover, the behavioral data for unidentified 
pictures are inconsistent with predictions that could be made on the basis of episodic 
accounts of familiarity.  Conversely, for Experiment 2, when encoding task was 
manipulated, the pattern of later recognition of unidentified pictures was consistent with 
perirhinal cortex model predictions, and inconsistent with episodic representation 
predictions. 
 Electrophysiological data.  Interpreting the electrophysiological data within a 
perirhinal cortex model is not straight forward.  However, there are a few 
correspondences that are worth noting with regard to the retrieval data.  For example, 
according to Volodya et al.’s model the directly observable familiarity signal emerges not 
from the perirhinal cortex (which is likely too deep to record signals for at the scalp), but 
instead from the prefrontal cortex.  The putative neural correlate of familiarity (FN400) 
has been observed over fronto-polar scalp regions on several occasions (e.g., Ecker & 
Zimmer, 2007; Groh-Bordin et al., 2005) as well as over the frontal scalp region, both of 
which area fairly near familiarity-related prefrontal areas.  Another consistency concerns 
the FN400 recorded over the frontal scalp for unidentified line picture under exclusion 
conditions.  The perirhinal cortex model would predict the strongest familiarity signal in 
the most perceptual orienting condition, which is what occurred in Experiment 2.  In this 
regard, the behavioral data (showing the greatest familiarity following perceptual 
encoding) are at the very least consistent with the ERP data recorded at retrieval in that 
the indices of familiarity are largest in conditions maintaining a perceptual orientation. 
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Conclusions 
In this dissertation it was shown that participants can recognize pictures at test 
that they did not identify during encoding, and that the recognition of such unidentified 
pictures is accompanied by the putative neural correlate of familiarity (Experiments 1 
and 2).  Moreover, it appears that familiarity-based picture recognition rely on non-
episodic representation. 
On the basis of the behavioral data and the electrophysiological data, it appears 
that participants can recognize unidentified masked pictures on the basis of perceptual 
and possibly conceptual information.  However, Experiment 2 showed that perceptual 
orientation at encoding (behavioral and electrophysiological data) and retrieval 
(electrophysiological data) increases familiarity-based picture recognition.  In general, 
the data suggest that familiarity (as observed within the context of Experiments 1 and 2) 
can show some degree of perceptual specificity, despite the fact that it likely it is 
supported by representations that are abstract.  While it was not the goal of this 
research to identify brain structures involved in the recognition of unidentified pictures, it 
does appear likely that this form of picture memory relies on conjunctive feature 
representations housed in the perirhinal cortex. 
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APPENDIX A. TOPOGRAPHICALLY ARRANGED  
GRAND AVERAGE ERP DATA – EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2 
 
Experiment 1: ERPs during Encoding 
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Experiment 1: ERPs during Retrieval 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Animacy Encoding 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Line Encoding 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Inclusion Retrieval Instructions (Following Animacy 
Task) 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Inclusion Retrieval Instructions (Following Line Task) 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Exclusion Retrieval Instructions (Following Animacy 
Task) 
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Experiment 2: ERPs during Exclusion Retrieval Instructions (Following Line Task) 
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APPENDIX B. RETRIEVAL INSTRUCTION FOR  
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CONDITIONS 
Inclusion Instructions 
 
Exclusion Instructions 
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APPENDIX C. MEMORY TEST RESPONSE  
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN DURING PRACTICE 
 
 
